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<sup>1</sup> “In this reply to Robert Shope three points are made: (1) that the interpretation of “prima facie”/actual duties in terms of good moral reasons/conclusive reasons is not new; (2) while Shope’s term “moral demand” confuses ross’ “prima facie”/actual obligation distinction, nevertheless Shope is correct in saying that Ross is ambiguous (contrary to a previous criticism by Baumrim), and the present author favors the line that “prima facie” obligations are real obligations which continue to exist even when over-ridden; (3) that the notion of “exception to a “prima facie” duty” seems to be either senseless or artificial which poses a somewhat different problem about “exceptions” than the one Shope claimed to find in Ross.”

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