

## Literatur zur Bernard Gerts moralischer Theorie

(Last Update: 26.06.07)

### Bibliography on Bernard Gert's moral theory

Jörg Schroth ([jschrot@gwdg.de](mailto:jschrot@gwdg.de))

<http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/bgert.pdf>

<http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~sophia/schroth/bgert.pdf>

- 2005 [1] Alexandra, Andrew/Miller, Seumas (2005): Common Morality and 'Institutionalizing' Ethics, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7, S. 24–33. – Dazu: Gert, Reply to Andrew Alexandra and Seumas Miller: Common Morality and 'Institutionalizing' Ethics, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7 (2005), S. 34–37.
- 2002 [2] Audi, Robert (2002): Reasons and Rationality in the Moral Philosophy of Bernard Gert, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 73–88. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2001 [3] Baier, Kurt (2001): Justified Morality, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, S. 427–33. – Dazu: Gert, Replies, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001), S. 463–81.
- 2002 [4] Baron, Marcia (2002): Character, Immorality, and Punishment, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 243–58. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 1995 [5] Birnbacher, Dieter (1995): *Tun und Unterlassen*, Stuttgart, S. 175–79.
- 2003 [6] Birnbacher, Dieter (2003): *Analytische Einführung in die Ethik*, Berlin, S. 82f., 399–404.
- 1983 [7] Bond, E. J. (1983): *Reason and Value*, Cambridge, S. 126–34.
- 2000 [8] Bond, E. J. (2000): Bernard Gert's Moral System, *Metaphilosophy* 31, S. 427–45.
- 2002 [9] Bond, E. J. (2002): Is the Lessening of Evil the Only Goal of Morality? A Role for *Eudaimonia* in Gert's Moral System, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 219–27. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2003 [10] Brand-Ballard, Jeffrey (2003): Consistency, Common Morality, and Reflective Equilibrium, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 13, S. 231–58.
- 2000 [11] Brock, Dan W. (2000): Review of Gert, Culver, Clouser, *Bioethics. A Return to Fundamentals*, *Ethics* 110, S. 614–17.

- 2001 [12] Brock, Dan W. (2001): Gert on the Limits of Morality's Requirements, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, S. 435–40. – Dazu: Gert, Replies, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001), S. 463–81.
- 2001 [13] Carson, Thomas L. (2001): Gert on Rationality, Intrinsic Value, and the Overridingness of Morality, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, S. 441–46. – Dazu: Gert, Replies, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001), S. 463–81.
- 1999 [14] Chambers, Tod (1999): *The Fiction of Bioethics. Cases as Literary Texts*, New York, London, S. 137–40.
- 2001 [15] Chang, Ruth (2001): Two Conceptions of Reasons for Action, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, S. 447–53. – Dazu: Gert, Replies, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001), S. 463–81.
- 2005 [16] Cocking, Dean (2005): Moral Arrogance and Moral Disagreement, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7, S. 48–54. – Dazu: Reply to Dean Cocking: Moral Arrogance and Moral Disagreement, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7 (2005), S. 55–59.
- 2001 [17] Copp, David (2001): Against Internalism About Reasons – Gert's Rational Options, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, S. 455–61. – Dazu: Gert, Replies, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001), S. 463–81.
- 2002 [18] Copp, David (2002): Gert on Reasons, Rationality, Harms, and Lists, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 89–108. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 1999 [19] Dancy, Jonathan (1999): Defending Particularism, *Metaphilosophy* 30, S. 25–32: S. 29–32 (“Response to Gert”). – Zu Bernard Gert (1999): Morally Relevant Features, *Metaphilosophy* 30, S. 13–24.
- 2002 [20] Deigh, John (2002): Moral Ideals, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 181–98. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 1994 [21] DeMarco, Joseph P. (1994): *A Coherence Theory in Ethics*, Amsterdam, Atlanta, S. 73–82 (“Gert's System”, “Gert's Rules”, “The Adequacy of Gert's Rules”, “Prima Facie Rules”, “Moral Ideals”).
- 1996 [22] DeMarco, Joseph P. (1996): *Moral Theory. A Contemporary Overview*, Boston, S. 123–26 (“Bernard Gert's System of Moral Rules”).
- 2002 [23] Driver, Julia (2002): Rules and Virtues, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 231–42. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.

- 2007 [24] Driver, Julia (2007): Humble Arrogance, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 365–69.<sup>1</sup> – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2007): Reply to Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 404–19.<sup>2</sup>
- 1993 [25] Hannaford, Robert V. (1993): *Moral Anatomy and Moral Reasoning*, Lawrence, S. 92–95 (“Gert and Advocacy”).
- 2005 [26] van der Hoven, Jeroen (2005): Applying our Common Morality: The Case of Privacy, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7, S. 38–43. – Dazu: Gert, Reply to Jeroen van der Hoven: Applying our Common Morality: The Case of Privacy, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7 (2005), S. 44–47.
- 2002 [27] Kagan, Shelly (2002): Gert on Aid to Others, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 127–43. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2002 [28] Kamm, F. M. (2002): A Note on Harms and Evils in Gert’s Moral Theory, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 215–18. Wiederabgedruckt als “Harms, Losses, and Evils in Gert’s Moral Theory” in F. M. Kamm, *Intricate Ethics. Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm*, Oxford 2007, S. 450–54.
- 2003 [29] Kellerwessel, Wulf (2003): *Normenbegründung in der Analytischen Ethik*, Würzburg, S. 357–79 („Rationalität und Normenbegründung: Bernard Gert“).
- 1999 [30] Kettner, Matthias (1999): Rationalität und Moral: Ein Gespräch mit Bernard Gert, *Information Philosophie* 27/ 4, S. 31–35.
- 2002 [31] Kettner, Matthias (2002): Gert’s Moral Theory and Discourse Ethics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 31–50. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2003 [32] Kettner, Matthias (2003): Die Konzeption der Bioethik von Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver

---

<sup>1</sup> “This essay defends consequentialist approaches to moral evaluation from a charge of moral arrogance made by Bernard Gert in “Moral Arrogance and Moral Theories.” A distinction is made between a commitment to there being a right answer to moral questions and certainty about the nature of the right answers.”

<sup>2</sup> “Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace challenge my account of moral arrogance, and Triplett and Wallace challenge its application to the problem of abortion. I try to show here that Driver’s attempt to defend consequentialism from my charge that it promotes moral arrogance is successful only if consequentialism explicitly gives up what has been considered one of its major virtues. I acknowledge that Triplett has uncovered some unclarity in my claim that the moral acceptability of abortion is an unresolvable moral issue. I also acknowledge that Wallace has uncovered some unclarity in my account of moral arrogance. After clarifying that account, I try to meet her challenge to defend my claim that it is not morally arrogant for a state to place some restrictions on abortions.”

und K. Danner Clouser, in *Bioethik. Eine Einführung*, hrsg. von Marcus Düwell und Klaus Steigleder, Frankfurt a. M., S. 88–104.

- 2002 [33] MacLean, Douglas (2002): Accentuate the Negative: Negative Values, Moral Theory, and Common Sense, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 199–213.
- 1985 [34] Nathanson, Stephen (1985): *The Ideal of Rationality*, Atlantic Highlands, N. J., S. 102–4, 115–23 (“Rational and Irrational Ends”).
- 2001 [35] Phillips, David (2001): Gert, Sidgwick, and Hybrid Theories of Rationality, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35, S. 439–48. – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2001): Replies to Three Critics, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35, S. 455–76.
- 2005 [36] Pogge, Thomas (2005): Timeless Wisdom or Moral Arrogance?, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7, S. 60–64. – Dazu: Gert, Reply to Thomas Pogge, Timeless Wisdom or Moral Arrogance?, *Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics* 7 (2005), S. 65–71.
- 1991 [37] Postow, B. C. (1991): Gert's Definition of Irrationality, *Ethics* 102, S. 103–9.
- 1991 [38] Price, W. Bruce (1991): Comment on Bernard Gert's Analysis of Rational Action, *Ethics* 102, S. 110–16.
- 1983 [39] Regan, Tom (1983): *The Case for Animal Rights*, Berkeley, S. 104–9.
- 2002 [40] Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (2002): On the Relevance of Ignorance to the Demands of Morality, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 51–70. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2002 [41] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2002): Gert contra Consequentialism, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 145–63. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2001 [42] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2001): Gert, Bernard, in *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, Second Edition, Vol. I, hrsg. von Lawrence C. Becker und Charlotte B. Becker, New York, S. 608–10.
- 2002 [43] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter/Audi, Robert (Hrsg.) (2002): *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, Lanham.
- 2002 [44] Smith, Michael (2002): Bernard Gert's Complex Hybrid Conception of Rationality, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 109–23. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2001 [45] Sterba, James P. (2001): Gert and the Defense of Morality, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35, S. 427–38. – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2001): Replies to Three Critics, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35,

- 2003 [46] Stratton-Lake, Philip (2003): Review of Gert, *Common Morality: Deciding What to Do*, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2005.06.03, <http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=2681>.
- 2006 [47] Strong, Carson (2006): Gert's Moral Theory and its Application to Bioethics Cases, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 16, S. 39–58.<sup>3</sup> – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2006): Making the Morally Relevant Features Explicit: A Response to Carson Strong, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 16, S. 59–71.<sup>4</sup>
- 2006 [48] Strong, Carson (2006): Continuing the Dialogue: A Reply to Bernard Gert, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 16, S. 189–94.<sup>5</sup> – Zu Bernard Gert (2006): Making the Morally Relevant Features Explicit: A Response to Carson Strong, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 16, S. 59–71. – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2006): A Reply to Carson Strong, *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 16, S. 195–97.<sup>6</sup>
- 2007 [49] Strong, Carson (2007): Gert's Theory of Common Morality, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 535–45. (Review Article on Gert's *Morality: Its Nature and Justification*, revised edition.)
- 2002 [50] Triplett, Timm (2002): Bernard Gert's Morality and its Application to Computer Ethics, *Ethics and Information Technology* 4, S.79–92.
- 2007 [51] Triplett, Timm (2007): Gert on Unresolvable Moral Debates, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 370–79.<sup>7</sup> – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2007): Reply to Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 404–19.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> “Bernard Gert's theory of morality has received much critical attention, but there has been relatively little commentary on its practical value for bioethics. An important test of an ethical theory is its ability to yield results that are helpful and plausible when applied to real cases. An examination of Gert's theory and his own attempts to apply it to bioethics cases reveals that there are serious difficulties with regard to its application. These problems are sufficiently severe to support the conclusion that Gert's theory is unacceptable as an approach for resolving bioethics cases, even relatively noncontroversial cases.”

<sup>4</sup> “Carson Strong criticizes the application of my moral theory to bioethics cases. Some of his criticisms are due to my failure to make explicit that both the irrationality or rationality of a decision and the irrationality or rationality of the ranking of evils are part of morally relevant feature 3. Other criticisms are the result of his not using the two-step procedure in a sufficiently rigorous way. His claim that I come up with a wrong answer depends upon his incorrectly regarding a weakly justified violation as one that all impartial rational persons would agree was permitted, rather than as one about which rational persons disagree.”

<sup>5</sup> “Continuing the dialogue begun in the March 2006 issue of the *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal*, I suggest that Bernard Gert's response to my paper does not adequately address the criticisms I make of his theory's application to bioethics cases.”

<sup>6</sup> “Carson Strong's reply to my response to his article demonstrates what happens when there is unacknowledged disagreement about the facts of a case or about the meaning of the terms used to describe those facts. I hope that our dialogue will help reduce this disagreement.”

<sup>7</sup> “Bernard Gert argues that, while the moral system contains a procedure for resolving most moral disagreements, it does not allow for such resolution in all cases. For example, it does not allow for the resolution of disputes about whether animals and human fetuses should be included within the scope of those to whom the moral rules apply. I agree with Gert that not all moral debates can be resolved, but I believe that Gert does not use all the argumentative resources available to philosophers to resolve them. I

- 2002 [52] Tugendhat, Ernst (2002): Justification in Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 17–29. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2007 [53] Wallace, Kathleen (2007): Moral Reform, Moral Disagreement, and Abortion, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 380–403.<sup>9</sup> – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2007): Reply to Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace, *Metaphilosophy* 38, S. 404–19.<sup>10</sup>
- 1979 [54] Wellman, Carl (1979): Gert's Contribution to Moral Philosophy, *Metaphilosophy* 10, S. 315–29.
- 2002 [55] Wolf, Susan (2002): The Role of Rules, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham, S. 165–78. – Dazu: Gert, Replies to My Critics, in *Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory*, hrsg. von Walter Sinnott-Armstrong und Robert Audi, Lanham 2002, S. 261–316.
- 2001 [56] Yarnall, Patrick H. (2001): The Intrinsic Goodness of Pain, Anguish, and the Loss of Pleasure, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35, S. 449–54. – Dazu: Bernard Gert (2001): Replies to Three Critics, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35, S. 455–76.

---

argue that considerations outside the moral system proper can be used to provide argumentative support favoring some positions over their rivals in moral controversies that Gert regards as intractable. I illustrate this with reference to the abortion debate. I also argue that reaching such conclusions about the superiority of one position over rivals need not result in moral arrogance.”

<sup>8</sup> “Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace challenge my account of moral arrogance, and Triplett and Wallace challenge its application to the problem of abortion. I try to show here that Driver's attempt to defend consequentialism from my charge that it promotes moral arrogance is successful only if consequentialism explicitly gives up what has been considered one of its major virtues. I acknowledge that Triplett has uncovered some unclarity in my claim that the moral acceptability of abortion is an unresolvable moral issue. I also acknowledge that Wallace has uncovered some unclarity in my account of moral arrogance. After clarifying that account, I try to meet her challenge to defend my claim that it is not morally arrogant for a state to place some restrictions on abortions.”

<sup>9</sup> “Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.”

<sup>10</sup> “Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace challenge my account of moral arrogance, and Triplett and Wallace challenge its application to the problem of abortion. I try to show here that Driver's attempt to defend consequentialism from my charge that it promotes moral arrogance is successful only if consequentialism explicitly gives up what has been considered one of its major virtues. I acknowledge that Triplett has uncovered some unclarity in my claim that the moral acceptability of abortion is an unresolvable moral issue. I also acknowledge that Wallace has uncovered some unclarity in my account of

---

moral arrogance. After clarifying that account, I try to meet her challenge to defend my claim that it is not morally arrogant for a state to place some restrictions on abortions.”