

## Literatur zum moralischen Partikularismus

### Bibliography on Moral Particularism

Last Update: 25.11.2011

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Alphabetische Ordnung / alphabetical order: <http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/bpartic.pdf>

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<sup>1</sup> “Over the last decades the traditional emphasis on moral rules, or principles, has been attacked by particularists like Jonathan Dancy. I argue that particularists are correct in rejecting traditional attempts at moral codification, but that it is still possible to have a rule-oriented approach to morality if we distinguish between different ways in which features can be morally relevant. I suggest that there are first a limited number of features that can serve as basic moral reasons for action, and then a class of relational features that can change the relevance of these features. I then argue that while particularists do well in drawing attention to the fact that sometimes our basic moral duties are put out of play by other relevant features, they fail to make sense of the exceptional nature of such situations. Only a rule-oriented understanding of morality can do this.”

40–49.<sup>2</sup> – Dazu: [45].

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<sup>2</sup> “This paper is a discussion of Jonathan Dancy’s book *Ethics Without Principles* (2004). Holism about reasons is distinguished into a weak version, which allows for invariant reasons, and a strong, which doesn’t. Four problems with Dancy’s arguments for strong holism are identified. (1) A plausible particularism based on it will be close to generalism. (2) Dancy rests his case on common-sense morality, without justifying it. (3) His examples are of non-ultimate reasons. (4) There are certain universal principles it is hard not to see as invariant, such as that the fact that some action causes of suffering to a non-rational being always counts against it. The main difficulty with weak holism is that justification can be seen as analogous to explanation, which will give us an atomistic and generalist conception of a normative reason.”

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<sup>3</sup> “In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp’s distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don’t here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don’t think that my way of doing these things is the only possible one, but not surprisingly I am interested in seeing what resources it might have to defend itself.”

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<sup>4</sup> “In one version, moral particularism says that morality has no need of principles. Jonathan Dancy has argued for this in his recently published *Ethics Without Principles*. For Dancy, the central issue is whether it is necessary for moral reasons to be codified in principles. He thinks not. This misses the point. Whether or not it needs to be or can be codified, moral agents should not follow rules, on pain of a bad-faith rule-fetishism. The authority of particular cases does not reside in any alleged failure of codifiability. It rests on the fact that moral agents cannot palm off responsibility for their actions on to experts or rules and that they must respond freshly to each case with an appropriate moral reaction: indignation, pity, remorse, etc. Ironically, this reconfiguration of the particularism issue follows from the proper appreciation of a passage from George Eliot, which Dancy cites as his own inspiration.”

<sup>5</sup> “Crisp is right to detect a clash between Dancy’s leading formulation of holism about reasons and the phenomenon of invariance. Replying to Crisp on behalf of the particularist, I suggest a better formulation of holism modelled on a standard treatment in the philosophy of language of context-sensitive expressions.to explanation, which will give us an atomistic and generalist conception of a normative reason.”

<sup>6</sup> “This paper is a defence of a holistic version of the generalist view of moral reasoning based on prima facie principles. In Section 1 I summarise Dancy’s arguments for particularism. Then I argue that particularism goes against strong intuitions regarding reasoning in general (Section 2), fails to account for the asymmetry of reasons (Section 3) and to make sense of compunction and moral imbecility (Section 4). I conclude (Section 5) that a holistic generalism is the right view of moral reasoning. Then I discuss Dancy’s objections to it. I argue that Dancy’s appeal to default reasons is philosophically equivalent to a holistic version of generalism, and hence incompatible with particularism (Section 6) and that his resistance to accept holistic generalism is the result of a foundationalist view of reasoning (Section 7). As an alternative to foundationalism I defend an Aristotelian dialectical view of moral reasoning.”

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<sup>7</sup> I. Einleitung. II. Der Partikularismus in allgemeiner Hinsicht. III. Varianten des Partikularismus. IV. Die Exaktheit von Ethik. V. Moralische Prinzipien in der Ethik des Aristoteles. VI. Phronêsis – Die Bezeichnung von Urteilskraft bei Aristoteles? VII. Die Bedeutung der aisthêsis. VIII. Die Normfigur als moralischer Akteur. IX. Ergebnis: Der Standard des Guten. X. Anhang. Literaturverzeichnis. Register. Glossar. Siglenverzeichnis.

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<sup>8</sup> “Adherents of particularism draw rather strong implications of this view. However, particularism has never been stated in a canonical way. We locate the core of particularism as a claim about how different reasons combine to generate the Tightness or wrongness of an action. Using the notion of an ordering of alternatives containing separable factors, we show that particularism can be stated more generally as the denial that there exist separable factors.

With this definition in place, we show that, once subjected to a number of clarifications, particularism largely does have the implications often associated with it. However, we find the various arguments that have been given in support of particularism to be very poor. We conclude that particularists do have a point when they claim that some form of generalism cannot simply be taken for granted. But no particular reasons in favour of being a particularist have been offered.”

<sup>9</sup> “A comparison of casuistry with the strain of particularism developed by John McDowell and David Wiggins suggests that casuistry is susceptible to two very different mistakes. First, as sometimes developed, casuistry tends toward an implausible rigidity and systematization of moral knowledge. Particularism offers a corrective to this error. Second, however, casuistry tends sometimes to present moral knowledge as insufficiently systematized: It often appears to hold that moral deliberation is merely a kind of perception. Such a perceptual model of deliberation cannot offer a convincing account of the possibility of moral progress. This second problem is one to which particularism is itself prone. To redress it, other aspects of casuistry must be exploited: Casuistry contains an account of presumptive generalizations that explains how moral deliberation might be structured by rules while also depending at critical junctures on perception.”

<sup>10</sup> 4.1 Einleitende Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Partikularismus (69). 4.2 Zum Partikularismus von Dancy (73). 4.3 Zur Kritik am Partikularismus von Dancy (83). 4.4. Fazit zum radikalen Partikularismus (97).

<sup>11</sup> “This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed by scholars such as Helga Kuhse, a particularistic version of virtue ethics properly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and a satisfactory account for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance, health care practice. In

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the first part of the paper, three criteria for comparing normative theories with respect to action-guiding power are outlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version of virtue ethics actually can provide more guidance than the universalistic theories favoured by Kuhse and others. In the second part of the paper it is claimed that universalist normative theories have serious problems accounting for the role that moral principles are supposed to play in the justification, of moral opinions, whereas the present version of virtue ethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification without invoking moral principles or eschewing objectivity.”

<sup>12</sup> “In a recent collection of papers – Moral Particularism (hereafter MP) – some writers argue against a particularist explanation of thick ethical features, particularist in the sense developed by Jonathan Dancy. In this piece I argue that particularists can tackle what I regard as the most interesting argument put forward by these writers, an argument I call the Counting Argument. My aim is twofold. First, I wish to make clear exactly what the debate between particularists and their opponents about the thick rests on. Secondly, I do not wish to provide a ‘knock-down’ argument to show particularism as true, but merely to push the onus back onto particularism’s opponents and show that far more needs to be said.

One last introductory comment. After some necessary scene-setting in the first section, where I explain how the philosophical ground is carved up and introduce some terminology, I indicate why this debate is fundamental in ethical theory although I don’t pursue the idea here.”

<sup>13</sup> “Moral particularism is a contentious position at present and seems likely to be so for the foreseeable future. In this Introduction, I outline and detail its essential claim, which I take to be, roughly, that what can be a reason that helps to make one action right need not be a reason that always helps to make actions right. This claim challenges a central assumption on which most, if not all, normative ethical theories are supposedly based. We owe this way of characterizing moral particularism to Jonathan Dancy, around whose writings much of the present debate revolves.”

<sup>14</sup> “In this paper, I concentrate on the notion of default valency, drawing on some of the distinctions made and thoughts given in my Introduction. I motivate why the notion is important for particularists to have up their sleeves by outlining a recent debate between particularists and generalists. I then move to the main aim of the piece which is to discuss how anyone, particularist and generalist alike, might seek to distinguish reason-generating features into different types. My main aim is not to argue for a specific way of dividing such features into types but to present various taxonomical options.”

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<sup>15</sup> “In a series of influential papers, John McDowell has argued that the rule-following considerations explored in Wittgenstein’s later work provide support for a particularist form of moral objectivity. The article distinguishes three such arguments in McDowell’s writings, labelled the Anthropocentrism Argument, the Shapelessness Argument, and the Anti-Humean Argument, respectively, and the author disputes the effectiveness of each of them. As far as these metaethical debates are concerned, the article concludes that the rule-following considerations leave everything in their place.”

<sup>16</sup> “Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, including mathematical and scientific reasons.”

<sup>17</sup> “What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have thought that in order to answer this question we must find and formulate exceptionless moral principles – principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach – Particularism – although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I develop and motivate a new formulation of particularism as a research program and I show that my formulation is not vulnerable to the most common objections to particularism. Moreover, I argue that the particularist research program shows enough promise to warrant further exploration.”

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<sup>18</sup> “Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice – and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I argue that particularists and pluralists are better situated than monists to explain why it is a good idea to think before we act, and that this gives us reason to favor particularism and pluralism over monism.”

<sup>19</sup> “With regard to intrinsically morally relevant factors it is natural to suppose that if a variation in a given factor makes a moral difference anywhere, then it makes the same moral difference everywhere (henceforth: the constancy assumption). Jonathan Dancy (and other moral particularists) reject the constancy assumption. Partly on the basis thereof, they infer that ethical decisions should be made “case by case, without the comforting support of moral principles”. In this article, I challenge Dancy's defence and use of a denial of the constancy assumption on three points. First, Dancy's appeal to moral intuitions do not justify denying a significant version of the constancy assumption. Second, if we reject the constancy assumption, surprisingly, it may in one crucial respect be very hard to defend moral particularism as commonly articulated. Third, rejecting the constancy assumption does not motivate seeing moral reasoning as essentially a case-by-case matter.”

<sup>20</sup> “Moral particularists have seen Wittgenstein as a close ally. One of the main reasons for this is that particularists such as Jonathan Dancy and John McDowell have argued that Wittgenstein's so-called “rule-following considerations” (RFCs) provide support for their skepticism about the existence and/or role of

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rules and principles in ethics. In this paper, I show that while Wittgenstein's RFCs challenge the notion that competence with language, i.e., the ability to apply concepts properly, is like mechanically following a rule, he does not reject the idea that there are rules that govern proper use of language. I then argue that while the RFCs may, at best, support a weak form of particularism that denies that moral competence is dependent on an explicit grasp of rules, they do not support a stronger version of particularism that denies that there are any true rules or principles in ethics."

<sup>21</sup> "We can shed new light upon Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism if we frame it in terms of Daniel Andler's recent discussion of the epistemological problem of context. Andler helps us in two specific ways. First, we can see that Dancy's work is highlighting the problem context raises for moral knowledge. This makes some criticisms of Dancy seem off the mark. Secondly, Andler's approach also helps us understand why Dancy seems reticent to provide more epistemological details. Nonetheless, the paper closes with a suggestion about the possibility of a particularist account of moral knowledge more detailed than anything Dancy has provided."

<sup>22</sup> "I argue for a form of particularism from a reading of Wittgenstein's critique of the idea that word use is governed by rules. In place of the idea that word use is driven by rules, I show how the patterns of word use, in virtue of which we express our reasons, emerge from our ongoing practice, including our practice of seeing things as similar. I argue that the notion of seeing the similarities is primitive for Wittgenstein. The remark, 'this and similar things are called "games"' does not signal a form of ignorance. It signals the constitutive role that speakers, as judges, have to play in the metaphysics of the patterns of word use."

<sup>23</sup> "Moral particularists are united in their opposition to the codification of morality, and their work poses an important challenge to traditional ways of thinking about moral philosophy. Defenders of moral particularism have, with near unanimity, sought support from a doctrine they call 'holism in the theory of

- 2006 [91] McKeever, Sean/Ridge, Michael (2006): Particularism and the Contingent A Priori, *Acta Analytica* 21 (2), S. 3–11.<sup>24</sup> Wiederabgedruckt in *Challenging Moral Particularism*, hrsg. von Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč und Vojko Strahovnik, New York 2008, S. 107–15. – Vgl. dazu [31].
- 2006 [92] McKeever, Sean/Ridge, Michael (2006): *Principled Ethics. Generalism as a Regulative Ideal*, Oxford.<sup>25</sup> – Vgl. dazu [30], [125], [133].
- 2007 [93] McKeever, Sean/Ridge, Michael (2007): Review of *Ethics Without Principles* by Jonathan Dancy, *Philosophical Review* 116, S. 124–28. – Zu [28].
- 2007 [94] McKeever, Sean/Ridge, Michael (2007): Turning on Default Reasons, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 4, S. 55–76.<sup>26</sup> – Dazu: [147].

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reasons.’ We argue that this is all a mistake. There are two ways in which holism in the theory of reasons can be understood, but neither provides any support for moral particularism.”

<sup>24</sup> “Particularism renders the options for a sound moral epistemology few and the prospects dim. One leading approach treats basic knowledge of particular cases as derivable from an a priori moral principle and a posteriori knowledge of the contingent non-moral facts to which the principle applies. Particularists must forgo this approach because it requires principles. Yet a purely a posteriori moral epistemology is also implausible, especially when combined with particularism. Particularists such as Jonathan Dancy are thus led to the view that our basic moral knowledge is a priori knowledge of contingent moral facts. We argue that this epistemology is unsound. While some cases of a priori knowledge of (even deeply) contingent facts may be defensible, they are not sufficient for particularist purposes. Moreover, neither Dancy’s appeal to the distinction between positive and negative dependence nor his discussion of intuitive examples provides sufficient support for this epistemology.”

<sup>25</sup> “Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice.

In *Principled Ethics*, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head on, and defend a distinctive view they call ‘generalism as a regulative ideal’. After cataloguing the wide array of views that have gone under the heading ‘particularism’ they explain why the main particularist arguments fail to establish their conclusions. The authors’ generalism incorporates what is most insightful in particularism (e.g. the possibility that reasons are context-sensitive – ‘holism’ about reasons) while rejecting every major particularist doctrine. At the same time, they avoid the excesses of hyper-generalist views according to which moral thought is constituted by allegiance to a particular principle or set of principles. Instead, they argue that insofar as moral knowledge and practical wisdom are possible, we both can and should codify all of morality in a manageable set of principles even if we are not yet in possession of those principles. Moral theory is in this sense a work in progress. Nor is the availability of a principled codification of morality an idle curiosity. Ridge and McKeever also argue that principles have an important role to play in guiding the virtuous agent.

Contents: 1 The many moral particularisms. 2 Holism about reasons. 3 Default reasons. 4 Moral vision. 5 Constitutive generalism. 6 From moral knowledge to default principles. 7 Beyond default principles or trimming the hedges. 8 Generalism as a regulative ideal. 9 Principled guidance. Appendix”

- 2008 [95] McKeever, Sean/Ridge, Michael (2008): Preempting Principles: Recent Debates in Moral Particularism, *Philosophy Compass* 3, S. 1177–92.<sup>27</sup>
- 1988 [96] McNaughton, David (1988): *Moral Vision. An Introduction to Ethics*, Oxford, S. 190–205.
- 2000 [97] McNaughton, David/Rawling, Piers (2000): Unprincipled Ethics, in *Moral Particularism*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker und Margaret Little, Oxford, S. 256–75.
- 2009 [98] Mason, Andrew (2009): Justice, Holism and Principles, *Res Publica* 15, S. 179–94.<sup>28</sup>
- 2002 [99] Millgram, Elijah (2002): Murdoch, Practical Reasoning, and Particularism, *Notizie di Politeia* 18 (66), S. 64–87. Wiederabgedruckt in Millgram, *Ethics Done Right. Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory*, Cambridge 2005, S. 168–97.
- 2006 [100] Miščević, Nenad (2006): Moral Concepts: From Thickness to Response-Dependence, *Acta Analytica* 21 (1), S. 4–32.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> “Particularism takes an extremely ecumenical view of what considerations might count as reasons and thereby threatens to ‘flatten the moral landscape’ by making it seem that there is no deep difference between, for example, pain, and shoelace color. After all, particularists have claimed, either could provide a reason provided a suitable moral context. To avoid this result, some particularists draw a distinction between default and non-default reasons. The present paper argues that all but the most deflationary ways of drawing this distinction are either implausible or else insufficient to help the particularist avoid flattening the moral landscape. The difficulty can be avoided, however, if we reject particularism’s extremely ecumenical view of reasons.”

<sup>27</sup> “Moral particularism, as recently defended, charges that traditional moral theorizing unduly privileges moral principles. Moral generalism defends a prominent place for moral principles. Because moral principles are often asked to play multiple roles, moral particularism aims at multiple targets. We distinguish two leading roles for moral principles, the role of standard and the role of guide. We critically survey some of the leading arguments both for and against principles so conceived.”

<sup>28</sup> “Some moral theorists defend a holistic account of practical reasons and deny that the possibility of moral thought depends upon the existence of moral principles. This article explores the implications of this position for theorising about justice, which has often aspired to provide us with an ordered list of principles to govern our institutions and practices.”

<sup>29</sup> “The paper examines three tenets of Dancy’s meta-ethics, finds them incompatible, and proposes a response-dependence (or response-dispositional) solution. The first tenet is the central importance of thick concepts and properties. The second is that such concepts essentially involve response(s) of observers, which Dancy interprets in a way that fits the pattern of context-dependent resultance: thick concepts are well suited for the particularist grounding of moral theory. However, and this is the third tenet, in his earlier paper (1986) Dancy forcefully argues against response-dispositional accounts of moral concepts and properties. The present paper argues that an anti-dispositional view is incompatible with the first two points concerning thick concepts. If thick concepts and properties are paramount and ubiquitous in moral

- 2008 [101] Mišćević, Nenad (2008): When the Plot Thickens: Dancy on Thick Concepts, in *Challenging Moral Particularism*, hrsg. von Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč und Vojko Strahovnik, New York, S. 140–65.
- 1963 [102] Mitchell, Dorothy (1963): Are Moral Principles Really Necessary?, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 41, S. 163–81.<sup>30</sup>
- 2007 [103] Moad, Omar Edward (2007): Reasons, Resultance, and Moral Particularism, *Philosophical Quarterly* 57, S. 112–16.<sup>31</sup>
- 2007 [104] Norman, Richard (2007): Particularism and Reasons: A Reply to Kirchin, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 4, S. 33–39.<sup>32</sup> – Zu [69].
- 2000 [105] Nussbaum, Martha (2000): Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principle, and Bad Behaviour, in *Moral Particularism*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker und Margaret Little, Oxford, S. 227–55.

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thought and reality, and if they are essentially tied to human responses, then anti-dispositionalism is false. Dancy himself avoids obvious contradiction by characterizing thick items (concepts) differently from the usual characterization of response-dependent items. Actions that satisfy thick concepts do so in virtue of meriting a determinate response. The (non-reductionist) response-dependence usually puts it slightly differently: such actions satisfy a given moral concepts in virtue of eliciting a merited response. I have argued at length that this tenuous difference in formulation is too weak to support a relevant difference in rebus. If the argument is right, Dancy is implicitly committed to a kind of response-dependence. Finally, the particularist should embrace thick concepts and properties, and reject anti-dispositionalism. However, this would bring back the analogy with color and other secondary qualities. Since there are *ceteris paribus* laws governing such properties, the analogy suggests that moral properties might also be best accounted for by a *ceteris paribus*, or hedged account, a compromise between traditional generalism and the particularism of Dancy's variety."

<sup>30</sup> "The author claims "the ultimate and irreducible step in moral reasoning is the making of particular judgments and decisions which are not derived from moral principles." She lays this out and comments on the objection that moral judgment is not a particular judgment. (staff)"

<sup>31</sup> "According to Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism, the way in which a given moral reason functions as a reason for or against an action can vary from case to case. Dancy also asserts that reasons are resultance bases. But a reason why something ought to be done is that in virtue of which it is something that ought to be done. If the function of a reason can vary, then resultance bases cannot be reasons. Perhaps the particularist might conceive a reason not as a resultance base, but as a specific type of which a resultance base is a token. But this picture of reasons cannot be correct."

<sup>32</sup> "Valency switching can appear especially puzzling if we think of moral reasons as 'pushes and pulls' – considerations whose job it is to get us to act or to stop us acting. Talk of 'default valency' doesn't remove the puzzle, it merely restates it. We need a different picture of reasons – perhaps as providing a map of the moral terrain which helps us to see which actions are appropriate to which situations, and who the appropriate agents are. The role of virtue concepts in particular is more complex and varied than that of providing 'reasons for acting'. A more holistic picture of reasons can make valency switching less mysterious."

- 2003 [106] Olson, Jonas/Svennson, Frans (2003): A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not Conflict, *Utilitas* 15, S. 194–205.
- 2006 [107] Pellegrino, Gianfranco (2006): Particularism and Individuation: Disappearing, not Varying, Features, *Acta Analytica* 21 (2), S. 54–70.<sup>33</sup>
- 2006 [108] Peterson, Martin (2006): Review of Jonathan Dancy, *Ethics Without Principles*, *Theoria* 72, S. 162–65. – Zu [28].
- 2006 [109] Piller, Christian (2006): Particularism and the Structure of Reasons, *Acta Analytica* 21 (2), S. 87–102.<sup>34</sup>
- 2004 [110] Potrč, Matjaž (2004): Particularism and Resultance, *Acta Analytica* 19, S. 163–87.<sup>35</sup>
- 2008 [111] Price, Anthony W. (2008): Particularism and Pleasure, in *Challenging Moral Particularism*, hrsg. von Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč und Vojko Strahovnik, New York, S. 185–91.
- 2006 [112] Quante, Michael (2006): Rezension von Jonathan Dancy, *Ethics without Principles*, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 60, S. 162–64. – Zu [28].

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<sup>33</sup> “Particularism denies that invariant valence is always possible and that it is needed in sound moral theorising. It relies on variabilism, namely the idea that the relevant features of a given situation can alter their moral valence even across seemingly similar cases. An alternative model is defended (the “disappearing model”), in which changes in the overall relevance of complex cases are explained by re-individuation of the constituent features: certain features do not alter their relevance in consequence of contextual changes, but rather they disappear, either because they are embedded within larger complexes or are substituted by different features. This view is shown to be compatible with the main premises of variabilism and explanatorily superior to it. Nevertheless, it does not involve particularism, but rather a peculiar form of generalism.”

<sup>34</sup> “I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.”

<sup>35</sup> “Moral particularism is a promising new approach which understands itself as a subchapter of holism in the theory of reasons. So particularism may be extended to other areas, such as metaphysics. One of the bases for this kind of move is elaborated by particularism itself as resultance, a strategy for providing the relevant basis that is opposed to various forms of generalism (the thin property of goodness is constituted by several thick properties, such as being good humoured, being pleasant; the property of this being a table is constituted from properties of there being four legs, a plate, a certain arrangement). It is claimed that resultance or emergence needs a background structure in order to get off the ground.”

- 1999 [113] Raz, Joseph (1999): The Truth in Particularism, in ders., *Engaging Reason. On the Theory of Value and Action*, Oxford 1999, S. 218–46 sowie in *Moral Particularism*, hrsg. von Brad Hooker und Margaret Little, Oxford 2000, S. 48–78.
- 2006 [114] Raz, Joseph (2006): The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy’s Version), *Mind* 115, S. 99–120. – Review of [28].
- 1997 [115] Reader, Soran (1997): Principle Ethics, Particularism and Another Possibility, *Philosophy* 72, S. 269–92.
- 2005 [116] Redondo, María Cristina (2005): Legal Reasons: Between Universalism and Particularism, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 2, S. 47–68.<sup>36</sup>
- 2006 [117] Robinson, Luke (2006): Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism, *Mind* 115, S. 331–60.<sup>37</sup>
- 2006 [118] Roeser, Sabine (2006): A Particularist Epistemology: ‘Affectual Intuitionism’, *Acta Analytica* 21 (1), S. 33–44.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> “The first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped.”

<sup>37</sup> “Moral principles play important roles in diverse areas of moral thought, practice, and theory. Many who think of themselves as ‘moral generalists’ believe that moral principles can play these roles—that they are capable of doing so. Moral generalism maintains that moral principles can and do play these roles because true moral principles are statements of general moral fact (i.e. statements of facts about the moral attributes of kinds of actions, kinds of states of affairs, etc.) and because general moral facts explain particular moral facts (i.e. facts about the moral attributes of particulars). Moral holism maintains that what is a moral reason to {phi} in one case may not be one in another, and may even be a moral reason not to {phi} given suitable circumstances. Some ‘moral particularists’ maintain that moral holism motivates scepticism about the existence of and need for moral principles, along with scepticism about the viability of principle-based approaches to ethics and moral theory. But I argue that moral holism is itself a form of moral generalism, one that takes facts about the right- and wrong-making powers of (generic) moral factors to explain certain particular moral facts—namely, the rightness and wrongness of particular actions. I also argue that a moral-theoretic version of dispositionalism – the view that dispositions, powers, or capacities are the fundamental units of explanation – explains both why moral holism is true and why moral generalism is true.”

<sup>38</sup> “Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. He has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet clear. In this

- 2010 [119] Roeser, Sabine (2010): *Moral Emotions and Intuitions*, Houndmills, Basingstroke, S. 111–37 (4. Particular Intuitions and Emotions: Introduction. The Importance of Particular Moral Judgments. Dancy’s Particularism. A Particularist Epistemology: Intuitions and Emotions. Conclusion).
- 1999 [120] Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni (1999): Particularism and Principles, *Theoria* 65, S. 114–26.<sup>39</sup>
- 1993 [121] Rosen, Bernard (1993): *Ethical Theory. Strategies and Concepts*, Mountain View, Cal., S. 199–210.
- 2008 [122] Salay, Nancy (2008): Thinking Without Global Generalisations: A Cognitive Defence of Moral Particularism, *Inquiry* 51, S. 390–411.<sup>40</sup>
- 2006 [123] Sandis, Constantine (2006): Dancy Cartwright: Particularism in the Philosophy of Science, *Acta Analytica* 21 (2), S. 30–40.<sup>41</sup>

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paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology that states: 1. that moral knowledge is based on intuitions and 2. that we need emotions in order to have moral knowledge. I will call this approach ‘affectual intuitionism’. Dancy rejects both claims, but I will argue that his arguments against these claims are not convincing.”

<sup>39</sup> “Jonathan Dancy argues in his book *Moral Reasons* that neither general nor specific moral principles are of any important use in moral decision making. I examine his reasons for denying any important role to such principles. With regard to general moral principles, I suggest that there are such principles that appear useful – an idea that Dancy in some passages actually seems to endorse. When it comes to highly specific principles, Dancy’s advice is less open to interpretation; since such principles match only one situation, Dancy considers them as of no use. I contest this view by considering an example that suggests that a highly specific principle has been of use.”

<sup>40</sup> “In their article entitled “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”, Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith (JPS henceforth) argue that moral particularism is a cognitively implausible theory since it appears to entail the view that one might have a skill that is not grounded in an ability to recognise and represent natural patterns in the world. This charge echoes the complaints of computational theorists of cognition against their embodied cognition counterparts, namely that, theories of cognition that eschew talk of mental representation are implausible qua theories of cognition. In both debates, the cognitive role of generalisation is central to the discussion; however, contrary to the received wisdom, I want to suggest that the dispute is not between generalisation or mental representation on the one hand and no generalisation or mental representation on the other, but rather between what I will call global and local generalisation. Using the dialogue between JPS and Dancy (our paradigm particularist) to frame this discussion, I show that by replacing Dancy’s connectionist model for particularist reasoning with a case-based one, we not only vindicate his response to JPS, but we also gain insight into how it is the global/local distinction rather than the generalisation/no generalisation distinction that divides the two views.”

<sup>41</sup> “This paper aims to explore the space of possible particularistic approaches to Philosophy of Science by examining the differences and similarities between Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism – as expressed in both his earlier writings (e.g., *Moral Reasons*, 1993), and, more explicitly defended in his book *Ethics*

- 1998 [124] Schaber, Peter (1998): Der ethische Partikularismus, in Jean-Claude Wolf und Peter Schaber, *Analytische Moralphilosophie*, Freiburg, S. 108–11.
- 2009 [125] Schroeder, Mark (2009): A Matter of Principle. Critical Study of Jonathan Dancy, *Ethics Without Principles* and Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, *Principled Ethics*, *Noûs* 43, S. 568–80. – Zu [28] und [92].
- 2011 [126] Schroeder, Mark (2011): Holism, Weight, and Undercutting, *Nous* 45, S. 328–344.
- 2001 [127] Schroth, Jörg (2001): Universalisierbarkeit und Partikularismus, in *Philosophie – Wissenschaft – Wirtschaft. Miteinander denken, voneinander lernen. Akten des VI. Kongresses der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Linz 1.–4. Juni 2000*, hrsg. von Rainer Born und Otto Neumaier, Wien, S. 595–600.
- 2001 [128] Schroth, Jörg (2001): *Die Universalisierbarkeit moralischer Urteile*, Paderborn, S. 79–86.
- 2002 [129] Schroth, Jörg (2002): Universalisierbarkeit und Partikularismus, in *Argument & Analyse – Sektionsvorträge – : Ausgewählte Sektionsvorträge des 4. internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie, Bielefeld, September 2000*, hrsg. von Ansgar Beckermann und Christian Nimtz, Paderborn: 2002, S. 608–17.
- 2003 [130] Schroth, Jörg (2003): Particularism and Universalizability, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 37, S. 455–61.
- 1990 [131] Schwemmer, Oswald (1990): Rationaler Pluralismus. Zur Kritik der Regel- und Prinzipienethik, in ders., *Die Philosophie und die Wissenschaften. Zur Kritik einer Abgrenzung*, Frankfurt a. M. 1990, S. 131–53.
- 1997 [132] Shafer-Landau, Russ (1997): Moral Rules, *Ethics* 107, S. 584–611.
- 2011 [133] Singer, Ira (2011): Review of McKeever and Ridge, *Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal*, *Metaphilosophy* 42, S. 170–77. – Zu [92].
- 2004 [134] Singleton, Jane (2004): Neither Generalism nor Particularism: Ethical Correct-

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*without Principles* (2004) – and Nancy Cartwright’s particularism in the philosophy of science, as defended in her early collection of essays, *How the Laws of Physics Lie* (1983), and her later book, *The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science* (1999). I shall argue that Dancy’s particularism is more radical, but also more plausible, than Cartwright’s, concluding that we have good reason to embrace a scientific particularism that is far closer to Dancy’s ethical particularism than any view defended by Nancy Cartwright, or any other philosopher from the ‘Stanford school’ of scientific theory.”

ness is Located in General Ethical Theories, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 1, S. 155–75.

- 1999 [135] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (1999): Some Varieties of Particularism, *Metaphilosophy* 30, S. 1–12. – Vgl. dazu [23].
- 2002 [136] Smith, B. (2002): Analogy in Moral Deliberation: The Role of Imagination and Theory in Ethics, *Journal of Medical Ethics* 28, S. 244–48.<sup>42</sup>
- 2006 [137] Smith, Benedict (2006): Particularism, Perception and Judgement, *Acta Analytica* 21 (2), S. 12–29.<sup>43</sup>
- 2010 [138] Smith, Benedict (2010): *Particularism and the Space of Moral Reasons*, Houndmills, Basingstoke.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> “This paper develops themes addressed in an article by Eric Wiland in the *Journal of Medical Ethics* 2000; 26: 466–8, where he aims to contribute to the debate concerning the moral status of abortion, and to emphasise the importance of analogies in moral argument. In the present paper I try to secure more firmly a novel understanding of why analogy is an essential component in the attempt to justify moral beliefs. I seek to show how analogical argument both encapsulates and exercises the notions of rationality and imagination and that the construction, development, and comparison of analogies fundamentally underpins ethical argument. In so doing, it enables us to adopt imaginative and ethically illuminating perspectives but in a manner that does not relinquish any claims to intellectual rigour. I present a critique of a brand of “moral particularism” by showing how it cannot, if construed in a certain way, adequately conceive of how we use analogies and imaginary cases in ethics. Although such a particularism is thus impotent with regard to ethical debate, I show that the wider motivation behind particularism that can be extracted is of clear relevance and importance to medical practitioners.”

<sup>43</sup> “According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a ‘perceptual’ metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities.”

<sup>44</sup> “Moral theory has been dominated by the idea that our moral thought and action require principles. In recent years, this view has been criticized by ‘particularists’ who deny a central place for moral principles in our lives. Particularism is a view that suggests that moral knowledge is a matter of attending to the details of particular cases rather than relying on principles. It is a startling idea and one that is at the forefront of contemporary philosophy. In *Particularism and the Space of Moral Reasons*, Benedict Smith adopts a new approach to the contemporary debate, and suggests novel ways to understand the prospects for moral particularism. The book applies a range of new ideas by drawing on different areas and traditions of philosophy, and includes discussion on human subjectivity, moral experience and moral judgement.”

- 2002 [139] Smith, Steven G. (2002): Do Particular Moral Judgments Follow a Rule?, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 40, S. 269–94.
- 2008 [140] Stangl, Rebecca (2008): A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics, *Philosophical Quarterly* 58, S. 665–78.<sup>45</sup>
- 2010 [141] Stangl, Rebecca (2010): Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism, *Ethics* 121, S. 37–57.<sup>46</sup>
- 2008 [142] Strahovnik, Vojko (2008): Introduction: Challenging Moral Particularism, in *Challenging Moral Particularism*, hrsg. von Mark Norris Lance, Matjaž Potrč und Vojko Strahovnik, New York, S. 1–11.
- 2008 [143] Strandberg, Caj (2008): Particularism and Supervenience, in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* Vol. 3, hrsg. von Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford, S. 129–58.
- 2000 [144] Stratton-Lake, Philip (2000): *Kant, Duty and Moral Worth*, London, S. 128–30 (“The Transcendental Conception of the Moral Law and Particularism”).
- 1995 [145] Tännsjö, Torbjörn (1995): In Defence of Theory in Ethics, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 25, S. 571–94.
- 1998 [146] Tännsjö, Torbjörn (1998): *Hedonistic Utilitarianism*, Edinburgh, S. 9–29 (“In Defence of Theory in Ethics”).
- 2007 [147] Thomas, Alan (2007): Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to McKeever and Ridge, *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 4, S. 77–84.<sup>47</sup> – Zu [94].

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Contents: Characterizing Moral Particularism. Particularism and Subjectivity. Perception and the Myth of the Moral Given. Moral Judgement. Moral Phenomenology. The Space of Moral Reasons. Bibliography. Index

<sup>45</sup> “There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexity of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist either to adopt an unattractive model of moral motivation or to embrace a fairly strong version of the unity of the virtues.”

<sup>46</sup> “In this essay, I defend an account of right action that I shall call “asymmetrical virtue particularism.” An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions is not deontically variant; if any action is vicious in some respect Y, then Y is always a wrong-making feature of any action whatever that has Y.”

- 2011 [148] Thomas, Alan (2011): Another Particularism: Reason, Status and Defaults, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 14, S. 151–67.<sup>48</sup>
- 1998 [149] Timmons, Mark (1998): The Logic of Moral Discourse, in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, hrsg. von Edward Craig, London, Vol. 5, S. 759–64: S. 761–64.
- 2002 [150] Timmons, Mark (2002): *Moral Theory. An Introduction*, Lanham, S. 245–66 (“Moral Particularism”).
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<sup>47</sup> “A putative problem for the moral particularist is that he or she fails to capture the normative relevance of certain considerations that they carry on their face, or the intuitive irrelevance of other considerations. It is argued in response that mastery of certain topic-specific truisms about a subject matter is what it is for a reasonable interlocutor to be engaged in a moral discussion, but the relevance of these truisms has nothing to do with the particularist/generalist dispute. Given that practical reasoning is plausibly a form of abductive reasoning, and is therefore non-monotonic, any arbitrary addition of information can change the degree of support evidence offers for a conclusion. Given this arbitrariness, it is no objection to the particularist if he or she represents the ‘normative landscape as flat’ in a way that does not display the ‘obvious’ relevance of certain considerations. The normative landscape is flat and our best account of practical reasoning represents it precisely as such. Appealing to a distinction between practical reasoning and moral reasoning does not help to resurrect this pseudoproblem for particularism.”

<sup>48</sup> “This paper makes the non-monotonicity of a wide range of moral reasoning the basis of a case for particularism. Non-monotonicity threatens practical decision with an overwhelming informational complexity to which a form of ethical generalism seems the best response. It is argued that this impression is wholly misleading: the fact of non-monotonicity is best accommodated by the defence of four related theses in any theory of justification. First, the explanation of and defence of a default/challenge model of justification. Secondly, the development of a theory of epistemic status and an explanation of those unearned entitlements that accrue to such status. Thirdly, an explanation of the basis of epistemic virtues. Finally, an account must be given of the executive capacity of rational decision itself as a ‘contentless ability’. This overall set of views can accommodate a limited role for generalizations about categories of evidence, but not such as to rescue a principled generalism. In particular, the version of particularism defended here explains why one ought not to accept the principled “holism” that has proved to be a problem for Dancy’s form of particularism. Ethics certainly involves hedged principles. However, principles cannot be self-hedging: there cannot be a “that’s it” operator in a principle as Richard Holton has claimed that there can be. Practical reasoning is concluded by the categorical detachment of the action-as-conclusion itself.”

<sup>49</sup> “This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally.

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Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion, and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label 'default reason'."

<sup>50</sup> "An essential part of particularism as a systematic option in philosophical ethics is the structure of perception. In this paper, we defend perception as a central feature against the meta-ethical and meta-epistemological prejudices of rationalism. The insurmountable border between perception and justification, which is central to rationalist ethics, rests on three premises that are rejected by particularism: ethical knowledge is not exclusively inferential or discursive, ethical reflection is not solely deductive reasoning, and the bases of justified actions do not have to be universal laws. Against rationalist ethics, we defend perception as a central and primary source of ethical knowledge, as a way of non-discursive reflection and as a genuine form of ethical justification. Ethical experience is not only reason but the complex responsiveness of persons that develops biographically as a result of situations in social and culturally contingent contexts."

<sup>51</sup> "Jonathan Dancy, who defends a version of moral particularism, is committed to the view that any feature or reason for action might, in logical terms, have a positive moral valence in one context, a negative moral valence in a different context, and no moral valence at all in yet another context. In my paper, I attempt to demonstrate that, despite the denial by Dancy that proposed grounding properties with invariant moral valences may play a foundational role in morality, his own approach toward moral reasoning unknowingly assumes such foundational grounding properties. I argue that Dancy's moral particularism is unknowingly directed toward moral absolutism, and, in making that argument, uncover reasons, admittedly inconclusive, to favor an absolutist ethic."

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- 1991 [159] Wallace, R. Jay (1991): Virtue, Reason, and Principle, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 21, S. 469–95. – Zu [87].