Literatur zu Kants Ethik
Bibliography on Kant's ethics

Alphabetische Ordnung / alphabetical order:
http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/bkant.pdf

Chronologische Ordnung / reverse chronological order:
http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/ckant.pdf


1 “We discuss Kant’s conception of moral rationalism from the viewpoint of recent debates, which have distinguished different forms of moral rationalism. We argue that Kant’s version, ‘silencing’, is different and stronger than currently held versions of moral rationalism and that it also differs from versions of silencing that contemporary thinkers advocate. We then discuss Kant’s version of silencing in the context of the moral demandingness debate and argue that silencing can make a perfect duty very demanding. However, it is important that whilst in cases of conflict between duty and personal happiness the normative standing of the latter is silenced, silencing does not require that agents do all they can in the case of imperfect duties. We finally indicate the kind of latitude imperfect duties allow for, according to Kant’s strong form of moral rationalism.”


2 “This paper analyzes Kant’s thesis in the Tugendlehre that there are certain ends (one’s own perfection and the happiness of others) that we are obligated to adopt. It contends that none of the three arguments which Kant advances in support of this thesis succeeds and that the attempted reconstruction by Nelson Potter likewise fails. It then maintains that the argument does work, if one brings in, as an implicit premise, transcendental freedom. Finally, it is argued that this late doctrine of obligatory ends marks a significant advance over the treatment of broad duties in the Grundlegung and can serve as a basis for defending Kant’s ethics against the familiar emptiness charge.”

3 “Guyer argues for four major theses. First, in his early, pre-critical discussions of morality, Kant advocated a version of rational egoism, in which freedom, understood naturalistically as a freedom from domination by both one’s own inclinations and from other people, rather than happiness, is the fundamental value. From this point of view, the function of the moral law is to prescribe rules best suited to the preservation and maximization of such freedom, just as on the traditional eudaimonistic account it is to prescribe rules for the maximization of happiness. Second, in the Groundwork, Kant abandoned this naturalistic approach and while retaining the same substantive thesis as his early moral philosophy, “namely that freedom is the value that is realized by adherence to the moral law” (Guyer 455), attempted to provide a non-naturalistic (transcendental) grounding for this valuation of freedom. Third, this took the form of a transcendental deduction, closely modeled on that of the first Critique, which was intended to demonstrate that we are in fact (noumenally) free and the moral law is the “causal law” of this freedom. Fourth, this deduction is a disaster, indeed, one of Western philosophy’s “most spectacular train wrecks” (Guyer 445). I shall discuss each in turn, devoting the bulk of my attention to the last.”
When examined critically, Kant’s views on sex and marriage give us the tools to defend same-sex marriage on moral grounds. The sexual objectification of one’s partner can only be overcome when two people take responsibility for one another’s overall well-being, and this commitment is enforced through legal coercion. Kant’s views on the unnaturalness of homosexuality do not stand up to scrutiny, and he cannot (as he often tries to) restrict the purpose of sex to procreation. Kant himself rules out marriage only when the partners cannot give themselves to one another equally – that is, if there is inequality of exchange. Because same-sex marriage would be between equals and would allow homosexuals to express their desire in a morally appropriate way, it ought to be legalized.”


physik der Sitten, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 64, S. 520–45.7


operativer Kommentar, hrsg. von Otfried Höffe, Frankfurt a. M., S. 45–65. Wiederab-


7 „Diese Arbeit widmet sich einem Hauptproblem der kantischen Pflichtensystematik in der Tugendlehre: Der Unterscheidung von vollkommnen und unvollkommnen Pflichten und der resultierenden Spannung zwi-
schen Einleitung und Elementarlehre. Während in der Einleitung in die Tugendlehre Tugendpflichten begrifflich nur als unvollkommne Pflichten eingeführt und abgeleitet werden, beginnt die Elementarlehre mit einem extensiven Abschnitt über vollkommene Pflichten, die dennoch Tugendpflichten sein sollen. Nach einer kurzen Betrachtung einschlägiger Vorschläge der Literatur zu diesem Problem, versucht die vorlie-
gende Arbeit aus dem Konzept der Weite von Pflichten Kriterien für die Zuordnung der verschiedenen Tugendpflichten zu gewinnen. Im Lichte dieser Kriterien erscheint Kants Beurteilung mancher verhandelter Pflichten als ‘vollkommen’ gerechtfertigt. Abschließend wird gezeigt, inwiefern sie dennoch zu den Tugendpflichten gehören können (und deshalb in der Elementarlehre ihren Platz haben), indem Kants eher beiläufige Unterscheidung von Strebens- und Erhaltungspflichten in den Mittelpunkt gerückt wird. Unvoll-
kommenheit einer Pflicht folgt nur aus ethischen Strebenspflichten, nicht aus gebotenen Maximen überhaupt. Das Ziel der Exposition aller relevanten Merkmale, die zu einer Tugendpflicht gehören können, lässt verstehen, warum die Einleitung nur auf Strebenspflichten zentriert ist.”

“This essay is concerned with one of the main problems in Kant’s system of duties in the Tugendlehre: the difference between perfect and imperfect duties and the resulting inconsistency between introduction and Elementarlehre. Even though the introduction establishes and derives duties of virtue as imperfect duties only, the Elementarlehre begins with a long section concerning perfect duties, which nevertheless are supposed to be duties of virtue. After a brief consideration of other interpreter’s views on this topic, this essay tries to develop criteria for the categorisation of the different duties of virtue from the concept of a duty’s latitude. In light of these criteria, Kant’s categorizing some of the discussed duties as perfect seems justifiable. Finally I will show, why they can nevertheless be ‘duties of virtue’, by emphasizing Kant’s distinction between duties to strive and those to conserve. Imperfection of a duty follows from duties to strive only, not from obligatory maxims per se. The goal of introducing all relevant characteristics, a duty of virtue may have, can explain, why the introduction is only concerned with duties to strive.”


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This book defends the thesis that Kant’s normative ethics and his practical ethics of sex and marriage can be valuable resources for people engaged in the contemporary debate over same-sex marriage. It does so by first developing a reading of Kant’s normative ethics that explains the way in which Kant’s notions of human moral imperfection unsocial sociability inform his ethical thinking. The book then offers a systematic treatment of Kant’s views of sex and marriage, arguing that Kant’s views are more defensible than some of his critics have made them out to be. Drawing on Kant’s account of marriage and his conception of moral friendship, the book argues that Kant’s ethics can be used to develop a defense of same-sex marriage.”


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10 “This article contends that the first section of Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* provides a sophisticated and valid argument, and that commentators are therefore mistaken in dismissing this section as flawed. In particular, the article undertakes to show that in this section Kant argues from a conception of the goodness of a good will to two distinctive features of moral goodness, and from these features to his ‘formula of universal law’. The article reveals the sophistication and validity of this argument by considering it in the light of a number of criticisms that are commonly levelled at the section. In conclusion, the article proposes that this interpretation of the section also has significant implications for the understanding of Kant’s method, his formulas and his basic conception of the ‘moral’.”


Barry, Peter Brian (2015): The Kantian Case Against Torture, Philosophy 90, S. 593–621.11


11 “There is a decided consensus that Kantian ethics yields an absolutist case against torture – that torture is morally wrong and absolutely so. I argue that while there is a Kantian case against torture, Kantian ethics does not clearly entail absolutism about torture. I consider several arguments for a Kantian absolutist position concerning torture and explain why none are sound. I close by clarifying just what the Kantian case against torture is. My contention is that while Kantian ethics does not support a variety of moral absolutism about torture, it does suggest a strong version of legal absolutism.”


Baumanns, Peter (1982): Kants kategorischer Imperativ und das Problem der inhaltlichen


12 “Kant’s most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). His principal aims in these works are to analyze the nature and ground of morality and to justify its supreme principle (the categorical imperative). Nevertheless, in these texts, Kant also paints a picture of what it means to have a good will or good character, and it is this account of the good will and the associated theory of moral motivation that have been the target of many of the historical and contemporary objections to Kant’s rationalism. From the perspective of these foundational works in Kant’s moral theory, it appears that all that is required for Kantian character is a firm commitment to do one’s duty from the motive of duty in the absence of inclination, or in the teeth of countervailing inclination. Kant’s defenders have rightly insisted that it would be hasty to draw any final conclusions about his considered views on character and moral psychology on the basis of the Groundwork and the second Critique. An adequate assessment of these kinds of charges against Kant, they have argued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his other important ethical texts, especially the Doctrine of Virtue (1797) and Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his theory of virtue, Kant presents a detailed account of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussions of the various virtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains that there are moral feelings that are part of a virtuous character and serviceable for morality. For these reasons, those interested in gleaning a more complete picture of Kant’s ethics await a detailed, systematic account of Kant’s views about virtue. This entry aims to sketch the outlines of such an account.”

13 “In this paper I develop a critique of Kantian ethics, and more precisely a critique of a particular conception of moral reasoning. The fundamental assumption that underlies the conception that I am targeting is that to justify (morally or otherwise) an action is (perhaps with an ‘all things being equal’ clause) to settle its value, in such a way that all rational participants would have to acknowledge that value. As an alternative to the Kantian conception, I propose a conception in which the basic unit of moral reasoning is not an action but rather what I call an ‘ethical position’ – where an ethical position is where, at any given moment and with respect to the matter at hand, you stand, and where moral reasoning consists in the articulation of ethical positions.”


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14 “This paper presents a critique of a prevailing conception of the relation between moral reasoning and judgment on the one hand, and moral goodness on the other. I argue that moral reasoning is inescapably vulnerable to moral, as opposed to merely theoretical, failure. This, I argue, means that there is something deeply misleading in the way that Kant’s moral theory, and some of its main rivals, have invited us to conceive of their subject matter.”  

15 “It is common for Kant’s rights-based liberalism to be contrasted with the communitarian authoritarianism of the later Fichte and of Hegel, and it is the concept of autonomy that is generally regarded as the theoretical fount of Kant’s theory of natural rights, providing the analytical link between Kant’s moral philosophy and his political and legal theory. The author argues that this view is erroneous: The notion of autonomy ultimately remains contentless and incapable of providing practical political and legal prescriptions without Kant’s substantive account of human nature, an account specifying both the proper moral ends that humans should strive for and the anthropological limits of human perfectibility. Kant’s theory of rights is informed by both sets of considerations. Contrary to the received view, Kant develops a socially sensitive account of the self in his later writings, and comes to believe that individual autonomy depends in large measure on the realisation of certain propitious sociocultural and political arrangements. For Kant, natural rights, like individual freedom, are not ahistorical, universal standards of political justice but the historical outcome of the long process of enlightenment. As such, what is right will depend on what is timely. Here Kant is much closer to Fichte and Hegel than is generally acknowledged.”
“Can we regard ourselves as having free will? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral injunctions, and why should we care about them? Unless we provide satisfactory answers to these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be subsumed by psychology, history, or rational decision theory. According to Ermanno Bencivenga, this outcome is both common and regrettable. Bencivenga points to Immanuel Kant for the solution. Kant’s philosophy is a sustained, bold, and successful effort aiming at offering us the answers we need. Ethics Vindicated is a clear and thorough account of this effort that builds on Bencivenga’s previous interpretation of transcendental philosophy (as articulated in his Kant’s Copernican Revolution) and draws on the entire Kantian corpus.”

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18 This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kant’s explanation of the duty of moral self-perfection. What kinds of activity count as striving for purity in one’s disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge.

19 It has been argued that Kant’s practical philosophy cannot allow for degrees of responsibility for one’s actions. However, it would be uncompromising to allow for only two possibilities: either full responsibility or none. Moreover, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant himself claims that there can be degrees of responsibility, depending on the magnitude of the obstacles that have to be overcome when acting. I will show that this claim is consistent with Kant’s theory as a whole and thereby make transparent how degrees of responsibility are possible for Kant. The solution is based on the distinction between two senses of
responsibility: taking oneself to be an accountable person is an all-or-nothing affair, whereas praise- or blameworthiness for a particular action can still be a matter of degree.”

20 “In “The Sources of Normativity” Christine Korsgaard attempts to defend Kant’s moral ontology as a kind of moral realism. She does so by way of drawing a distinction between substantial and procedural moral realism. After dismissing substantial realism as dogmatic and defending procedural moral realism, she goes on to claim that Kant’s view is best described as procedural moral realism. It has been argued against Korsgaard that procedural moral realism is a misnomer and that it turns out to be an anti-realist position. I don’t think that this criticism is correct and I will defend Korsgaard against the subjectivist objections that have been leveled against her. However, my main concern is to show why even Korsgaard’s procedural moral realism is still not completely in line with Kant’s own epistemological and ontological commitments. In contrast to Korsgaard, I argue that Kant’s conception of reason as a capacity that is “by itself practical” commits him to a position which is best described by what I will call “moral idealism.” Practical reason is not merely a faculty for cognizing some testing procedure that would reliably distinguish between good and bad maxims. In Kant, practical cognition consists in cognition of what I ought to do such that I do it, i. e. bring the object of my cognition into existence through a kind of self-affection.”

21 “Kant famously claims that the table of the categories of freedom does not require explanation, ‘since it is intelligible enough of itself’ (Critique of Practical Reason 5 : 67). Kant interpreters have been baffled by this claim, and the disagreement among the increasing number of studies in more recent years suggests that the table is not as straightforward as Kant took it to be. In this article I want to show that a coherent interpretation of the table depends essentially on a clarification of what have been taken to be three fundamental ambiguities in Kant’s presentation of the table. This assumption about ambiguities in Kant’s text is, I argue, rooted in a hybrid conception of practical rationality assumed by his interpreters. I believe the task of disambiguating the table in all three cases can be completed. But it will require spelling out Kant’s moral cognitivism in such a way that he emerges as holding what I will call a unitary account of practical rationality.”
"According to a widespread view, Kant’s claim that moral wrongness has its ground in a contradiction underlying every immoral action is a “bluff” rooted in “dogmatic moralism”. Ever since Benjamin Constant’s exchange with Kant, counterexamples have played a crucial role in showing why Kant’s “universalization procedure” fails to determine the moral validity of our judgments. Despite recent attempts to bring Kant’s ethics closer to Aristotle’s, these counterexamples have prevailed. Most recently, Jesse Prinz has launched another attack along the same lines. Prinz insists that Kant’s universalization procedure fundamentally begs the question and fails to generate plausible results. Even authors who are very sympathetic to Kant, such as Allen Wood, have tried to downplay universalization, focusing instead on other formulations of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I respond directly to four of the most prominent counterexamples. In each case, I aim to show how we can uphold Kant’s fundamental claim that the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative articulates the form of our particular moral judgments."
“This paper provides a methodologically original construction of Kant’s “Formula of Universal Law” (FUL). A formal structure consisting of possible worlds and games—a “game frame”—is used to implement Kant’s concept of a maxim and to define the two tests FUL comprises: the “contradiction in conception” and “contradiction in the will” tests. The paper makes two contributions. Firstly, the model provides a formal account of the variables that are built into FUL: agents, maxims, intentions, actions, and outcomes. This establishes a clear benchmark for understanding how the mechanics of FUL actually work. Secondly, the analysis of the resulting framework sheds new light on discussions about the implications of FUL. On the basis of this, we suggest a move to “comprehensive Kantianism”, which is the application of FUL to systems of maxims rather than to isolated maxims.”

“Kant’s ethics do not include a discussion of justice as a specific virtue, and the “Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right” appear to deal only with private and public law, but not with justice. In fact, Kant’s ethics in the three Critiques and later relevant writings is dependent on God’s iustitia distributiva as the highest good and the institution of the state is labelled as “public justice”. This article attempts to explain this connection and to provide a contribution to the topic of Kantian justice. The Epilogue to this article discusses a letter dated November 6, 1790, which Kant wrote in one of his official capacities at the University of Königsberg and which as of yet has remained unpublished.”

“Some contemporary Kantians have argued that one could not be virtuous without having internalized certain patterns of awareness that permit one to identify and respond reliably to moral reasons for action. I agree, but I argue that this insight requires unrecognized, far-reaching, and thoroughly welcome changes in


the traditional Kantian understanding of maxims and virtues. In particular, it implies that one’s characteristic emotions and desires will partly determine one’s maxims, and hence the praiseworthiness of one’s actions. I try to show this by pointing out an instability in the Kantian understanding of maxims. On the one hand, maxims are thought of as consciously affirmed, subjective principles of action. On the other hand, Kantians claim that nothing counts as an action, nor as morally assessable, unless it has a maxim. One cannot take both thoughts seriously without implausibly constricting the range of behavior that counts as action, hence as morally assessable. This difficulty can be overcome, I suggest, by jettisoning the idea that maxims must be consciously affirmed, and by stressing the way in which maxims are grounded in the pruning and shaping of one’s emotions and desires during socialization. This opens the door to a rich Kantian theory of virtue. It also raises questions about the scope and ground of our moral responsibility, which I address at the end of the paper.”

26 “Kant maintained that dutiful action can have the fullest measure of moral worth even if chosen in the face of powerful inclinations to act immorally, and indeed that opposing inclinations only highlight the worth of the action. I argue that this conclusion rests on an implausibly mechanistic account of desires, and that many desires are constituted by tendencies to see certain features of one’s circumstances as reasons to perform one or another action. I try to show that inclinations to violate moral requirements sometimes manifest a morally objectionable half-heartedness in one’s commitment to those very requirements, and – by extension – to the values that undergird these requirements.”
Kantian moral concepts concerning respect for human dignity have played a central role in articulating ethical guidelines for medical practice and research, and for articulating some central positions within bioethical debates more generally. The most common of these Kantian moral concepts is the obligation to respect the dignity of patients and of human research subjects as autonomous, self-determining individuals. This article describes Kant’s conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values, and draws on the work of several contemporary Kantian philosophers who employ the distinction to make sense of some common moral intuitions, feelings, and norms. Drawing on this work, the article argues that the conceptual distinction between dignity and autonomy as values is indispensable in the context of considering our obligations to those who are dependent and vulnerable.

“In this paper I take up two problems that arise in connection with the Kantian duty to cultivate certain moral and non-moral feelings and emotions.”
Amsterdam 1969, S. 143–405 (Book II: Kant’s Ethical Works\textsuperscript{29}).


\textsuperscript{30} “Early in the Preface to \textit{Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone}, Kant claims that “morality leads ineluctably to religion”. This thesis is hardly an innovation of the \textit{Religion}. Again and again throughout the critical corpus, Kant argues that religious belief is ethically significant, that it makes a morally meaningful difference whether an agent believes or disbelieves. And yet these claims are surely among the most doubted of Kant’s positions – and they are often especially doubted by readers who consider themselves Kantians. That Kant of all people should have so cherished religion is perhaps surprising: his moral view enshrines the notion that moral worth arises solely from the “good will”, that is, from a will determined by the moral law. Kant claims to be able to deduce this law and to account for how it motivates without ever relying on religious propositions. Rather, he grounds morality in the conception of autonomy, in the absolutely free self-legislation of the moral principle. So why, after effecting this dramatic Copernican revolution in ethics, does Kant appear to backslide, insisting on the moral necessity of religious belief?”
“Embarrassed by the apparent rigorism Kant expresses so bluntly in ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie,’ numerous contemporary Kantians have attempted to show that Kant’s ethics can justify lying in specific circumstances, in particular, when lying to a murderer is necessary in order to prevent her from killing another innocent person. My aim is to improve upon these efforts and show that lying to prevent the death of another innocent person could be required in Kantian terms. I argue (1) that our perfect Kantian duty of self-preservation can require our lying to save our own lives when threatened with unjust aggression, and (2) that Kant’s understanding of moral duty was that duties are symmetrical, such that if one has a duty to perform a given action on one’s own behalf or to protect one’s own rational nature, then one also has a duty to perform similar acts on other’s behalf or to protect their rational nature. Thus, that the individual protected against aggression by means of deception is not oneself should be of no consequence from a Kantian perspective. Lying to the murderer is thus an extension of the Kantian requirement of self-defense.”

“Thanks to recent scholarship, Kant is no longer seen as the dogmatic opponent of suicide that he appears to be at first glance. However, some interpreters have recently argued for a Kantian view of the morality of suicide with surprising, even radical, implications. More specifically, they have argued that Kantianism (1) requires that those with dementia or other rationality-eroding conditions end their lives before their condition results in their loss of identity as moral agents and (2) requires subjecting the fully demented or those confronting future dementia to non-voluntary euthanasia. Properly understood, Kant’s ethics have neither of these implications (1) wrongly assumes that rational agents’ duty of self-preservation entails a duty of self-destruction when they become non-rational, (2) further neglects Kant’s distinction between duties to self and duties to others and wrongly assumes that duties can be owed to rational agents only during the time of their existence.”


34 “7. Hill’s Ideal of Autonomy 7.1. Introduction 7.2. Hill’s Kantian ideal of autonomy 7.2.1. What the Kantian ideal of autonomy is not, according to Hill 7.2.2. What the Kantian ideal of autonomy is, according to Hill 7.3. Merits of Hill’s ideal: the extent to which he achieves his aims and solves the problems of the extended ideal of autonomy 7.4. Why Hill fails to achieve his own aims: Is Hill’s ideal Kantian? 7.5. Objections to Hill’s idea of choice and deliberation 7.6. Why Hill fails to solve Problem Three of the extended ideal 7.7. Conclusion 8 The Ideal of the Person in Kant’s Groundwork 8.1. Introduction 8.2. The ideal person according to Kant 8.2.1. Principles and reasons 8.2.2. Autonomy 8.2.3. Good will and the good 8.2.4. Why Kant’s ideal of autonomy is not morally ‘neutral’ 8.2.5. Is self-control a Kantian virtue? More on Kant’s second-best ideal of the person 8.3. Kant’s answer to Problem Three 8.3.1. Two contradictory positions on the relation between autonomy and morality 8.3.2. The Wille/Willkür distinction reconsidered: Kant’s concept of radical evil 8.3.3. Conclusion 8.4. Conclusion 8.4.1. Kantian autonomy and the extended ideal of autonomy 8.4.2. General conclusion.”

35 “In line with familiar portrayals of Kant’s ethics, interpreters of his philosophy of education focus essentially on its intellectual dimension: the notions of moral catechism, ethical gymnastics and ethical ascetics, to name but a few. By doing so, they usually emphasise Kant’s negative stance towards the role of feelings in moral education. Yet there seem to be noteworthy exceptions: Kant writes that the inclinations to be honoured and loved are to be preserved as far as possible. This statement is not only at odds with Kant’s general claim that education should not encourage feelings, but more importantly, it encourages a feeling
that is in many ways paradigmatically un-Kantian. How are we to understand the fact that of all feelings, the love of honour should be preserved? To answer this question, I begin by clarifying the reasons behind Kant's negative stance towards feelings in moral education. I then turn to his account of the feeling of love of honour. After distinguishing between its good and its bad forms, I consider two ways of making sense of the positive role Kant assigns to it. The first, modest reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour is morally useful because it has two functions: an epistemic one, and a motivational one. The second, more ambitious reading will suggest that the feeling of love of honour enables the child to experience her inner worth as bearer of value.”

Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the other hand, treat the concept of dignity as a substantive value that justifies a deontological conception of respect for persons. A third conception of respect for the dignity of persons, the conception that I favor, focuses directly on the special value of our rational nature. According to this consequentialist conception, we respect the dignity of persons by promoting the flourishing of rational nature.

The most apparent obstacles to a just, enlightened and peaceful social world are also, according to Kant, nature’s way of compelling us to realize those and other morally good ends. Echoing Adam Smith’s idea of the ‘invisible hand’, Kant thinks that selfishness, rivalry, quarrelsomeness, vanity, jealousy and self-conceit, along with the oppressive social inequalities they tend to produce, drive us to perfect our talents, develop culture, approach enlightenment and, through the strife and instability caused by our unsocial sociability,
push us towards justice, political equality and the highest good. What are we to make of these arguments, which seem to rely on questionable empirical assumptions, invoke dubious claims about natural teleology and sit uncomfortably with fundamental aspects of Kant’s ethical framework? I suggest that the arguments reveal one of Kant’s deep and important insights about the moral life by partially describing what a good and virtuous person reasonably hopes for.”

“The humanity formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative demands that we treat humanity as an end in itself. Because this principle resonates with currently influential ideals of human rights and dignity, contemporary readers often find it compelling, even if the rest of Kant’s moral philosophy leaves them cold. Moreover, some prominent specialists in Kant’s ethics recently have turned to the humanity formulation as the most theoretically central and promising principle of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, despite the intuitive appeal and the increasingly recognized philosophical importance of the humanity formulation, it has received less attention than many other, less central, aspects of Kant’s ethics. Richard Dean offers the most sustained and systematic examination of the humanity formulation to date. Dean argues that the ‘rational nature’ that must be treated as an end in itself is not a minimally rational nature, consisting of the power to set ends or the unrealized capacity to act morally, but instead is the more properly rational nature possessed by someone who gives priority to moral principles over any contrary impulses. This non-standard reading of the humanity formulation provides a firm theoretical foundation for deriving plausible approaches to particular moral issues – and, contrary to first impressions, does not impose moralistic demands to pass judgment on others’ character. Dean’s reading also enables progress on problems of interest to Kant scholars, such as reconstructing Kant’s argument for accepting the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, and allows for increased understanding of the relationship between Kant’s ethics and supposedly Kantian ideas such as ‘respect for autonomy’.

Contents: I. Good Will as an End in Itself. 1 Introduction. 2 What should we treat as an end in itself? 3 The good will reading meshes with major ideas of Kant’s ethics. 4 The textual dispute, and arguments in favour of minimal readings. 5 Is the good will reading just too hard to swallow? II. The Humanity Formulation as a Moral Principle. 6 The argument for the humanity formula. 7 How duties follow from the categorical imperative. 8 Kantian value, beneficence, and consequentialism. 9 Non-human animals, humanity, and the kingdom of ends. 10 Would Kant say we should respect moral autonomy? 11 Autonomy as an end in itself? 12 Some big pictures.”
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42 “Kant’s formula of the end in itself commands that one treat humanity in oneself and in others always as an end and never merely as a means. Interest in, and debate concerning, this formulation of the categorical imperative has been growing among Kantians and ethicists more generally. After an overview of this formulation and Kant’s argument for it, this piece outlines several areas of current debate. It then explores some dominant and emerging positions regarding two questions: the identity of the end in itself, and the relation between the end in itself and the value of other things.”
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43 “Rawls’s view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls’s teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this article, I argue that the critics’ interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant’s moral and political philosophy. Kant’s conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division.”
The purpose of this chapter is to assess how fatal or otherwise Kantian autonomy might be to the position adopted in traditional natural law theory. To this end, the focus will be on how Kant’s fundamental principle of morality, the categorical imperative, is established. The concern is to compare Kant’s analysis, not with competing moral positions generally, therefore, but, narrowly, with the traditional natural law suggestion that fundamental natural facts do inform reason morally and are epistemically significant in that regard.” (S. 29)


45 “Immanuel Kant’s claim that the categorical imperative of morality is based in practical reason has long been a source of puzzlement and doubt, even for sympathetic interpreters. Kant’s own explanations, which mainly concern his often-criticized formula of universal law, are laconic and obscure, leading interpreters to dismiss them in favor of less ambitious claims involving his other famous formulas. In The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom provides an illuminating new interpretation of the categorical imperative, arguing that we have exaggerated and misconceived Kant’s break with tradition: Kant never departs from the classical conception of practical reason as a capacity for knowledge of the good. His distinctive contribution is the idea that morality’s imperatives express the form of such knowledge.
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By developing an account of practical knowledge that situates Kant’s ethics within his broader epistemology and rethinks numerous topics in his moral psychology and in his account of practical reason (including desire, intention, choice, will, as well as pleasure, happiness, and the good), Engstrom’s work promises to deepen and to reshape our understanding of Kantian ethics.” (Publisher’s description)

In this article I argue that Kant’s conception of the good will in its relation to the gifts of nature and fortune listed in the opening paragraphs of Groundwork I is usually misunderstood. The misunderstanding has its roots in the attribution of the alleged predicate ‘good in a conditioned sense’ to those gifts, even when they are taken in isolation. As a result, the centrality and primacy of Kant’s concept of the good will as the condition of the goodness of those gifts is completely obscured. However, a different picture emerges if one takes into account that ‘good in a conditioned sense’ properly means ‘good only on the condition of being combined with a good will’, so that talking of the goodness of such gifts taken in isolation or apart from the good will is a logical contradiction. Accordingly, we will see that, in his practical philosophy, Kant assigns to the good will a role very similar to the role played by Aristotle’s concept of substance in his theoretical philosophy. For, according to Kant, those gifts can be good and be said to be good only on the condition of being in a will which is good. Finally, we will see how this interpretation of the primacy of the good will sheds light on Kant’s view on the moral worth of actions.

“In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant stipulates that ‘Love is a matter of feeling, not of willing . . . so a duty to love is an absurdity.’ Nonetheless, in the same work Kant claims that we have duties of love to other human beings. According to Kant, the kind of love which is commanded by duty is practical love. This paper defends the view that the duty of practical love articulated in the Doctrine of Virtue is distinct from the duty of beneficence and best understood as a duty of self-transformation, which agents observe by cultivating a benevolent disposition and practical beneficent desires.”


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48 “Barbara Herman offers an interpretation of Kant’s *Groundwork* on which an action has moral worth if the primary motive for the action is the motive of duty. She offers this approach in place of Richard Henson’s sufficiency-based interpretation, according to which an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is sufficient by itself to generate the action. Noa Latham criticizes Herman’s account and argues that we cannot make sense of the position that an agent can hold multiple motives for action and yet be motivated by only one of them, concluding that we must accept a face-value interpretation of the *Groundwork* where morally worthy actions obtain only when the agent’s sole motive is the motive of duty. This paper has two goals, one broad and one more constrained. The broader objective is to argue that interpretations of moral worth, as it is presented in the *Groundwork*, depend on interpretations of Kant’s theory of freedom. I show that whether we can make sense of the inclusion of nonmoral motives in morally worthy actions depends on whether the ‘always causal framework’ is consistent with Kant’s theory of freedom. The narrow goal is to show that if we adopt an ‘always causal’ framework for moral motivation, then Herman’s position and her critique of the sufficiency-based approach fail. Furthermore, within this framework I will specify a criterion for judging whether an action is determined by the motive of duty, even in the presence of nonmoral motives. Thus, I argue Latham’s conclusion that we must accept a face-value interpretation is incorrect.”
**temporary Moral Philosophy, S. 23–48.**

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49 “This paper focuses on Kant’s claim that friendship is governed by a polarity between love and respect conceived as attractive and repulsive forces. It argues that interpreting this polarity is crucial for understanding Kant’s moral vision and how it is anything but inimical to an ethics of intimacy. More specifically, it shows that the notion of attractive and repulsive moral forces is a key element for understanding both Kant’s theory of friendship and its importance for the ethical vision of the Metaphysics of Morals as a whole. The tension between love and respect underlies all moral relations, whether universal and impersonal, or particular and personal, and, moreover, echoes the attractive and repulsive struggle that Kant believes governs the material world. The picture of Kantian morality that emerges against this background is thus one where individuals constantly strive both to retain their agency and open up to others by acknowledging and embracing ends other than one’s own, hence finding themselves in a constant struggle for balance. Part I examines Kant’s claim against his theory of matter and force. Part II argues that intimate, personal friendships provide only the most concrete and specific example of the tensions inherent in the kind of universal friendship that Kantian morality requires of all. The final part, offered as a variation upon the theme, sketches a reply to Rae Langton’s critique of Kant’s morality and theory of friendship.”


51 “This paper offers an imminent interpretation of Kant’s political teleology in the context of his response to Moses Mendelssohn in Theory and Practice III concerning prospects of humankind’s moral progress. The paper assesses the nature of Kant’s response against his mature political philosophy in the Doctrine of Right. In ‘Theory and Practice III’ Kant’s response to Mendelssohn remains incomplete: whilst insisting that individuals have a duty to contribute towards humankind’s moral progress, Kant has no conclusive answer as to how individuals might act on that duty. ‘Theory and Practice III’ lacks a clear conception of the distinctness of political morality from the domain of virtue; Kant’s resort to teleological argumentation is indicative of his lack of an account of instituting Right. The latter can be found in the Doctrine of Right – yet Kant’s earlier teleological arguments contribute crucially to the development of his mature morality of Right.”

52 “This article builds on David Velleman’s recent work on moral relativism to argue that Kant’s account of moral judgement is best read in a contextualist manner. More specifically, I argue that while for Kant the form of moral judgement is invariant, substantive moral judgements are nonetheless context-dependent. The same form of moral willing can give rise to divergent substantive judgements. To some limited extent, Kantian contextualism is a development out of Rawlsian constructivism. Yet while for constructivists the primary concern is with the derivation of generally valid principles of morality, Velleman’s Kant-inspired form of moral relativism demonstrates the indispensability to a Kantian approach of indexical reasons for action. I argue in turn that Velleman’s focus on the indexical nature of reasons for action must be supplemented by an account of agential reflexivity. The latter divides Kantian contextualism from Kantian relativism.”
“Kant’s account of the freedom gained through virtue builds on the Socratic tradition. On the Socratic view, when morality is our end, nothing can hinder us from attaining satisfaction: we are self-sufficient and free since moral goodness is (as Kant says) ‘created by us, hence is in our power’. But when our end is the fulfilment of sensible desires, our satisfaction requires luck as well as the cooperation of others. For Kant, this means that happiness requires that we get other people to work for our ends; and this requires, in turn, that we gain control over the things other people value so as to have influence over them. If this plan for happiness is not subordinated to morality, then what is most valuable to us will be precisely what others value. This is the root of the ‘passions’ that make us evil and make us slaves whose satisfaction depends on others. But, significantly, this dependence is a moral slavery and hence does not signal a loss, or even diminishment of the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility.”

“The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of the moral law from actual acts of willing on behalf of those bound by that law (an independence that is upheld). The resulting position, which is called not ‘all the way down’ constructivism, is attributed to Kant.”

“In his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant’s desiderata for a supreme principle of practical reasoning and morality require that the subjective conditions under which some action is thought of as justified via some maxim be sufficient for judging the same action as justified by any agent in those conditions. This describes the kind of universalization conditions now known as moral supervenience. But when he specifies his “formula of universal law” (FUL) Kant replaces this condition with a quite different kind of universality: the judgment that some agent could rationally (i.e., without willing the frustration of his own valued ends) will his adoption of some maxim under the condition that this would cause all agents in his world to adopt it as well. Our wills typically lack this efficacy, so requiring that our wills conform to what would be rational for a hypothetical agent in this situation to will is a heteronomous requirement.
Several intuitively wrong maxims pass Kant’s test but fail the test of supervenience, because they generate no contradiction in a world of universal compliance but do so in non-ideal worlds, demonstrating the inadequacy of the FUL and the logical superiority of moral supervenience.”


\(^{56}\) “Kantian socialists at the turn of the twentieth century, as well as contemporary authors seeking a principle with which to condemn capitalism, have turned to Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself (FEI). This article assesses the arguments from FEI against capitalism from the perspective of the issues that arise in interpreting and applying Kant’s formula. There are various strategies with which a Kantian might use FEI to condemn conduct that Kant did not use FEI to condemn. The article asks whether any of the existing arguments from FEI employ plausible versions of these strategies to derive a strict duty from that formula’s Never Merely as a Means principle that condemns capitalism.”
“Some commentators have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a meta-ethical constructivist. Among meta-ethical constructivist interpretations I distinguish between ‘atheistic’ and ‘agnostic’ versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order. Even though these two versions are incompatible, each is linked with central Kantian doctrines, revealing a tension within Kant’s own view. Moreover, among interpretations that cast Kant as rejecting substantive realism but embracing procedural realism, some (i.e., those that are ‘constructivist’) face charges of indeterminacy or relativism, while others (practical reasoning views) face ‘daunting rationalism’ objections. I close with some objections to interpreting Kant as a meta-ethical constructivist.”

“The focus of my argument is whether, and in what sense, freedom is ‘revealed’ by the fact of reason in Kant’s second Critique. I examine the passages in which Kant refers to the fact of reason and conclude that he uses the term to refer to our taking morality as authoritative, and to our apprehending the content of the moral law. I then point out how various commentators have claimed each to be the fact of reason. Next I address how each is claimed by Kant to reveal ‘freedom’ to us and argue that our taking morality as authoritative is best understood as referring to our conception of ourselves as autonomous beings, and that our apprehending the moral law’s content reveals only the idea of freedom as a coherent one. Neither would demonstrate that we actually are autonomous, nor would their conjunction, despite what some commentators have claimed. In closing I defend the deflationary position that the fact of reason entitles us to postulate our freedom, but only from the practical point of view, and that it demonstrates that freedom is a coherent idea.”

“In this paper, I argue that we can identify three different kinds of ‘respect for persons’ in Kant’s writings: (1) respect as ‘honor’ or ‘esteem’ based upon a person’s unequal comparative value vis-à-vis other people; (2) ‘political respect’ based upon a person’s equal comparative value vis-à-vis other people; and (3) ‘moral respect’ based upon a person’s absolute and incomparable value vis-à-vis non-rational animals and things. My approach challenges standard readings of Kant in two ways. First, contra many of Kant’s critics and defenders, I argue that he explicitly recognizes more partial ways we can respect people in terms of (1) respect as ‘honor’ or ‘esteem.’ Second, contra dominant contractualist readings of Kant, I argue that such views mistakenly conflate (2) ‘political respect’ which involves treating people in ways they would agree to based on principles of mutual reciprocity and fairness and (3) ‘moral respect’ for people as ends-in-themselves. I conclude by examining the overall relevance of this approach for recent debates about political liberalism. In the end, I argue that this new Kantian framework offers us a highly systematic, principled, and perhaps even exhaustive taxonomy for capturing the many different ways in which we can respect people in general.”
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61 “Kant’s conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: (1) The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex (conscience). To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: (2) the welfare of others (love of others); and (3) our own moral being (self-respect). (4) Feelings shape our particular moral acts (moral feeling). I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties.”

62 “The article defends three claims regarding the relation between the different formulas of the categorical imperative. (1) On its prevailing reading, FUL gives different moral guidance than FH; left answered, this problem is an argument for adopting a competing perspective on FUL. (2) The prohibitions and commands of the formulas should be taken to be extensionally the same; but FKE adds a dimension missing from the others, gained by uniting their perspectives, namely, bringing the variety of moral laws into systematic unity. (3) The grammatically ambiguous phrase in GMS, 4 : 436 . 9–10 claims that FA alone unites the other formulas in itself.”
In what follows I will consider Kant’s and Habermas’s conceptions of moral validity in a comparative and critical way. First, I will reconstruct Habermas’s discursive or deliberative reformulation of Kant’s moral theory (sec.1). And, second, I will introduce some comparative critical considerations (2). I will contend that, though much is gained with Habermas’s intersubjectivist reformulation of Kant’s moral philosophy, some problems emerge that could be treated with the help of certain Kantian insights. I will focus on Kant’s and Habermas’s strictly moral writings. The issue of political validity or legitimacy (i.e., of the validity of norms that are to be enforced by a coercive state apparatus) is of course of great importance, but I will not address it here.”
In ethics, deductivism strives for self-evident premises as a foundation for normative claims, whereas coherentism seeks moral justification in relations between abstract normative claims and moral judgments. While Immanuel Kant is still widely believed to have pursued a deductivist project, the article contends that he endeavored to justify his moral philosophy in general, and the Categorical Imperative in particular, in the coherentist manner that has since been advocated by John Rawls. First, the characteristics of Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium are summarized and traced within Kant’s writings. The resulting coherentist interpretation is then defended against the opposing view that Kant’s appeal to the ‘fact of reason’ proves his adherence to ethical intuitionism.


“Conventional wisdom on Kantian ethics holds that in order to find out if one’s action is morally permissible, one must “interpersonally universalize” the maxim behind that action, i.e., be able to will it for everyone without falling into some sort of contradiction. I argue in this paper that this conventional wisdom must be supplemented by a requirement to “temporally universalize” one’s maxim, such that it hypothetically holds for all times. Doing so, I argue, allows us to better understand Kant’s arguments for duties to oneself in the Groundwork, and it also allows us to avoid putative problem maxims for Christine Korsgaard’s “practical contradiction” interpretation of the universalization procedure, namely those offered by Barbara Herman that contain a coordination feature (e.g., “I will play tennis at 10:00 on Sundays”).”

“Contemporary Kant scholarship generally takes ‘humanity’ in Kant’s ethical writings to refer to beings with rational capacities. However, his claims that only the good will has unqualified goodness and that humanity is unconditionally valuable suggests that humanity might be the good will. This problem seems to have infiltrated some prominent scholarship, and Richard Dean has recently argued that, in fact, humanity is indeed the good will. This paper defends, and tries to make sense of, the more conventional view that humanity and the good will are distinct.”

“In this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in order to evaluate whether his theory can be saved. Critics argue that Kant does not adequately distinguish between evil and mundane wrongdoing, making his use of the term ‘evil’ emotional hyperbole; by defining evil as the subordination of the moral law to self-love his analysis is seemingly overly simplistic and empirically false; and by focusing solely on the moral character of the perpetrator of evil, Kant’s theory apparently ignores the most salient aspect of evil – the suffering of victims. While I will not claim that Kant provides us with a fully adequate theory of evil, I respond to each of these criticisms and conclude that Kant’s theory can still provide significant insight into both the nature of evil and the moral psychology of perpetrators of evil.”
"Debates about commodification in bioethics frequently appeal to Kant’s famous second formulation of the categorical imperative, the formula requiring us to treat the rational (human) being as “an end in itself” and “never as a means only.” In the course of her own treatment of commodification, Margaret Jane Radin observes that Kant’s application of this formula “does not generate noncontroversial particular consequences.” This is so, I argue, because Kant offers three different — and largely incompatible — interpretations of the formula. One focuses on the obligation to preserve rational willing; the second stresses respect for human (physical) dignity and integrity; the third views respect for others as "ends in themselves" as primarily involving a willingness to govern one’s conduct by a procedure of impartial co-legislation. Only the third of these interpretations, I conclude, offers a reasonable and coherent approach to moral judgment about the limits of commodification.”

“A new book by Stephen Engstrom repeats a criticism of Bruce Aune’s of Kant’s derivation of the universalizability formula of the categorical imperative. The criticism is that Kant omitted at least one substantive premise in the derivation of the formula: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.’ The grounds for the formula that are given in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, however, are said to support only a weaker requirement, namely, that a maxim conform to a universal law. Hence, Kant omits at least one necessary substantive premise of the derivation. This paper attempts to show that nothing substantive is omitted from the argument. It only needs two principles of inference that it is assumed add nothing substantive to the premises.”
In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is a natural dialectic with respect to morality (4:405), a different claim from those advanced in the first and second Critiques. Förster's challenge may therefore be reformulated as the problem of explaining why practical reason has a canon in the first Critique, a dialectic in the Groundwork, and an antinomy in the second Critique. In this paper, I answer this challenge. I argue that these differences are due to the different aims and scope of the works, and in particular, the different place of the inclinations in their arguments.

In recent years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology.


“Henry Allison and Paul Guyer have recently offered interpretations of Kant’s argument in *Groundwork III*. These interpretations share this premise: the argument moves from a non-moral, theoretical premise to a moral conclusion, and the failure of the argument is a failure to make this jump from the non-moral to the moral. This characterization both of the nature of the argument and its failure is flawed. Consider instead the possibility that in *Groundwork III*, Kant is struggling toward something rather different from this, not trying to pull the moral rabbit out of the theoretical hat, but instead seeking a proto-phenomenological grounding of morality: a grounding that begins from first personal felt experiences that already possess moral content, and proceeds to its further practical claims via attentive reflection on these felt experiences. This paper brings this assumption to our reading of *Groundwork III*, showing that in doing so we acquire a deeper appreciation both of the argument, and the reasons it fails. Kant’s argument is practical throughout. And the failure of the argument is the failure of Kant’s nascent efforts to provide a new, phenomenological method for the grounding of practical philosophy.”

“In this essay, I look at some claims Anne Margaret Baxley makes, in her recent book *Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy*, about the relationship between reason and sensibility in Kant’s theory of virtue. I then reflect on tensions I find in these claims as compared to the overall goal of her book: an account of Kant’s conception of virtue as autocracy. Ultimately, I argue that interpreters like Baxley (and myself) who want to welcome a more robust role for feeling in Kantian ethics must, in order to achieve our purposes, move beyond the general account of the limits for the role of the moral feeling of respect for persons; Conclusion.”

“In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant’s moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person’s first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological experience in Kant’s account of the Fact of Reason, develops a new a reading of the Fact, and grants a moral epistemic role for feeling in grounding Kant’s a priori morality. The book thus challenges readings which attribute only a motivational role to feeling; and Fichtean readings which violate Kant’s commitments to the limits of reason. This study will be valuable to students and scholars engaged in Kant studies.”
“Maxims play a crucial role in Kant’s ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their strengths and weaknesses. Part I: Established Approaches, begins with Rüdiger Bubner’s view that Kant took maxims to be what ordinary people of today take them to be, namely pithily expressed precepts of morality or prudence. Next comes the position, most associated with Rüdiger Bittner and Otfried Höffe, that maxims are Lebensregeln, or ‘life-rules’ – quite general rules for how to conduct oneself based on equally general outlooks on how the world is. These first two interpretations make sense of Kant’s claim, made in his anthropological and pedagogical writings, that we have to learn how to act on maxims, but they become less plausible in light of Kant’s probable view that people always act on maxims – after all, how can people learn how to act on something they always act on anyway? The next two views, each advanced, at different times, by Onora O’Neill, make better sense of the fact that people always act on maxims, for they hold that maxims are intentions – either specific intentions, such as ‘to open the door’, or general intentions, such as ‘to make guests feel welcome’ – and it is perfectly sensible to claim that people always act on intentions. However, they face the same problem as the two previous views, which is that if people always act on maxims, what sense does it make to say they also have to learn how to act on them? Henry Allison, the main representative of the fifth view, claims, on the basis of Kant’s doctrine of the ‘highest maxim’, that maxims are principles organized hierarchically, such that an agent endorses one maxim because she endorses a more general maxim. Unfortunately for Allison, there is little direct textual support for his claim that maxims are organized hierarchically.”

“Maxims play a crucial role in Kant’s ethical philosophy, but there is significant disagreement about what maxims are. In this two-part essay, I survey eight different views of Kantian maxims, presenting their strengths and their weaknesses. In Part II: New Approaches, I look at three more recent views in somewhat greater detail than I do the five treatments canvassed in ‘Recent Works on Kantian Maxims I: Established Approaches’. First, there is Richard McCarty’s Interpretation, which holds that Kant’s understanding of maxims can be illuminated by placing them in the context of the Wolffian tradition, according to which maxims are the major premises of practical syllogisms. The next subject Maria Schwartz, holds that careful attention to Kant’s distinction between rules and maxims, as well as Kant’s concept of happiness, allows us to make sense of almost all of Kant’s remarks on maxims. It may be, however, that on Schwartz’s view agents turn out to perform actions as opposed to thoughtlessly habitual behaviors much less often than is plausible. This leads to the final approach, exemplified by Jens Timmermann, which is that Kant understands maxims equivocally. I claim that something like Timmermann’s approach is the only way to make sense of all of what Kant has to say on maxims.”


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79 Inhalt: Sources and Abbreviations (S. vii), 1. Context (S. 1), 2. Overview of Themes (S. 10), 3. Reading the Text: Preface (S. 23), 4. Reading the Text: Section I. From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law (S. 36), 5. Reading the Text: Section II. Formulating the Categorical Imperative (S. 66), 6. Reading the Text: Section III. The Categorical Imperative Applies to Us (S. 146), Notes (S. 172), Suggestions for Further Reading (S. 179), Index (S. 183).

80 “During the 1760s and 1770s, Kant entertained a naturalistic approach to ethics based on the supposed psychological fact of a human love for freedom. During the critical period, especially in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly rejected such an approach. But his attempt at a metaphysical foundation for ethics in section III of the Groundwork was equally clearly a failure. Kant recognized this in
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...his appeal to the “fact of reason” argument in the Critique of Practical Reason, but thereby gave up on any attempt to ground the fundamental principle of morality at all. So it is of interest to see how far we might now proceed along the lines of his original naturalistic approach.”

81 “In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant makes a distinction between duties of virtue and the obligation to be virtuous. For a number of reasons, it may seem as if the latter does not actually require any actions of us not already required by the former. This essay argues that Kant does succeed in describing obligations that we have to prepare for virtuous conduct that are different from simply fulfilling specific duties of virtue, and that in so doing he describes an important element of the moral life.”


82 “Kant’s accounts of moral education, appraisal respect and gratitude each depend on the assumption that human beings see and judge each other’s actions to be morally good. This assumption appears to stand in tension with the Opacity Thesis, Kant’s claim that we can never know if an action is morally good. This paper examines Kant’s discussion of moral illusion to relieve this tension. It is argued that we are required to uphold moral illusion, i.e. to represent others’ actions to be morally good (while knowing that we may be mistaken), due to the duty of beneficence for others’ moral well-being.”

83 “Kant’s ethics is used by some as a defence of the exploitation of animals and is criticised by others for not recognising any moral relevance of the plight of animals. These appeals overlook the broad applicability of Kant’s principles. In this article, I argue that Kant’s ethics implies a duty to abstain from most meat and some other animal products derived from farming. I argue that there is a Kantian principle not to choose goods that have been derived from wrongdoing, with certain qualifications. This principle isolates the wrong of using others to commit wrongdoing on one’s behalf. As has been argued by others, Kant’s ethics implies that animal farming as we know it in our society almost universally involves wrongdoing and the slaughter of animals is especially tied to wrongdoing. I argue for a broad sense in which these ideas together imply that choosing farmed meat, and probably other animal products, is treating animal industry workers as mere means. Thus, we have a Kantian duty to abstain from these products.”
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If, as Kant says, “the will is practical reason”, we should think of willing as a mode of reasoning, and its activity represented in movement from evaluative premises to intention by way of a validity-securing principle of inference. Such a view of willing takes motive and rational choice out of empirical psychology, thereby eliminating grounds for many familiar objections to Kant’s account of morally good action. The categorical imperative provides the fundamental principle of valid practical inference; however, for good willing, we also require correct premises. These come from specifications of the two obligatory ends – our own perfection and the happiness of others. Interpreting good willing as good reasoning not only fits well with Kant’s metaphysics of free action, it also offers a sound method for reasoning to and about individual as well as role-dependent moral obligations.”
Dazu:


Sedgwick, Sally (2011): ‘Letting the Phenomena In’: On How Herman’s Kantianism Does and Does Not Answer the Empty Formalism Critique, Kantian Review 16, S. 33–47. 87

Herman, Barbara (2011): Embracing Kant’s Formalism, Kantian Review 16, S. 49–66. 88


85 “This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman’s Moral Literacy – the idea that, for Kant, the will is a ‘norm-constituted power’ whose activity is guided by its own internal norm, that the obligatory ends are reasonably viewed as the ends of all rational choice, and that morality ‘completes’ practical reason or rational agency.”

86 “In her recent book, Barbara Herman explores a range of topics commonly associated with virtue ethics; her focus, however, is not so much on virtue as on normal moral competence and the basic moral capacity underpinning it. To explicate this competence, Herman introduces the idea of moral literacy, arguing that it reveals Kantian ethical thought to be better able than Humean views to account for our readiness to hold persons responsible even for conduct reflecting character flaws that stem from deficiencies in their upbringing. Examination of Herman’s account raises a question, however, about how intimately moral literacy is related to the basic moral capacity.”

87 “In Moral Literacy, Barbara Herman informs us that she will defend an ‘enlarged version of Kantian moral theory’ (Herman 2008: ix). Her ‘enlarged version’, she says, will provide a much-needed alternative to the common but misguided characterization of Kant’s practical philosophy as an empty formalism. I begin with a brief sketch of the main features of Herman’s corrective account. I endorse her claim that the enlarged Kantianism she defends is true to Kant’s intentions as well as successful in correcting the objections she outlines. I then argue that there is another version of the empty formalism worry Herman does not address. Not only does she not address it, but her form of Kantianism provides fuel for its fire.”

88 “In response to critical discussions of my book, Moral Literacy, by Stephen Engstrom, Sally Sedgwick and Andrews Reath, I offer a defence of Kant’s formalism that is not only friendly to my claims for the moral theory’s sensitivity to a wide range of moral phenomena and practices at the ground level, but also consistent with Kant’s high rationalist ambitions.”
245–61.


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89 "That an act can have moral worth even if the end of the action is not realized seems asymmetrical with Kant’s dual notion that acts cannot have moral worth if the maxim for action is impermissible. Recent scholarship contends that fixing the asymmetry will allow impermissible acts done from a morally worthy motive to have moral worth. I argue against the asymmetry thesis and contend that Kant cannot consistently maintain a class of impermissible, morally worthy action and the view that right acts respect the dignity of humanity.”

90 "Samuel Kerstein argues that an asymmetry between moral worth and maxims prevents Kant from accepting a category of acts that are impermissible, but have moral worth. Kerstein contends that an act performed from the motive of duty should be considered as a candidate for moral worth, even if the action’s maxim turns out to be impermissible, since moral worth depends on the correct moral motivation of an act, rather than on the moral rightness of an act. I argue that Kant cannot consistently maintain that there are morally forbidden, though good, acts since one of the conditions of acting from the moral law should be that one has a true belief about what the moral law requires. My project, then, rejects the possibility of morally impermissible, worthy acts for Kant, and qualifies the conditions for moral worth Kerstein gives with an epistemological constraint on moral worth.”


"Problem One of the German commercial hospital chains is trying to ground their business policy on elements of Kantian moral philosophy. Allegedly, the categorical imperative is inserted as a norm of conduct into the contracts of leading officers. We discuss whether the reference to Kantian ethics is sound and is suited to improving the moral standards of hospitals."
Arguments  Scrutiny of the companies’ statements reveals that the categorical imperative is equated with the Golden Rule, which Kant explicitly rejects, and that the Golden Rule is distorted. In addition, the texts ignore that the categorical imperative entails not only duties of respect but also duties of beneficence.

Conclusion  Kantian arguments may indeed have some impact on hospital organisation but if so they should be genuine. In the case at stake, they are misused. However, even this misuse indicates an intuition that running a hospital includes moral demands.”
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Hill Jr., Thomas E.</td>
<td><em>Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory</em>, Ithaca</td>
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“Why should we be interested in Kant’s ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory.

But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, known as “Kantian constructivism” that is far superior to the traditional “value realist” theory, and that it is because of this that we should accept his theory.

It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant’s moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism. But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism rather than constructivism. Whilst my aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend it, I will try to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy of further study.”

“I argue for a new reading of Kant’s claim that respect is the moral incentive; this reading accommodates the central insights of the affectivist and intellectualist readings of respect, while avoiding shortcomings of
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>The Concept of Love in Kant’s Virtue Ethics, in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, hrsg. von Monika Betzler, Berlin, S. 147–73.</td>
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...each. I show that within Kant’s ethical system, the feeling of respect should be understood as paradigmatic of a kind of pleasure, pleasure in the moral. The motivational power of respect arises from its nature as pleasurable feeling, but the feeling does not directly motivate individual dutiful actions. Rather, the feeling is motivational in the sense that, after an agent has acted in a morally good way, the pleasure that results from that action contributes to the cultivation of virtue in the agent and, consequently, morally good actions in the future. Understanding the feeling of respect to be moral pleasure not only gives us insight into how finite rational beings develop virtue, but also a new way of understanding respect as an incentive."


“According to the long orthodox interpretation of Kant’s theory of motivation, Kant recognized only two fundamental types of motives: moral motives and egoistic, hedonistic motives. Seeking to defend Kant against the ensuing charges of psychological simplism, Andrews Reath formulated a forceful and seminal repudiation of this interpretation in his 1989 essay “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant’s Principle of Happiness.” The current paper aims to show that Reath’s popular exegetical alternative is untenable. His arguments against the traditional view miss the mark, and his revisionist interpretation of Kant’s theory of motivation cannot bear the considerable weight of the countervailing evidence.”
In this article, I examine anew the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and its contributions to educational theory. I make four claims. First, that Kant should be read as having the Categorical Imperative develop out of subjective maxims. Second, that moral self-perfection is the aim of moral education. Third, that moral self-perfection develops by children habituating the results of their moral maxims in scenarios and cases. Fourth, that character and culture, Kant’s highest aims for humanity, are the ultimate beneficiaries of this process.”

“Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to theological voluntarist accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A correct understanding of Kant’s development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism.”
This article surveys recent work on Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*, with a particular focus on his doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates, assessing the implications of such work for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations raised by Kant's first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I survey recent work on the Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and argue that it does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics. In section 3, I argue that recent work on Kant's doctrine of the practical postulates does not support an anti-realist interpretation of Kant's ethics.”

“The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial practices such as elective abortion, human embryo-destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled and those in persistent vegetative states. A review of recent work on Kant reveals the need for a careful examination of the content of Kant's biological and psychological theories and their relation to his views about moral status. Such an examination, in conjunction with Kant's practical-metaphysical analysis of the origins of freedom, reveals Kant's principled basis for his contention that all human beings possess moral status.”

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<td>1987</td>
<td>Kelkar, Meena A.</td>
<td>Formulations of the Categorical Imperative (Kant), <em>Indian Philosophical Quarterly</em> 14, S. 389–414.</td>
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In the Formula of Humanity, Kant embraces the principle that it is wrong for us to treat others merely as means. For contemporary Kantian ethicists, this Mere Means Principle plays the role of a moral constraint: it limits what we may do, even in the service of promoting the overall good. But substantive interpretations of the principle generate implausible results in relatively ordinary cases. On one interpretation, for example, you treat your opponent in a tennis tournament merely as a means and thus wrongly when you try, through defeating him, to win first place. The article aims to develop a reconstruction of the Mere Means Principle that has more plausible implications than do rival reconstructions. It sets out a sufficient condition for an agent’s treating another merely as a means. This condition is intended to be Kantian, but not necessarily one that Kant endorses.”


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104 “Although many take the formula of humanity to be Kant’s best formulation of the CI, there is no agreement on his argument for it. Kant says that the argument comes in GMM3, but that section is difficult to interpret. I draw on his remarks about cognizing other minds in the Paralogisms to interpret the argument of sub-section 2 of GMM3, the argument that rational beings must “lend” the idea of freedom to all rational beings. Kant later rejects his attempt to establish the CI in GMM3 and tries again in the fact of reason passages of the Second Critique. I follow Willaschek’s reading of these texts: Humans can cognize their freedom by performing a Gedankenexperiment where they experience their wills being moved through the moral law.” Kant tries to move from that demonstration to the claim that pure reason gives the moral law to all humans, but his argument fails. Appealing again to his theory of other minds, I argue that he could have offered a cogent argument that all humans have an efficacious moral law within.”


106 „Die Frage, ob wir von allen Menschen verlangen dürfen, denselben Moralstandards zu gehorchen, entscheidet darüber, ob es überhaupt legitim ist, globale Moralmaßstäbe, z.B. als Menschenrechte, juridisch fixieren und Verstöße entsprechend sanktionieren zu wollen. Der ethische Relativismus liefert gewichtige Argumente gegen eine affirmative Haltung dieser Frage gegenüber. Kant hat für die präskriptive Gültigkeit seines kategorischen Imperatifs für alle Menschen durch das viel diskutierte Faktum-Theorem argumentiert. Die Studie sucht die Frage zu beantworten, wie dieses von Kant
nachgerade beiläufig vorgetragene Theorem überhaupt zu verstehen ist. Dabei ist es die zentrale These des Autors, dass man nicht verstehen kann, was Kant mit dem Faktum der Vernunft meint, wenn man nicht weiß, was Vernunft (nach Kant) überhaupt ist. Aus diesem Grund geht der semantischen Analyse des Faktum-Theorems eine elaborierte Darstellung des Kantischen Vernunftbegriffs voraus. Mithilfe dieser Strategie kann die Bedeutung des Faktum-Theorems erfasst und das Theorem selbst auf seine Plausibilität hin überprüft werden.

Trotz einiger systematischer Defizite des Theorems, zeigt die Studie, dass sowohl Kants Vernunftbegriff als auch das Faktum der Vernunft unserem Alltagsbewusstsein viel vertrauter ist als es auf den ersten Blick scheinen mag.

107 “Kant’s most prominent formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is generally thought to demand that one act only on maxims that one can will as universal laws without this generating a contradiction. Kant’s view is standardly summarized as requiring the ‘universalizability’ of one’s maxims and described in terms of the distinction between ‘contradictions in conception’ and ‘contradictions in the will’. Focusing on the underappreciated significance of the simultaneity condition included in the FUL, I argue, by contrast, that the principle is better read as requiring that one be able to will two things simultaneously without self-contradiction, namely, that a maxim be one’s own and that it be a universal law. This amounts to a new interpretation of the FUL with significant interpretive and philosophical advantages.”

108 “Within Kantian ethics and Kant scholarship, it is widely assumed that autonomy consists in the self-legislation of the principle of morality (the Moral Law). In this paper, we challenge this view on both textual and philosophical grounds. We argue that Kant never unequivocally claims that the Moral Law is self-legislated and that he is not philosophically committed to this claim by his overall conception of morality. Instead, the idea of autonomy concerns only substantive moral laws (in the plural), such as the law that one ought not to lie. We argue that autonomy, thus understood, does not have the paradoxical features widely associated with it. Rather, our account highlights a theoretical option that has been neglected in the current debate on whether Kant is best interpreted as a realist or a constructivist, namely that the Moral Law is an a priori principle of pure practical reason that neither requires nor admits of being grounded in anything else.”


\(^{109}\) The paper discusses the concepts of obligation and moral evidence in Mendelssohn's and Kant's prize essays. I argue that Mendelssohn departs in significant ways from Christian Wolff's position, and that Kant
intends to overcome Wolffian philosophy with Newtonian methodology while still owing a lot to Wolff and to the project of an ethics within the limits of metaphysics. Although quite akin to Francis Hutcheson’s philosophy, it becomes clear that Kant intended to lay the foundation of an innovative concept of obligation, which shares some similarities with Christian August Crusius’s interpretation of it."

10 “Kant’s account of “precepts of prudence” raises a striking interpretive puzzle. On the one hand, he presents such precepts as normative-practical rules; on the other hand, he relegates them to theoretical philosophy. I argue that to render these two strands coherent, we must assume that our empirical nature is a “source of normativity” for us: prudence is normative for us just because we have an “unconditional” empirical desire for obtaining happiness, a maximum of pleasant sensations. Since rules of prudence cognize the means for causing a state of affairs that we desire and value insofar as we are receptive natural beings, these rules do not presuppose the active self-legislation of practical reason. Hence they belong to the theoretical cognition of nature.”

11 “I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori, objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide genuine, objective normative-practical necessities. There are no objective practical necessities in our pursuit of empirical ends and desires. Hence, non-moral agency is a rationally impoverished form of agency.”
This paper attempts to bring to light and to justify the double task that Kant confers on the categories of freedom. It will be maintained that the categories of freedom do not only function as the ratio cognoscendi of free actions within the sensible world but they are also well appropriated to ground the concepts of the good and the evil as genuine rules of moral salience (according to Herman’s well-known label), that is to say, as rules of how to detect and appraise circumstances and deeds bestowed with moral significance.
of Kant” in Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge, S. 3–42.


“Here are two widespread responses to Kant’s categorical imperative. On one hand, one might note the absence of detailed rational derivation. On the other hand, even someone who maintains some skepticism is likely to have a sense that (nevertheless) there is something to Kant’s central ideas. The recommended solution is analysis of elements of the categorical imperative. Their appeal turns out to have different

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sources. One aspect of the first formulation rests on the logic of normative utterances. But others can be justified only in terms of their contributions to desirable functionings of a moral order.”


115 “Ethical theories in the Kantian tradition tend to centre heavily on rational agency, so it may appear challenging for such theories to account for the wrongness of bodily violence, especially the wrongness of bodily violence to animals who lack rationality. This article develops a Kantian explanation for the *pro tanto* wrongness of killing or injuring animals who have agency and lack rationality, based on a Kantian explanation for the *pro tanto* wrongness of killing or injuring people. Even though morality is grounded in the will of rational agents or the value of rational agency, one does not have to be a rational agent to be morally considerable.”


116 “The traditional understanding of Kant and Kierkegaard is that their views on the good will and inwardness, respectively, commit them to denying moral luck in an attempt to isolate an omnipotent moral subject from involvement with the external world. This leaves them vulnerable to the criticism that their ethical thought unrealistically insulates morality from anything that happens in the world. On the interpretation offered here, inwardness and the good will are not contrasted with worldly happenings, but are instead a matter of worldly happenings that exhibit a particular temporal structure. Kant and Kierkegaard should not be understood as denying moral luck.”


¹¹⁸ “Kant’s comments ‘against Garve’ constitute his reaction to the latter’s remarks on Cicero’s De Officiis. Two related criticisms of Kant’s against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then taken at Garve’s claim that ‘Kantian morality destroys all incentives that can move human beings to act at all’. I argue that Kant and Garve rely on two different models of human action for their analyses of moral motivation; these models differ in what each takes to be salient for the explanation of human action. I show that Samuel Clarke’s analogy of physical explanation in the framework of Newtonianism (in his Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion) usefully illuminates the difference between Kant and Garve in these respects.”
“Since H. J. Paton’s famous commentary from 1947, Kant’s interpreters have considered a ‘deduction of the categorical imperative’ a challenge. This is quite puzzling since Kant himself never talks about such a deduction – and the famous ‘deduction’ he does mention in *Groundwork III*.4 is, as a close reading shows, not at all the deduction of a law but the deduction of a concept, of the idea of a pure lawgiving will: Only the reality of this idea can explain the possibility of – prima facie impossible – categorical imperatives and thus of morality as autonomy. The presupposition of the validity of the moral law, however, was already a cornerstone of Kant’s critical metaphysics in 1781: Moral theology (which replaces all speculative proofs of immortality and of God’s existence) depends on the moral law’s being an undisputed datum without any need for philosophical justification (‘deduction’). While in the *Groundwork* (1785) Kant tried to show the practical reality of the idea of a pure will with the help of a speculative deduction of freedom (which a reviewer described as being ‘uncritical’ in May 1786), in the second Critique (1787/88) the reality of that very idea, and with it the idea of freedom, depends (as did immortality and God’s existence in 1781) on the aforementioned practical datum, which, from that point on, Kant called a “Factum der reinen Vernunft” [fact of pure reason].”
"A standard interpretation of Kantian “maxims” sees them as expressing reasons for action, implying that we cannot act without a maxim. But recent challenges to this interpretation claim that Kant viewed acting on maxims as optional. Kant’s understanding of maxims derives from Christian Wolff, who regarded maxims as major premises of the practical syllogism. This supports the standard interpretation. Yet Kant also viewed commitments to maxims as essential for virtue and character development, which supports challenges to the standard interpretation, and raises questions about the coherence of Kant’s overall conception of the role of maxims in practical philosophy.”

"Critics have charged that there are gaps in the logic of Kant’s derivation of the formula of universal law. Here I defend that derivation against these charges, partly by emphasizing a neglected teleological principle that Kant alluded to in his argument, and partly by clarifying what he meant by actions’ “conformity to universal law.” He meant that actions conform to universal law just when their maxims can belong to a unified system of principles. An analogy with objects’ conformity to universal law in nature helps show how Kant was correct in deriving the formula of universal law from the premises of his argument."
This article argues for a distinction between reticence and lying on the basis of what Kant says about reticence in his correspondence with Maria von Herbert and in his other ethical writings, and defends this distinction against the objections of Rae Langton (“Duty and Desolation”, Philosophy 67, No. 262 (October 1992), 481–505). Lying is necessarily deceptive, whereas reticence is not necessarily deceptive. Allowing another person to remain ignorant of some matter is a form of reticence that is not deceptive. This form of reticence may be ethically permissible.”
“This chapter develops an internalist defense of the claim that we all have most reason to be moral, drawing on Kant’s argument for his “formula of humanity,” which states: “so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means.” It argues that rational pressure to form maximally coherent, systematically justifiable sets of ends gives us all reason to respect others as ends in themselves—reason that cannot be outweighed by our reasons to promote our own optional ends. It defends the Kantian argument against some prominent objections.”

“Significant effort has been devoted to locating a good argument for Kant’s Formula of Humanity. In this paper, I contrast two arguments, based on Kant’s text, for the Formula of Humanity. The first, which I call the ‘Valued Ends’ argument, is an influential and appealing argument developed most notably by Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood. Notwithstanding the appeal and influence of this argument, it ultimately fails on several counts. I therefore present as an alternative the ‘Autonomy’ argument, which is largely inspired by the failings of the Valued Ends argument.”


gorischen Imperativ ergibt, dessen Verfolgung aber trotzdem über das bloße Handeln nach verallgemeiner-
baren Maximen hinausgeht. Durch eine Neuinterpretation von Kants These, im höchsten Gut sei das Glück stets proportional zur Tugend, gelingt es dem Autor, nicht nur diese These, sondern auch Kants Aussagen über Gerechtigkeit, Glückswürdigung und Hoffnung argumentativ an den kategorischen Imperativ zu binden und damit im Kontext des höchsten Guts zu rechtfertigen. Dem Autor zufolge hat das höchste Gut somit eine wichtige eigenständige Funktion in der kantischen Ethik, ohne ihren deontologischen Charakter in Frage zu stellen.” (Verlagstext)  

Inhalt: Vorwort. Inhalt. Einleitung. Teil I: Kants deontologische Ethik. 1. Der kategorische Imperativ und all-
gemeine Glückseligkeit. 2. Gegenstände praktischer Vernunft. 3. Kants Kritik an heteronomen Moralbegrün-
dungen. Teil II: Das höchste Gut. 4. Tugend als erstes Element des höchsten Guts. 5. Glückseligkeit als zweite

126 „Regeln im Sinne von Handlungsvorschriften setzen ihre Anwendbarkeit schon begrifflich voraus. Alle Re-
geln regeln mögliches Verhalten, seien es Verkehrsregeln, juridische Gesetze, mathematische und logische Verfahren, und selbst „Bedeutungspostulate“, die festlegen, wie ein Ausdruck verständlich zu verwenden ist. Regeln ohne irgendeinen möglichen Anwendungsspielraum sind sinnlos. Dabei werden durch Regeln nicht nur mögliche Anwendungen präsupponiert, sondern umgekehrt aus gegebenen Tatsachen oder Ereignissen Regelmäßigkeiten herausgelesen, die sich in der Regel ausdrücken. Die Regel bezeichnet in diesem Sinne das „Prinzip hinter den Tatsachen“, das sie diesen freilich in gewisser Weise erst andichtet. Zweck dieses Vorgehens ist nicht zuletzt, die mögliche Fortsetzung der Tatsachenreihe gleichzeitig zu bestimmen und zu begründen, jedenfalls aber eine gewisse Ordnung, Rechtfertigung und Voraussagbarkeit des Han-
delns zu gewährleisten. Regelanwendung verlangt deshalb eine komplexe geistige Kompetenz, die nicht nur Fähigkeiten der Abstraktion und Reflexion, sondern auch Können und Erfahrung voraussetzt.”


127 “I reconsider the relation between love and respect in Kantian ethics, taking as my guide Iris Murdoch’s view of love as the fundamental moral attitude and a kind of attention to individuals. It is widely supposed that Kantian ethics disregards individuals, since we don’t respect individuals but the universal quality of personhood they instantiate. We need not draw this conclusion if we recognise that Kant and Murdoch share a view about the centrality of love to virtue. We can then see that respect in the virtuous person cannot be blind to the individual, as critics of Kantian ethics contend. My approach contrasts recent efforts (Velleman and Bagnoli) to assimilate Kantian respect to Murdochian love, which overlook Murdoch’s distinctive claims about the singularity of moral activity. This idea is not as un-Kantian as it seems, and it should inform any Kantian ethics that aims to address the charge about individuals.”

128 “My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians take practical reasoning to be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the grounds that it need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this conception of practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical debate – each side of which, I argue, points to issues that need to be jointly accommodated in the account of practical reason. From the constructivist, I accept the essential efficacy of practical reason; from the realist, I accept that any genuinely cognitive exercise of practical reason owes allegiance to what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. I conclude that a Kantian account of recognition respect enables us to accommodate both claims.”

129 “There can be no doubt that Kant thought we should be reflective: we ought to care to make up our own minds about how things are and what is worth doing. Philosophical objections to the Kantian reflective ideal have centred on concerns about the excessive control that the reflective person is supposed to exert over their own mental life, and Kantians who feel the force of these objections have recently drawn attention to Kant’s conception of moral virtue as it is developed in his later work, chiefly the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Melissa Merritt’s book is a distinctive contribution to this recent turn to virtue in Kant scholarship. Merritt argues that we need a clearer, and textually more comprehensive, account of what reflection is, in order not only to understand Kant’s account of virtue, but also to appreciate how it effectively rebuts long-standing objections to the Kantian reflective ideal.”

130 “In ‘On the Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’, Kant defends a position that cannot be salvaged. The essay is nonetheless important because it helps us understand his philosophy of law and, more specifically, his interpretation of the social contract. Kant considers truthfulness a strict legal duty because it is the necessary condition for the juridical state. As attested by Kant’s rejection of Beccaria’s arguments against
the death penalty, not even the right to life has such strict unconditional status. Within the juridical state, established by the social contract, the (single) innate right to freedom is transformed into a bundle of merely positive rights, including the right to life. Understanding the reason for the rejection of ‘the right to lie from philanthropy’ thus helps us understand the, in a sense, ‘positivist’ character of Kant’s legal philosophy. In conclusion, some suggestions are made to bring his position closer to our common moral understanding.”

131 “I defend a strong version of the Kantian claim that actions done solely from duty have moral worth by (1) considering pure cases of acting from duty, (2) showing that love and sympathy, unlike a sense of duty, can often lead us to do the wrong thing, (3) carefully distinguishing moral from non-moral virtues, and (4) by distinguishing pathological sympathy from practical sympathy. Not only is acting purely from a sense of duty superior to acting from love and sympathetic feelings, but the cold-heartedness found in Kant’s examples should be thought of as a virtue rather than a vice.”

132 “Some commentators have condemned Kant’s moral project from a feminist perspective based on Kant’s apparently dim view of women as being innately morally deficient. Here I will argue that although his remarks concerning women are unsettling at first glance, a more detailed and closer examination shows that Kant’s view of women is actually far more complex and less unsettling than that attributed to him by various feminist critics. My argument, then, undercuts the justification for the severe feminist critique of Kant’s moral project.”


133 “In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant’s categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary to implement the derived principle. The analysis demonstrates the moral significance of the weak principle of universalization and its epistemic advantage over the categorical imperative.”

134 “I begin with Kant’s notion of a maxim and consider the role which this notion plays in Kant’s formulations of the fundamental categorical imperative. This raises the question of what a maxim is, and why there is not the same requirement for resolutions of other kinds to be universalizable. Drawing on Bernard Williams’ notion of a thick ethical concept, I proffer an answer to this question which is intended neither in a spirit of simple exegesis nor as a straightforward exercise in moral philosophy but as something that is poised somewhere between the two. My aim is to provide a kind of rational reconstruction of Kant. In the final section of the essay, I argue that this reconstruction, while it manages to salvage something distinctively Kantian, also does justice to the relativism implied in what J. L. Mackie calls ‘people’s adherence to and participation in different ways of life’.”

“Kant scholars since the early nineteenth century have disa-greed about how to interpret his theory of moral motivation. Kant tells us that the feeling of respect is the incentive to moral action, but he is notoriously ambiguous on the question of what exactly this means. In *Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action*, Iain Morrisson offers a new view on Kant’s theory of moral action. In a clear, straightforward style, Morrisson responds to the ongoing interpretive stalemate by taking an original approach to the problem. Whereas previous commentators have attempted to understand Kant’s feeling of respect by studying the relevant textual evidence in isolation, Morrisson illuminates this evidence by determining what Kant’s more general theory of action commits him to regarding moral action. After looking at how Kant’s treatment of desire and feeling can be reconciled with his famous account of free maxim-based action, Morrisson argues that respect moves us to moral action in a way that is structurally parallel to the way in which nonmoral pleasure motivates nonmoral action.

In reconstructing a unified theory of action in Kant, Morrisson integrates a number of distinct elements in his practical philosophy. *Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action* is part of a new wave of interest in Kant’s anthropological (that is, psychological) works.” (Publisher’s (Ohio University Press) description)


139 „In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims about conscience in his moral writings of the 1790s reveal a fundamental instability in his moral philosophy. The central issue is the relationship between the moral law as the form of universality and the judgment of individuals about specific cases. Against Thomas Hill’s claim that Kant has only a limited role for conscience, I argue that conscience has a comprehensive role in Kantian deliberation. I unpack the claims about conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals to show that they describe conscience as both a basic act of self-consciousness and as an all-things-considered judgment. I outline the role of conscience in moral motivation, and argue that taken together Kant’s writings about conscience reveal a way to rethink Kant’s conception of the Fact of Reason.”

140 “In Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account, Jeanine Grenberg argues for the centrality to Kant’s ethics of the experience of the feeling of moral constraint, especially as that feeling is described in Kant’s fact of reason argument. She criticizes interpretations of the fact of reason that interpret it as primarily a certain kind of act. I defend my version of an act-based interpretation against Grenberg’s criticisms, flesh out the Fichtean background of that interpretation and raise some further questions about Grenberg’s account.”


This paper is concerned with the normative content of Kant’s formula of humanity (FH). More specifically, does FH, as some seem to think, imply the specific and rigid prescriptions in ‘standard’ deontological theories? To this latter question, I argue, the answer is ‘no’. I propose reading FH largely through the formula of autonomy and the formula of the kingdom of ends, where I understand FA to describe the nature of the capacity of humanity – a capacity for self-governance. The latter, I suggest, is akin to the capacity for planning and intentional action described in Michael Bratman’s work. A significant part of what FH requires, I then propose, is that we exercise these capacities for planning in such a way that we accommodate and coordinate with the (permissible) plans and intentions of others. Kant himself, as do many commentators, emphasizes the idea that our human capacities give us a distinctive kind of value. On my interpretation, by contrast, what is fundamentally important is not the value of the capacities but rather what they make possible: distinctive ways of mistreating (using) persons, but also a distinctive kind of morally desirable relationship.

The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant.

Kant maintains that it is easy to see how hypothetical imperatives are possible, because the following proposition is analytic: “Whoever wills the end also wills (in so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that is within his control”. When we realize that “rationality” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant.


Against this, I argue that the derivation of an imperative from an act of willing an end is an act of synthesis, and that analysis of the concept of ‘my willing an end’ merely yields the possibility of hypothetical imperatives.”


145 “Writers like Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood understand Kant’s idea of rational nature as an end in itself as a commitment to a substantive value. This makes it hard for them to explain the supposed equivalence between the universal law and humanity formulations of the categorical imperative, since the former does not appear to assert any substantive value. Nor is it easy for defenders of value-based readings
to explain Kant's claim that the law-giving nature of practical reason makes all beings with practical reason regard the idea of a rational nature as an end in itself. This article seeks to replace these value-based readings with a reading of the idea of rational nature as an end that fits better with the overall argument of the *Groundwork*.”

146 “It is commonly thought that on Kant’s view of action, ‘everyone always acts on maxims’. Call this the ‘descriptive reading’. This reading faces two important problems. First, the idea that people always act on maxims offends against common sense: it clashes with our ordinary ideas about human agency. Second, there are various passages in which Kant says that it is ‘rare’ and ‘admirable’ to firmly adhere to a set of basic principles that we adopt for ourselves. This article offers an alternative: the ‘normative reading’. On this reading, it is a normative ideal to adopt and act on maxims: it is one of the things we would do if our reason were fully in control of our decision-making.”

147 “This paper considers two contenders for the title of highest good in Kant’s theory of practical reason: happiness proportioned to virtue and the maximization of happiness and virtue. I defend the ‘proportionality thesis’ against criticisms made by Andrews Reath and others, and show how it resolves a dualism between prudential and moral practical reasoning. By distinguishing between the highest good as a principle of evaluation and an object of agency, I conclude that the maximization of happiness and virtue is a corollary of the instantiation of the proportionality thesis.”
Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart – the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral self-knowledge and moral self-knowledge requires a theoretical commitment to a conception of the moral self, sound moral agency is for Kant crucially tied to theory. Kant plausibly holds that self-knowledge is a protection against moral confusion and self-deception. I conclude that although his account relies too heavily on the awareness of moral law to explain its connection to moral development, it is insightful and important in Kantian ethics.
“In Theory and Practice Kant challenges the well-worn view that practitioners do not need to rely on theory. He acknowledges that experts with a deep knowledge of theory may fail as practitioners both in technical matters, and in matters of morality and justice. However, since action-guiding theories are intended to shape rather than to fit the world, practitioners have no point of reference other than the theories or principles that they seek to enact. If theories of duty appear to offer too little guidance for action, they should look for more rather than fewer principles, which will enable them to guide their practical judgement with greater, if still incomplete, specificity.”


“Kant’s distinction between duties of right and of virtue remains controversial, for a number of reasons. A close look at the distinctions he draws and the claims that he makes suggests that a distinction between the
requirements of enforceable duties of right and of unenforceable duties of virtue is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is not exclusive because it is possible to fulfil duties of right as a matter of principle, in which case what is done is both right and virtuous. It is not exhaustive because certain duties, among them the duty to enter a civil condition and duties of equity, are not in principle enforceable, yet are duties of right."

152 “Kant’s attempts to provide a foundation for morality are examined, with particular focus upon the fact of reason proof in the second Critique. The reconstructions proposed by Allison and Korsgaard are analysed in detail. Although analogous in many ways, they ultimately differ in their understanding of the relation between this proof and that presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A synthesis of the two reconstructions is proposed which amounts to combining Korsgaard’s awareness of the issue of agent-situatedness, with Allison’s emphasis upon the pivotal role of the notion of transcendental freedom. The reconstructed proof relies upon a teleological assumption about human agency, and thus does not provide an unconditional grounding for the moral law. After a brief examination of contemporary approaches to the grounding of a universal morality in the broadly Kantian tradition, the paper concludes with a suggestion as to how the value of freedom can form the core of an adequate response to reason’s demand for such a ground.”

153 “In this paper I argue that, on Kant’s view, the work of genius serves as a sensible exhibition of the Idea of the highest good. In other words, the work of genius serves as a special sign that the world is hospitable to our moral ends and that the realization of our moral vocation in such a world may indeed be possible. In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate that the purpose of the highest good is not to strengthen our motivation to accept the moral law as binding for us but, rather, to strengthen our motivation to persist in our already existent moral dispositions. In the second part, I show that the works of genius exhibit the Idea of the highest good and, consequently, strengthen our hope in its realization. Drawing on the results of the second part, the third part of the paper demonstrates that beauty, of both art and nature, symbolizes morality in a more substantive sense than that suggested by Henry Allison’s “formalistic” interpretation. Since, on my view, fine art in Kant serves as a sensible representation of an undetermined conceptual content, or the Idea of the highest good, the fourth part of the paper addresses the vexed question of whether Kant’s account of fine art already anticipates the cognitive role later attributed to it by the German Idealists.”
Critics of Kant’s moral philosophy often object that his emphasis on individual autonomy makes him unable to account for our ‘second-personal’ or ‘bipolar’ duties. These are duties we owe to other people rather than duties we have with respect to them – as we might have duties with respect to the environment or works of art. With a recent and novel formulation of this objection as my foil, I argue that the apparent force of the ‘bipolarity’ objections rests on a failure to appreciate Kant’s inherently practical approach to ethics. On the positive side, reflection on criticisms of Kant’s treatment of ‘bipolar’ normativity helps to shed new light on his conception of practical agency and its place in his system of morals.

Kant’s Formula of Humanity famously forbids treating others merely as a means. It is unclear, however, what exactly treating someone merely as a means comes to. This essay argues against an interpretation of this idea advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. The essay then develops a new interpretation that suggests an important connection between the Formula of Humanity and Kant’s political philosophy: the content of many of our moral duties depends on the results of political philosophy and, indeed, on the results of actual political decision making.

There are several senses in which Kant’s moral law is independent of sensibility. This paper is devoted mainly to Kant’s account of ‘physical conditions independence’, or the idea that the moral law can compel us to pursue ends that might be impossible to realize empirically. Since this idea has received little attention from commentators, this paper addresses both its textual basis in Kant’s writings and its overall philosophical viability.


“This paper introduces Husserl’s ethics by examining his critique of Kant’s ethics. It presents Husserl’s lectures on ethics in which he offers his own ethical theory in a historical context. The phenomenological ethics seeks to combine the advantages of both the traditional empiricism and rationalism. Husserl’s ethics takes into account that emotions play an essential role in the constitution of values and morals. Contrariwise, Husserl fights against relativism in ethics and praises Kant for the discovery of an absolute moral imperative. He considers Kant’s ethics as a rationalistic position that is too formal and that does not take into account that every will must be motivated by some concrete material good that is evaluated in our feelings or emotions.”

“The contribution starts with the observation that Kant mentioned Human Dignity in his main works with great variety in emphasis. In the ‘Grundlegung’ from 1785 we find a significant treatment and again in the ‘Tugendlehre’ from 1798 but none in the ‘Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft’ from 1788 and in the ‘Rechtslehre’ from 1797. This needs an explanation. In the ‘Grundlegung’ human dignity is not attached to the second formula of the categorical imperative, the formula of self-purposiveness, as it is often assumed, but to the third formula of a kingdom of ends. It is there explained as self-legislation. This placement needs also an explanation, which is attempted by the article. In the ‘Tugendlehre’ human dignity is then explained as self-purposiveness. So Kant changed his understanding of human dignity from the ‘Grundlegung’ to the ‘Tugendlehre’. But the question is: why?”
Kant identifies what are in fact Free Riders as the most noxious species of polemicists: those who attack metaphysical beliefs in the existence of God, freedom or immortality as lacking empirical proof, in order to conceal the flimsy metaphysical foundations of their own cynicism. Kant thinks polemic reduces the stature and authority of reason to a method of squabbling that destabilizes social equilibrium and portends disintegration into the Hobbesian state of nature. In the first Critique, Kant agrees with Hobbes that this process can only be reversed through consensual agreement to relinquish the unlimited freedom of this state for the authority of law. He proposes two textually related solutions to the Free Rider problem: First, a critique of reason in its polemical use in the first Critique, and, in the Groundwork, its application to the Free Rider’s self-defensive polemical subterfuge. Second, he argues that promise-keeping is a perfect duty that allows no exceptions “to the advantage of inclination.” These two solutions appear as connected steps in Kant’s attempted derivation of perfect and imperfect duties from the categorical imperative. The questionable success of the derivation does not affect the independent merit of either solution. The first enables us to better appreciate the role of those laws in structuring and regulating our empirical agency. The second enables us to mend the Social Contract and reverse our descent into Hobbes’ state of nature. The first solution enables us to see the point of the second.”
After decades of vigorous debate, many contemporary philosophers in the Kantian tradition continue to believe, or at least hope, that morality can be given a firm grounding by showing that rational agents cannot consistently reject moral requirements. In the present paper, I do not take a stand on the possibility of bringing out the alleged inconsistency. Instead I argue that, even if a successful argument could be given for this inconsistency, this would not provide an adequate answer to “the normative question” (i.e., “why should I be moral?”). My defense of this claim emerges from a defense of a claim about Kant, namely, that he did not attempt to answer the normative question in this way. After carefully articulating Kant’s answer to the normative question, I argue that his answer to this question contains a lesson about why we should not embrace the approach that is popular among many contemporary Kantians.”


163 “In his applied moral philosophy, Kant formulates the parents’ duty to make their child happy. I argue that, for Kant, this duty is an ad hoc attempt at compensating for the parental guilt of having brought a person into the condition of existence – and hence also having created her need for happiness – on their own initiative. I argue that Kant’s considerations regarding parental duties and human reproduction in general imply arguments for an ethically justified anti-natalism, but that this position is abolished in his teleology for meta-ethical reasons.”

164 “The third section of Kant’s *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* is one of the most difficult texts to interpret in practical philosophy. The aim of the argumentation and structure of the text remain contentious to this day and its interpretation is largely contingent on questions of philology. The commentary presented in this book interprets the section word by word along the text, calling into question several popular research hypotheses.”


¹⁶⁵ Foreword. Introduction. 1 Humans as Hybrids. 2 A Brief Exercise in Transcendental Idealism. 3 The Moral Law. 4 The Fact of Reason. 5 The Will. 6 Value. 7 The Highest Good. 8 Aufklärung. 9 Social Life. 10 Conclusion. Bibliography. Subject Index. Index of Names.


“Andrews Reath presents a selection of his best essays on various features of Kant’s moral psychology and moral theory, with particular emphasis on his conception of rational agency and his conception of autonomy. The opening essays explore different elements of Kant’s views about motivation, including his account of respect for morality as the distinctive moral motive and his view of the principle of happiness as a representation of the shared structure of non-moral choice. These essays stress the unity of Kant’s moral psychology by arguing that moral and non-moral considerations motivate in essentially the same way. Several of the essays develop an original approach to Kant’s conception of autonomy that emphasizes the political metaphors found throughout Kant’s writings on ethics. They argue that autonomy is best interpreted not as a psychological capacity, but as a kind of sovereignty: in claiming that moral agents have autonomy, Kant regards them as a kind of sovereign legislator with the power to give moral law through their willing. The final essays explore some of the implications of this conception of autonomy elsewhere in Kant’s moral thought, arguing that his Formula of Universal Law uses this conception of autonomy to generate substantive moral principles and exploring the connection between Kantian self-legislation and duties to oneself. The collection offers revised versions of several previously published essays, as well as two new papers, ‘Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality’ and ‘Agency and Universal Law’. It will be of interest to all students and scholars of Kant, and to many moral philosophers.”

Contents: 1 Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination. 2 Hedonism, Heteronomy, and Kant’s Principle of Happiness. 3 The Categorical Imperative and Kant’s Conception of Practical Rationality. 4 Legislating the Moral Law. 5 Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality. 6 Legislating for a Realm of Ends: The Social Dimension of Autonomy. 7 Agency and Universal Law. 8 Duties to Oneself and Self-Legislation. 9 Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant’s Ethics.


167 “This article explores a set of questions about the ‘idea of freedom’ that Kant introduces in the fourth paragraph of *Groundwork* III. I develop a reading that supports treating it as a normative notion and brings out its normative content in some detail. I argue that we should understand the idea as follows: that it is a general feature of reasoning and judgement that it understands itself to be a correct or sound application of the normative standards of the relevant domain of cognition, not influenced by irrelevant or external factors. Reasoning and judgement are thus normatively committed to these standards of correctness. A second and related concern is to explore connections between the idea of freedom and Kant’s conception of autonomy and to identify different points at which autonomy plays a role in the argument of *Groundwork* III. In the final section, I mine the idea of freedom for a set of normative commitments specific to rational agency that play a foundational role in Kant’s moral conception.”


169 “The paper tries to defend the Augustinian and Kantian position on the moral problem of lying against the popular opinion that this position must be rejected as an inhuman rigorism. The first part argues that Augustine and Kant do not intend to condemn entirely any kind of lying in any single case, which would be the task of (the power of) judgment (Urteilskraft). Rather, they strive for a clarification of lying as a
fundamental moral concept of language. Those concepts are not morally neutral, as consequentialist positions hold, but function rather as a kind of conceptual measure or compass for moral judgment. That means that single lies can be excusable or an inevitable evil. But under no circumstance do we have a right or even an obligation to lie. The second part shows how the moral prohibition against lying as a linguistic act can be argued for - as Augustine and Kant do - by reflection on the anthropological meaning of language for human existence. For this purpose, following the phenomenological tradition three meanings of language are distinguished: 1. language as object, 2. language as practice, 3. language as “Sinnhorizont” (conceptual structured horizon of sense)."
bridge, S. 230–47.


171 “The idea that our most basic duty is to treat each other with respect is one of the Enlightenment’s greatest legacies and Kant is often thought to be one of its most powerful defenders. If Kant’s project were successful then the lofty notion that humanity is always worthy of respect would be vindicated by pure practical reason. Further, this way of defending the ideal is supposed to reflect our autonomy, insofar as it is always one’s own reason that demands that one treat humanity with respect. In this article, I consider what i take to be one of the most important and compelling attempts to defend the Kantian project. I draw the
disappointing conclusion that this attempt does not succeed. The reasons this attempt fails shed some light on the difficulties facing any attempt to defend the Kantian project.”

172 “In the middle section of Theory and Practice, Kant speaks briefly ‘against Hobbes’; but for a fuller version of Kant’s anti-Hobbesianism one must turn to the three Critiques, the Groundwork, and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. It is in those works that one learns that, for Kant, Hobbes’s notion of ‘will’ as fully determined ‘last appetite’ destroys the freedom needed to take ‘ought’ or moral necessity as the motives for self-determined action; that Hobbes’s version of the social contract is thus incoherent; that Hobbes is not even able to show how moral ideas (i.e. ‘ought’) are conceivable through the ‘pressure’ of ‘outward objects’. For Kant, in short, Hobbes has no adequate notions of will, freedom, moral necessity, ideation, or even obligatory contract, and therefore fails in his own stated aims.”

173 “I criticize the widely accepted “practical” interpretation of the universality test contained in Kant’s first formula of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – the formula of the universal law of nature. I argue that this interpretation does not work for contradictions in conception because it wrongly takes contradictions in the will as the model for them and, as a consequence, cannot establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction. This interpretation also assumes an understanding of universality that departs from Kant’s own and, cannot, for this reason, capture the kind of contradiction that he explicitly claims to establish. I provide an alternative interpretation, which I call revised logical interpretation, that allows us to account for contradictions in conception, including those examples that the practical interpretation cannot handle, as well as to establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction.”
“Immanuel Kant, in a much-maligned view, thought that we could only have indirect duties to nonhuman animals who have no inherent moral value since they lack rationality. While there are various responses to this worrisome position, no one seems to consider that animals could conceivably qualify as having rationality, even on Kantian high standards. Animals engage in various activities (such as playing, seeking revenge, and altruistically helping others) that could be taken as indicators of the core aspects of rationality that Kant requires for having absolute worth (such as a reflective self-consciousness, a free end-setting ability, and the ability to make moral demands on others). While these animal behaviors will not prove that animals are rational, we must remember that we also cannot prove that other humans are rational. Instead, my goal is only to provide a basis for a precautionary moral principle that requires treating animals as minimally rational, given that they might be. On this basis, we ought to accept some direct Kantian duties for the respectful treatment of animals.”

“Before and in the Groundwork, Kant argues as follows for the validity of the moral law: we want to be free. Following the moral law is the only way to be free. So we should follow the moral law. The first premise of this syllogism is treated differently before and in the Groundwork. First Kant thought it an empirical fact that men want to be free and want it more than anything else. Later he sought an a priori argument showing that we ought to want to be free and are right in thinking it good. The former justification of the moral law is superior. When we look to “salvage the normative core of Kantian moral philosophy” (Guyer 445), we should turn to it. – So far Paul Guyer.

It is evident that Guyer fails to describe Kant’s thought in the Groundwork. It is equally clear that Kant never held the position Guyer claims he held before the Groundwork. (The quotations Guyer gives in support of his claim show this.) Therefore I shall not discuss Guyer’s interpretation of Kant. Instead I shall consider the philosophical merits of the position he ascribes to the pre-critical Kant, and which he recommends as superior. We shall see that that position makes no sense. This indirectly addresses the interpretive question, as it is a reason against ascribing it to Kant.”


178 “This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant’s practical project, according to which maxims are made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant’s theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we are (viz., uncaused causes). This solves the neglected puzzle of why there are passages in Kant’s works suggesting robust analogies between mathematics and ethics, since to universalize a maxim is to test a priori whether a practical object with that particular content can be constructed. An apparent problem with this hypothesis is that the medium of practical sensibility (feeling) does not play a role analogous to the medium of theoretical sensibility (intuition). In response I distinguish two separate Kantian accounts of mathematical apriority. The thesis that maxim universalization is a species of construction, and thus a priori, turns out to be consistent with the account of apriority that informs Kant’s understanding of actual mathematical practice.”


Sato, Tsutomu (2008): Chemical Affinity in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, in *Recht und Frieden in

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179 “Derek Parfit’s *On What Matters* is widely recognized as elegant, profound, and destined to change the landscape of moral philosophy. In Volume One, Parfit argues that the distinct—indeed, powerfully conflicting—theories of deontology and contractualism can be woven together in a way so as to yield utilitarian conclusions. Husain Sarkar in this book calls this, *The Ultimate Derivation*. Sarkar argues, however, that this derivation is untenable. To underwrite this conclusion, this book traverses considerable Parfitian terrain. Sarkar shows why Parfit hasn’t quite solved what Sidgwick had called “the profoundest problem in ethics”; he offers a reading of Kant, Rawls, and Scanlon that reveals Parfit’s keen utilitarian bias; and he demonstrates why Parfit’s *Triple Theory* does not succeed in its task of unifying conflicting moral theories (without making substantial utilitarian assumptions). The final chapter of the book is about meta-ethics. It shows that Parfit’s *Convergence Principle* is mistaken even though it unveils Parfit’s utterly humane concerns: Moral philosophers are not, as Parfit thinks, climbing the same mountain. But for all that, Sarkar maintains, Parfit’s book is arguably the greatest consequential tract in the history of moral philosophy.”
Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant’s framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.


182 “In the Introduction of the Tugendlehre, Kant identifies love of human beings as one of the four moral predispositions that make us receptive to the moral law. We claim that this love is neither benevolence nor the aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general (both are also called love of human beings); rather it is amor complacentiae, which Kant understands as the delight in moral striving for perfection. We also provide a detailed analysis of Kant’s almost completely neglected theory of moral predispositions. They are necessary conditions to be aware of the moral law and to be motivated by it.”

183 “Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according
to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is not, and could not be, introduced in paragraphs 9–13 of Groundwork. 1. Further, I will argue that the first proposition as I understand it can also be reconstructed as the conclusion (‘Folgerung’) of a deductive argument proper; however, I will also discuss the option that ‘Folgerung’ could be understood as a corollary rather than a conclusion. Finally, Allison’s own interpretation will be criticized.”

184 “Kant is by no means the pure rationalist that Husserl and others represented him as being. To the contrary I claim that Kant is an ethical intuitionist when it comes to our recognition of the validity of the moral law. Interpreting Kant’s famous thesis about the “fact of reason”, I will first argue for three interpretative theses: 1. The factum theory explains our insight into the binding character of the moral law; it is a theory of justification. 2. In our consciousness of the categorical imperative, the moral law is immediately given in its unconditional and binding validity. 3. The unconditional validity of the CI is given in the feeling of respect. Drawing on basic thoughts of Reformed Epistemology, I will then sketch a way to defend Kant’s theory.”
In Kant’s writings there is no worked out theory of values. Nonetheless, he has given some hints as to what such a Kantian theory of value might look like. I argue for the claim that his theory should be classified as a version of a fitting-attitude theory of value that is nowadays advocated by several philosophers. Values are, according to Kant, dependent on proper pro-attitudes (Kant’s term for pro-attitudes is Wohlgefallen). In order for a pro-attitude to be apt, the pro-attitude must be explained by reasons that are grounded in properties the attitude is about. One problem for this view is the so-called “wrong kinds of reasons problem”. According to my view, this problem can be solved by delivering distinct definitions of aptness for first- and second-order pro-attitudes. I try to show that Kant has hinted at this solution for the “wrong kinds of reasons problem”.

According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don’t-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some – those who have an end.

This paper explores the relevance of Kant’s categorical imperative to military ethics and the solution it suggests for improving the treatment of women in the military. The second formulation of the categorical imperative makes universal respect for humanity a moral requirement by asserting that one must always treat other people as means in themselves and never as merely means to an end. This principle is a promising guide for military ethics and can be reconciled with the acts of violence required by war. This
paper argues that it can also regulate soldiers’ relations to each other and that it may contribute to reorienting military culture in a way that overcomes the biases against female military personnel.”

188 “In her seminal attack on modern moral philosophy, G. E. M. Anscombe claims that Kant’s ‘rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it’. Although this so-called problem of relevant descriptions has received considerable attention in the literature, there is little agreement on how it should be understood or solved. My aim in this paper is, first, to clarify the problem by clearing up several misunderstandings, and, second, to show that the problem is rooted in a standard assumption about Kant’s stance on the scope of moral principles—an assumption that precludes its solution. I argue that the problem consists in the fact that Kant’s formula of universal law seems to stand in need of an account of moral sensibility that does not render the formula superfluous. But, as my discussion of existing solutions reveals, there can be no such account. Instead, I propose a dissolution: we should think of the formula of universal law itself as Kant’s account of moral sensibility. In order to do so, we must reject the standard assumption that a principle is universal if and only if it holds for all instances of the action type that it specifies.”

189 “Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both as an interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent.”
“Since more than 50 years Kant scholars debate the question whether the Law of Right as introduced in the *Metaphysics of Morals* by Kant can be justified by the Categorical Imperative. On the one hand we have those who think that Kant’s theory of right depends from the Categorical Imperative, on the other hand we find a growing group of scholars who deny this. However, the debate has been flawed by confusion and misunderstanding of the crucial terms and principles. Therefore, my first task will be to clarify these terms and principles by introducing distinctions that have been neglected too often. After this I try to show a) that the Law of Right can in fact be justified by using the testing method the Categorical Imperative prescribes and b) that there is no other way to justify it. Doing this I criticize in detail the new arguments adherents of the independence thesis have recently put forward.”

“This article addresses a foundational issue in Kant’s moral philosophy, the question of the relation of the Categorical Imperative to value. There is an important movement in current Kant scholarship that argues that there is a value underlying the Categorical Imperative. However, some scholars have raised doubts as to whether Kant has a conception of value that could ground the Categorical Imperative. In this paper I seek to add to these doubts by arguing, first, that value would have to be of a particular kind in order to be the foundation of Kant’s moral philosophy. Second, I argue that Kant does not have such a conception of value,
Sensen, Oliver (2011): *Kant on Human Dignity*, Berlin. – Vgl. Dazu [60], [156], [778] und [1268].


and that his arguments rule out that value could ground his moral philosophy. I then outline an alternative reading of how Kant uses ‘inner value’. My conclusion will be that Kant does not derive the Categorical Imperative from an underlying value. While some of his passages could also be read as if value were foundational for Kant, a close look at these passages and his arguments point away from this conclusion.”

Kant’s ethical Platonism (S. 93), The Categorical Imperative (S. 95), Formal and substantive rationality (S. 104), The existence of the categorical imperative (S. 107), Rational autonomy and moral legislation (S. 114), The dialectic of practical reason (S. 126), Religion of practical reason (S. 131), The immanent ideas (S. 135).

“The role of hypothetical acts, as opposed to actual acts, has been neglected in understanding the nature of what is required by the Respect for Persons formulation of the Categorical Imperative in concrete moral
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relations between persons. This had led to a failure to understand fully the way and the extent to which the Categorical Imperative may be present in all such relations with others as encapsulated in an appropriate attitude towards others that may refer to hypothetical acts, as well as actual acts. The result is an underestimation of the direct relevance and moral efficacy of the Categorical Imperative.“

194 “I argue that rationalists need not adopt Kant’s method for determining what one has reason to do, where by “Kant’s method” I mean the view that normative guidance comes only from directives imposed on the agent by the agent’s own will. I focus on Kant’s argument for “imperatives of skill,” one sort of hypothetical imperative. I argue, against Korsgaard, that Kant’s argument is neither better nor significantly different than the sort of argument non-Kantian rationalists offer. I close by arguing that Korsgaard is wrong to think that her question “why should I care about performing the means to my ends?” is a serious worry.”


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195 “In this essay, I examine the motive of inner truthfulness in the moral philosophy of Kant, which came to the fore in his work in the 1790s. Truthfulness and sincerity are interpreted as the roots of all morality. In the first chapter, I present two interpretations of inner honesty from two different perspectives: in relation to a duty to oneself and to the issue of conscience. The second chapter (the core of the essay) works out the main demand of truthfulness, especially in the context of the theory of radical evil from *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. As a last step, I show that with the motive of truthfulness, Kant’s philosophy meets the thinking of F. Nietzsche, with its emphasis on sincerity.”

196 “This paper aims to offer an analysis of ‘Against Hobbes’, the title of the second section of Kant’s essay *On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory but is of no Use in Practice*. The paper suggests that we should take the title ‘Against Hobbes’ seriously and that Kant meant to target Hobbes as the standard-bearer of the old regime and in particular Hobbes’s claim that the Head of state cannot act unjustly against his citizens. It is argued that Kant’s interpretation of Hobbes conforms to what can be regarded as the majority view in Hobbesian scholarship and that Kant poses a serious challenge to Hobbes, in so far as he removes the very foundations from Hobbes’s argument on justice, namely, a specific notion of natural law. Finally the paper highlights Kant’s lack of interest in engaging with possible Hobbesian counter-arguments.”


197 "There has long been a suspicion that Kant’s test for the universalizability of maxims can be easily subverted: instead of risking failing the test, design your maxim for any action whatsoever in a manner guaranteed to pass. This is the problem of maxim-fiddling. The present discussion of this problem has two theses:
1) That extant approaches to maxim-fiddling are not satisfactory;
2) That a satisfactory response to maxim-fiddling can be articulated using Kantian resources, especially the first two formulations of the categorical imperative.
This approach to maxim-fiddling draws our attention to a Kantian notion of an offence against Morality itself that has largely been overlooked."


199 Inhalt: Einleitung (1), Der Apriorismus der theoretischen Philosophie Kants (4), Der Begriff der praktischen Vernunft (22), Der Apriorismus der praktischen Vernunft (37), Glückseligkeit und Sittlichkeit (48), Der Formalismus der Kantischen Ethik (63), Die Lehre von der Freiheit (77), Das Gefühl der Achtung (91), Der Begriff des höchsten Gutes (97), Die Postulate der praktischen Vernunft (117–29).

200 ”The author argues against Christine Korsgaard’s influential interpretation of Kant’s contradiction in conception test of the categorical imperative. Korsgaard’s rejection of the ‘teleological’ interpretation is shown to be based on a misunderstanding of the role that teleology plays for Kant in ruling out immoral maxims, and her defence of the ‘practical’ interpretation is shown to be less faithful to the text than the competing ‘logical’ interpretation. The works of Barbara Herman and Allen Wood are also discussed and evaluated.”


202 “The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of 'ought implies can' is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so that there is an important divergence here which can easily be overlooked.”


204 “I discuss the relation between Kant’s trust in the rational capacities of ordinary agents and education. First, I show that Kant is very optimistic regarding our common moral capacities. Then I discuss what room this leaves for moral education. I argue that a discussion of Kant's conception of moral education should distinguish between different functions of education: (i) education is necessary for agents to make the transition from a purely instrumental to a pure practical use of reason (Basic Education); (ii) education can strengthen the motivational force of the moral law by presenting the moral law in all its dignity and clarity (Motivational Education); (iii) education can instruct agents about the source of morality and offer an abstract formula of the Categorical Imperative (Philosophical Education); and (iv) education can enhance agents’ capacity to apply general moral principles to concrete cases (Education of Judgement).”
There is a consensus that Kant’s aim in the *Groundwork* is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents’ motivation, protect against self-deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant’s *Groundwork* shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self-deception and without being influenced by misleading theory, is deficient. Critical practical philosophy needs to set right agents about the stringency of some of their duties, and agents need to be made aware that they have certain other duties. I discuss how Kant corrects the common agent’s notion of the stringency of the duty to not make false promises and how Kant corrects the common agent’s notion of duties to self. I finally discuss how his critical practical philosophy can become popular and achieve the correction of the common perspective. I stress the role of education informed by philosophical theory for this and contrast it with so called ‘popular philosophy’.

I discuss the problem that Kant’s ethics seems to be incapable of capturing our strong intuition that emergencies create a context for actions that is very different from other cases of helping and from other opportunities to further obligatory ends. I argue that if we pay attention to how Kant grounds beneficence we see that distress and emergency function as constitutive concerns. They are vital to establishing the duty of beneficence in the first place, and they also guide the application of duties to specific cases. Kant’s conception of imperfect duties to others, when understood correctly, offers a way to understand why emergencies are morally important, but also why other factors have a place in our moral reasoning.

Common sense tells us that in certain circumstances, helping someone is morally obligatory. That intuition appears incompatible with Kant’s account of beneficence as a wide imperfect duty, and its implication that agents may exercise latitude over which beneficent actions to perform. In this paper, I offer a resolution to the problem from which it follows that some opportunities to help admit latitude and others do not. I argue that beneficence has two components: the familiar wide duty to help others achieve their ends and a narrow duty to avoid indifference to others as end-setters. Although we are not always required to help, we are always required not to be indifferent. When helping someone is the only way not to be indifferent to a person, helping him/her is obligatory. My account avoids certain difficulties with other proposed solutions and can also address an important concern about proximity.
An examination of Kant’s account of moral worth. The debate over whether or not Kant said moral actions have worth only if they are carried out from duty or whether actions carried out from mixed motives can be good is complex and lies at the heart of Kant’s philosophy. Philip Stratton-Lake offers an account of acting from duty which utilizes the distinction between primary and secondary motives. He maintains that the moral law should not be understood as normative moral reason but as playing a transcendental role. Thus, a Kantian account of moral worth is one where the virtuous agent is one who is responsive to concrete particular considerations whilst preserving an essential role for universal moral principles.”


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210 “Contemporary Kantians who defend Kant’s view of the superiority of the sense of duty as a form of motivation appeal to various ideas. Some say, if only implicitly, that the sense of duty is always “available” to an agent, when she has a moral obligation. Some, like Barbara Herman, say that the sense of duty provides a “nonaccidental” connection between an agent’s motivation and the act’s rightness. In this paper I show that the “availability” and “nonaccidentalness” arguments are in tension with one another. And the “availability” idea, although certainly supported by some passages in Kant himself, is also clearly denied in other passages. My conclusion is that Kantians will need to abandon either availability or nonaccidentalness if they wish to have a consistent set of views about the sense of duty.”

211 “Many philosophers have objected to Kant’s account of duties regarding nonhuman nature, arguing that it does not ground adequate moral concern for non-human natural entities. However, the traditional interpretation of Kant on this issue is mistaken, because it takes him to be arguing merely that humans should abstain from animal cruelty and wanton destruction of flora solely because such actions could make one more likely to violate one’s duties to human beings. Instead, I argue, Kant’s account of duties regarding nature grounds much stronger limitations on how humans may treat non-human animals and flora, since such duties are rooted in the imperfect duty to increase one’s own moral perfection. This duty proscribes actions affecting nonhuman nature that decrease one’s moral perfection, such as those that cause organisms unnecessary harm. Moreover, the duty to moral perfection prescribes (but does not strictly require) actions affecting non-human nature that increase one’s moral perfection, such as those that
benefit organisms. Given this interpretation, I show that, contrary to a widely held view, Kant’s moral philosophy can ground a coherent and robust approach to environmental ethics.”

“Kant’s ‘practical philosophy’ comprehends a diverse group of his writings on ethics, politics, law, religion, and the philosophy of history and culture. Kristi E. Sweet demonstrates the unity and interdependence of these writings by showing how they take as their animating principle the human desire for what Kant calls the unconditioned – understood in the context of his practical thought as human freedom. She traces the relationship between this desire for freedom and the multiple forms of finitude that confront human beings in different aspects of practical life, and stresses the interdependence of the pursuit of individual moral goodness and the formation of community through the state, religion, culture and history. This study of Kant’s approach to practical life discovers that doing our duty, itself the realization of our individual freedom, requires that we set for ourselves and pursue a whole constellation of social, political and other communal ends.”

Contents: Introduction. 1. Freedom of the self as such: the good will, duty, and moral feeling. 2. Freedom of the self over time: virtue. 3. Freedom of the self and the moral world: the highest good. 4. Enacting the moral world: founding and promoting a civil condition. 5. Enacting the moral world: joining the ethical community. 6. Human finitude undone: culture and history. Conclusion: practical reason’s ‘peculiar fate’.

“A central claim in Kantian ethics is that an agent is properly morally motivated just in case she acts from duty alone. Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker, and Justin Oakley claim that certain emotionally infused actions, such as lending a compassionate helping hand, can only be done from compassion and not from duty. I argue that these critics have overlooked a distinction between an action’s manner, how an action is done, and its motive, the agent’s reason for acting. Through a range of examples I demonstrate how an emotion can determine an action’s manner without also serving as the motive. Thus, it is possible for an agent to act compassionately from duty alone. This distinction between the manner and the motive of an action not only restores a central claim in Kantian ethics but it also allows for an expanded role of emotions in moral action.”

“Konrad Cramer, in “Reflections on the Logical Structure of a Kantian Moral Argument”, argues that the Universal Law Formulation (UL) of the Categorical Imperative is best understood as providing us with an indirect method for determining the moral permissibility of acting on our maxims. He then goes on argue, however, that no interpretation of UL is consistent with Kant’s epistemic claim that we can easily discover what morality demands of us. In response I argue that Cramer relies on an excessively demanding interpretation of Kant’s epistemic claim and that his indirect interpretation of UL rests on a problematic account
how our maxims relate to the actions that we perform on their basis. I then turn to the question of the overall plausibility of UL, and stress the need to interpret it within the context of Kant’s overall moral system.”

215 “Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the creative self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After considering the possibility that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal autonomy, I argue that the elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue” – specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others. This discovery is important for at least three reasons: first, it elucidates the relationship among the various conceptions of autonomy employed by personal-autonomy theorists and contemporary Kantians; second, it brings to the surface previously unnoticed or undernoticed features of Kant’s moral theory; and third, it provides an essential line of defense against certain critiques of contemporary Kantian theories, especially that of John Rawls.”
One way of understanding Kant’s views about moral emotions is the cultivation view. On this view, emotions play a role in Kantian morality provided they are properly cultivated. I evince a sceptical position about the cultivation view. First, I show that the textual evidence in support of cultivation is ambiguous. I then provide an account of emotions in Kant’s theory that explains both his positive and negative views about them. Emotions capture our attention such that they both disrupt the mind’s composure and serve as a surrogate for reason. As such, Kant cannot recommend that we cultivate our emotions. “

“Kant’s Transition Project and Late Philosophy” is the first study to provide a close reading of the connection between texts written by Kant during 1796 and 1798. Connecting Kant’s unfinished book project, the Opus postumum, with the Metaphysics of Morals, it identifies and clarifies issues at the forefront of Kant’s focus towards the end of his life. Labelled by Kant as the “Transition Project”, the Opus postumum generates debate among commentators as to why Kant describes the project as filling a “gap” within his system of critical philosophy. This study argues for a pervasive transition project that can be traced through Kant’s entire critical philosophy and is the key to addressing current debates in the scholarship. By showing that there is not only a Transition Project in Kant’s theoretical philosophy but also a Transition Project in his practical philosophy, it reveals why an accurate assessment of Kant’s critical philosophy requires a new understanding of the Opus postumum and Kant’s parallel late writings on practical philosophy. Rather than seeing Kant’s late thoughts on a Transition as afterthoughts, they must be seen at the centre of his critical philosophy.”
III, S. 345–54.


219 „There seems to be a strong sentiment in pre-philosophical moral thought that actions can be morally valuable without at the same time being morally required. Yet Kant, who takes great pride in developing an ethical system firmly grounded in common moral thought, makes no provision for any such extraordinary acts of virtue. Rather, he supports a classification of actions as either obligatory, permissible or prohibited, which in the eyes of his critics makes it totally inadequate to the facts of morality. The related idea of uncommonly grand and noble deeds is frequently dismissed by Kant as high-flown emotional nonsense. Such considerations give rise to the fear that actions intuitively classed as morally commendable but not required must be re-classified as commands of duty by Kant, making his ethical theory as unbearably demanding as direct utilitarianism. The paper divides into three sections: (1) an examination of the nature of moral goodness from a meta-ethical angle that introduces some passages from Kant’s writings presenting strong theoretical evidence against the case for supererogatory action; (2) a critique of Thomas Hill’s suggestion that within the category of wide duty we can accommodate some of the main features of actions classified as supererogatory in other ethical systems; concluding that, contra Hill, there are no actions of wide duty that can be so characterized in any significant sense; and (3) a final discussion of the problem of how demanding the requirements of Kantian ethical theory really are.”


220  “In 1993, Richard Hare argued that, contrary to received opinion, Kant *could* have been a utilitarian. In this article, I argue that Hare was wrong. Kant’s theory would not have been utilitarian or consequentialist even if his practical recommendations coincided with utilitarian commands: Kant’s theory of value is essentially anti-utilitarian; there is no place for rational contradiction as the source of moral imperatives in utilitarianism; Kant would reject the move to separate levels of moral thinking: first-order moral judgement makes use of the principle of morality; and, relatedly, he would resist the common utilitarian distinction between actions and their motives because any correct description of an action must refer to motivation. The article concludes with the thought that any consequentialist theory based on pre-given ends (teleology) lacks thephilosophical resources to distinguish between willing something as a means and as an end, leaving means only, and destroying transparency.”

221  “The present article is an attempt to clarify the Kantian conception of duties to the self and to defend them against common objections. Kant’s thesis that all duty rests on duties to the self is shown to follow from the autonomy of the human will; and the allegation that they are impossible because the agent could always release himself from such a duty turns out to be question-begging. There is no attempt to prove that there are such duties, but they are revealed to be an indispensable part of morality. Traditional attributes of moral commands, such as ‘categoricity’ or ‘overridingness’ make no sense in a one-sidedly other-regarding or social conception of morality.”

222  “What is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant’s reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on *Theory and Practice*. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional – even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant’s attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve’s challenge.”


223 “This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.”

224 “Pauline Kleingeld’s “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”, published in this journal in 2017, presents a powerful challenge to what has become the standard (‘practical’) reconstruction of the categorical imperative. In this response to Kleingeld, I argue that she is right to emphasise the ‘simultaneity requirement’ – that we must be able to will a proposed maxim and ‘simultaneously’, ‘also’ or ‘at the same time’ the maxim in its universalised form – but I deny that this removes the categorical imperative test from the world of universalisation because the agent must be understood as part of that world. There are two distinct types of conflict: a contradiction that results from non-universalisability and Kleingeld’s ‘volitional’ conflict, located within the will of the immoral agent. The standard ‘practical’ reconstruction of the categorical imperative remains largely intact.”

225 “Is Kant’s ethical theory too demanding? Do its commands ask too much of us, either by calling for self-sacrifice on particular occasions, or by pervading our lives to the extent that there is no room for permissible action? In this article, I argue that Kant’s ethics is very demanding, but not excessively so. The notion of ‘latitude’ (the idea that wide duty admits of ‘exceptions’) does not help. But we need to bear in mind (i) that moral laws are self-imposed and cannot be externally enforced; (ii) that ‘right action’ is not a category of Kantian ethics – there is a more and a less, and lack of perfection does not entail vice; and (iii)
that only practice makes perfect, i.e. how much virtue can realistically be expected can vary from agent to agent. The principle that ‘ought’ is limited by ‘can’ is firmly entrenched in Kant’s ethical thought.”
“Kant’s most canonical argument against suicide, the universal law argument, is widely dismissed. This paper attempts to save it, showing that a suicide maxim, universalized, undermines all bases for practical law, resting both the non-negotiable value of free rational willing and the ordinary array of sensuous commitments that inform prudential incentives. Suicide therefore undermines moral law-governed community as a whole, threatening ‘savage disorder’. In pursuing this argument, I propose a non-teleological and non-theoretical nature – a ‘practical nature’ or moral law governed whole – the realization of which morality demands.”
Journal of Philosophical Studies 13, S. 461–75.229


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229 “This paper asks how we should conceptualize the relationship between responsibility and obligation. Its central concern is the relevance of considerations of obligation to the attribution of responsibility for what we do or bring about. The paper approaches this issue through an examination of Kant’s complex, challenging and instructive theory of responsibility, in which strict obligation plays a pivotal role in attributions of responsibility for the outcomes of our actions. Even if we do not accept Kant’s strongly juridical concept of responsibility, his theory provides insight into the way in which we should see the connection between responsibility and obligation.”


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230 “In this paper, I sketch a Kantian account of duties of rescue, which I take to be compatible with Kant’s theory. I argue that there is in fact no Btrumping relation^ between imperfect and perfect duties but merely that Blatitude shrinks away^ in certain circumstances. Against possible demandingness objections, I explain why Kant thought that imperfect duty must allow latitude for choice and argue that we must understand the necessary space for pursuing one’s own happiness as entailed by Kant’s justification of one’s duty to promote other’s happiness. Nevertheless, becoming worthy of happiness has always priority over one’s own happiness, even when circumstances are such that we cannot secure our own happiness without seriously neglecting more pressing needs of other persons. I conclude that Kant’s moral theory calls for complementation by the political and juridical domain. Implementing just political institutions and creating satisfactorily well-ordered societies create an external world which is friendlier to our attempts to reconcile moral integrity and a happy human life.”

231 “Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason is one of the most perplexing aspects of his moral philosophy. The aim of this paper is to defend Kant’s doctrine from the common charge of dogmatism. My defense turns on a previously unexplored analogy to the notion of ‘matters of fact’ popularized by members of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century. In their work, ‘facts’ were beyond doubt, often referring to experimental effects one could witness first hand. While Kant uses the German equivalent (‘Tatsachen’) in different contexts, I argue that the scientific analogy opens up a new framework for interpreting his strategy of justification in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In the final section, I address a few possible objections to my reading, one of which I anticipate coming from Dieter Henrich (1989) and Ian Proops (2003), who have argued that Kant’s Fact of Reason is best understood under a legal analogy.”

232 “This paper offers a new interpretation of Kant’s relationship with skepticism in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. My position differs from commonly held views in the literature in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that Kant’s relationship with skepticism is active and systematic (contrary to Hill, Wood, Rawls, Timmermann, and Allison). On the other hand, I argue that the kind of skepticism Kant is interested
in does not speak to the philosophical tradition in any straightforward sense (contrary to Forster and Guyer). On my reading, Kant takes up a skeptical method in the *Groundwork* as a way of exposing certain obstacles in our ordinary and philosophical thinking about morality. The central obstacle he is interested in is practical in character, arising from a natural tendency we have to rationalize against the moral law. In attempting to resolve this tendency, I argue, the *Groundwork* turns out to have a profoundly educative task.”

233 “In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second *Critique*, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to which the fact of reason refers to the actuality of our moral consciousness.”

234 “It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in *Groundwork* III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second *Critique*, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in *Groundwork* III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second *Critique*. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works.”

235 “A number of neo-Kantians have suggested that an act may be morally worthy even if sympathy and similar emotions are present, so long as they are not what in fact motivates right action—so long as duty, and duty alone, in fact motivates. Thus, the ideal Kantian moral agent need not be a cold and unfeeling person, as some critics have suggested. Two objections to this view need to be answered. First, some maintain that motives cannot be present without in fact motivating. Such non-motivating reasons, it is claimed, are incoherent. Second, if such motives are not in fact motivating, then nonetheless the moral agent’s
performance of right action will be objectionably cold and unfeeling. While the first objection is not compelling, since the alternative according to which all motives in fact motivate but differ in strength suffers from the very same problems attributed to the neo-Kantian view, the second has force, and any account of moral worth must make room for motives such as sympathy actually motivating right action.”
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Recently, there has been some discussion about the relationship between Kant’s conception of right (the sphere of juridical rights and duties) and his moral theory (with the Categorical Imperative as its fundamental norm). In section 1, I briefly survey some recent contributions to this debate and distinguish between two different questions. First, does Kant’s moral theory (as developed in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason) imply, or validate, a Kantian conception of right (as developed in the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Doctrine of Right)? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative sufficient to show that the fundamental principles of right are normatively valid? Second, does Kant’s conception of right presuppose his moral theory? In other words, is the Categorical Imperative necessary to show that the basic principles of right are normatively valid? In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with defending a negative answer to the first of these questions. In section 2, I will discuss Paul Guyer’s attempt to vindicate a positive answer to the same question. In section 3, reasons will be given why any attempt to derive Kant’s conception of right from the Categorical Imperative must fail because of the analytic connection between right and coercion.”
In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self-mastery or self-command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self-command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems presented by the passions. Such agents are able to stick to the results of self-legislation over time and thereby achieve a form of temporally extended freedom.

A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason. Friedrich Schiller advanced a version of this criticism to which Kant publicly responded. Recent commentators have emphasized the role that Kant’s reply assigns to the pleasure that accompanies successful moral action. In contrast, I argue that Kant’s reply relies primarily on the sublime feeling that arises when we merely contemplate the moral law. In fact, the pleasures emphasized by other recent commentators depend on this sublime feeling. These facts illuminate Kant’s views regarding the relationship between morality, freedom, and the development of moral feelings.


According to Bittner, Kant has established a theory of action that is untenable because it attempts to explain action on the basis of a theory of practical syllogisms. This article defends Kant’s view (developed in GMS II, AA 04: 412.26–30) by explaining the meaning in which actions can be ‘deduced’ from practical laws or from maxims.”


\textsuperscript{240} “Paul Guyer’s paper “Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” raises a set of issues about how Kantian ethics should be understood in relation to present day “philosophical naturalism” that are very much in need of discussion. The paper itself is challenging, even in some respects iconoclastic, and provides a highly welcome provocation to raise in new ways some basic questions about what Kantian ethics is and what it ought to be. Guyer offers us an admirably informed and complex argument, both historical and philosophical, that tangles with some of the most difficult problems in Kant’s moral philosophy. It begins with some ambitious and controversial claims about Kant’s moral philosophy prior to the Groundwork of 1785. It then offers an interpretation, and also a fundamental criticism, of the Groundwork’s attempt to establish the moral law based on the idea of freedom of the will. And finally, it raises – and expresses some opinions on – the large and vexed questions of the relationship between transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism, and whether Kantian ethics can be made consistent with a naturalistic philosophical outlook. In these comments I will have something to say on each of these topics, without pretending (any more than Guyer does) to have exhausted what might be said about them.”

\textsuperscript{241} Inhaltsverzeichnis: Preface. Abbreviations. 1 Reason. 2 Moral Worth. 3 Ethical Theory. 4 The Moral Law. 5 Humanity. 6 Autonomy. 7 Freedom. 8 Virtue. 9 Duties. 10 Conscience. 11 Social Justice. 12 Punishment. 13 Sex. 14 Lies. 15 Consequences. Notes. Index.


242 “This Element defends a reading of Kant’s formulas of the moral law in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. It disputes a long tradition concerning what the first formula (Universal Law/Law of Nature) attempts to do. The Element also expounds the Formulas of Humanity, Autonomy and the Realm of Ends, arguing that it is only the Formula of Humanity from which Kant derives general duties, and that it is only the third formula (Autonomy/Realm of Ends) that represents a complete and definitive statement of the moral principle as Kant derives it in the Groundwork. The Element also disputes the claim that the various formulas are ‘equivalent’, arguing that this claim is either false or else nonsensical because it is grounded on a false premise about what Kant thinks a moral principle is for.”


244 “Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant’s claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant’s doctrine. I argue that Kant’s claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant’s claim focus on one condition that
a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to understanding why moral requirements are not hypothetical. I also argue that the claim that moral requirements are not categorical because they depend on desires for motivation is beside the point. The issue of whether moral requirements are categorical is not an issue about whether moral desires or feelings are necessary for moral motivation but are rather an issue about the ground of moral desires or moral feelings. Moral requirements are categorical because they are requirements of reason, and reason makes moral desires or feelings possible.”

“245 This paper seeks to discover the purpose of Kant’s “Typic of Pure Practical Judgement” in the Critique of Practical Reason. My first thesis is that the problem underlying this chapter is not a new discovery of the Critique: the function of pure practical judgement is simply to test the morality of maxims by means of the so-called type. The new complexity of this approach still calls for a renewed investigation into an old puzzle. To that effect, my second thesis is that the maxim test is related to the doctrine of the categories of freedom, which Kant also newly introduced in the Critique. How the test procedure works in detail will be explained in light of the categories.”

“Kant’s discussion of the feeling of respect presents a puzzle regarding both the precise nature of this feeling and its role in his moral theory as an incentive that motivates us to follow the moral law. If it is a feeling that motivates us to follow the law, this would contradict Kant’s view that moral obligation is based on reason alone. I argue that Kant has an account of respect as feeling that is nevertheless not separate from the use of reason, but is intrinsic to willing. I demonstrate this by taking literally Kant’s references to force in the second Critique. By referring to Kant’s pre-critical essay on Negative Magnitudes (1763), I show that Kant’s account of how the moral law effects in us a feeling of respect is underpinned by his view that
the will is a kind of negative magnitude, or force. I conclude by noting some of the implications of my discussion for Kant’s account of virtue.”