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Literatur zum ethischen Relativismus Bibliography on ethical relativism

Alphabetische Ordnung / alphabetical order:

<http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/brelativ.pdf>

Chronologische Ordnung / reverse chronological order:

<http://www.ethikseite.de/bib/crelativ.pdf>

- 2025 [1] Sagar, Paul (2025): Bernard Williams and the Relativism of Distance: A Defence, *European Journal of Philosophy* 33, S. 839–53. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13070>
- 2023 [2] Sodoma, Katharina Anna (2023): Moral Relativism, Metalinguistic Negotiation, and the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, *Erkenntnis* 88, S. 1621–41.¹
- 2023 [3] Wong, David B. (2023): *Moral Relativism and Pluralism*, Cambridge.
- 2020 [4] Baghrarian, Maria/Coliva, Annalisa (2020): *Relativism*, New York, S. 225–55 (“Relativizing Moral Values”).

¹ “Although moral relativists often appeal to cases of apparent moral disagreement between members of different communities to motivate their view, accounting for these exchanges as evincing genuine disagreements constitutes a challenge to the coherence of moral relativism. While many moral relativists acknowledge this problem, attempts to solve it so far have been wanting. In response, moral relativists either give up the claim that there can be moral disagreement between members of different communities or end up with a view on which these disagreements have no “epistemic significance” because they are always faultless. This paper introduces an alternative strategy: accounting for disagreement in terms of “metalinguistic negotiation”. It argues that this strategy constitutes a better solution to the challenge disagreement poses for moral relativists because it leads to a nuanced understanding of the epistemic significance of moral disagreement between members of different communities. The upshot is a novel account of disagreement for moral relativists that has consequences for how moral relativism should be understood.”

- 2019 [5] Li, Yong (2019): Moral Ambivalence: Relativism or Pluralism? *Acta Analytica* 34, S. 473–91.²
- 2019 [6] Wong, David B. (2019): Relativism and Pluralism in Moral Epistemology, in *The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology*, hrsg. von Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones und Mark Timmons, New York, S. 316–328.
- 2019 [7] Wreen, Michael (2019): Moral Relativism and Majority Rule, *Metaphilosophy* 50, S. 361–76.³
- 2018 [8] Flikschuh, Katrin (2018): Kant’s Contextualism, *Kantian Review* 23, S. 555–79.⁴
- 2018 [9] Wiersbinski, Peter (2018): Interpersonales Dilemma statt irrtumsfreie Nichtübereinstimmung: Ein anderer Blick auf das Phänomen, das den moralischen Relativismus motiviert

² “When we disagree with each other at the beginning of a debate, we are confident that we are right and the other side is just wrong (More discussions on moral disagreement can be seen at Rowland in *Philosophy Compass* 12(2), 2017). But at the end of the debate, we could be persuaded that we are wrong and the other side is right. This happens a lot when we disagree on empirical or factual claims. However, when we disagree with each other on moral issues, it is quite rare that either side is persuaded. We could be frustrated by the other’s stubbornness. But sometimes we come to see that the other side has a point. Their view seems reasonable. We might even feel that we could have taken their moral perspective and values. This phenomenon of moral ambivalence is discussed extensively by David Wong as part of his argument for moral relativism that there is no single true morality (Wong 2006). Recently, Agustín Vicente and Agustín Arrieta write to refute Wong’s argument (Vicente and Arrieta in *Acta Analytica: International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition* 31:207– 223, 2016). They argue that moral ambivalence is a phenomenon of moral pluralism, the position that there are different acceptable courses of actions, rather than moral relativism (For many readers, moral pluralism is similar to moral relativism. I will specify the difference later). In this paper, I argue that moral ambivalence does not support the kind of moral pluralism that Vicente and Arrieta argue for. Furthermore, I point out that moral ambivalence does not support Wong’s naturalism, the position that morality has human nature constraints, but it does support the kind of relativism that he endorses.”

³ “A number of arguments against relativism are based on the concept of majority rule. Since, the arguments allege, on relativism moral truth is founded on majority opinion, relativism entails that (a) moral progress and reform are impossible, (b) propaganda, advertising, brainwashing, and high birth rates turn mistaken moral judgments into correct ones, (c) moral horrors, if enough people believe them acceptable, are not moral horrors at all, (d) finding out what’s right and what’s wrong is extremely easy, (e) moral reasoning is very different from what we normally take it to be, and (f) internal criticism of a moral code is impossible. These arguments get their due in this article, which first de-fines and explicates relativism and then exposes, explains, and criticizes the arguments. Especially important to understand about the relation between relativism and majority opinion is the notion of a convention. Accordingly, it is discussed at some length.”

⁴ “This article builds on David Velleman’s recent work on moral relativism to argue that Kant’s account of moral judgement is best read in a contextualist manner. More specifically, I argue that while for Kant the form of moral judgement is invariant, substantive moral judgements are nonetheless context-dependent. The same form of moral willing can give rise to divergent substantive judgements. To some limited extent, Kantian contextualism is a development out of Rawlsian constructivism. Yet while for constructivists the primary concern is with the derivation of generally valid principles of morality, Velleman’s Kant-inspired form of moral relativism demonstrates the indispensability to a Kantian approach of indexical reasons for action. I argue in turn that Velleman’s focus on the indexical nature of reasons for action must be supplemented by an account of agential reflexivity. The latter divides Kantian contextualism from Kantian relativism.”

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- 2017 [11] Liessmann, Konrad Paul (2017): Ethischer Relativismus – alles eine Frage der Perspektive?, in *Alles relativ? Ethische Orientierungen zwischen Beliebigkeit und Verantwortung*, hrsg. von Mathias Lindenau und Marcel Meier Kressig, Bielefeld 2017, S. 27–47.
- 2016 [12] Braun, Florian (2016): *Der ethische Relativismus als Herausforderung für die ethischen Theorien*, Marburg.
- 2016 [13] Earp, Brian D. (2016): Between Moral Relativism and Moral Hypocrisy: Reframing the Debate on 'FGM,' *Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal* 26, S. 105–144. (Dazu: Richard A. Shweder: Equality Now in Genital Reshaping. Brian Earp's Search for Moral Consistency, S. 145–54; Jamie Lindemann Nelson: Relativists and Hypocrites. Earp on Genital Cutting, S. 165–72.).
- 2016 [14] Harth, Manfred (2016): Untergräbt der Relativismus die Autorität der Moral und die regulative Funktion ihrer Wahrheit? *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 93, 291–322.⁷
- 2016 [15] Kölbel, Max (2016): Relativismus, in *Grundkurs Metaethik*, hrsg. von Markus Rüter, Münster, S. 91–99.
- 2016 [16] O'Connor, David (2016): Moral Relativism and the Euthyphro Dilemma, *Think* 15, S. 71–78.

⁵ „Relativisten wollen erklären, wie es möglich ist, dass X urteilt „A soll vollzogen werden“ und Y urteilt „A soll nicht vollzogen werden“ und beide das Wahre urteilen. Sowohl indexikalistische Relativisten als auch Wahrheitsrelativisten gehen dabei vom Verhältnis der Negation zwischen den Urteilen aus. Wahrheitsrelativisten halten dafür, dass im ersten Urteil ein Inhalt akzeptiert wird, der im zweiten abgelehnt wird, und dass die Wahrheit beider Urteile durch verschiedene moralische Standards zu evaluieren ist. Indexikalisten denken, dass im ersten Urteil ein anderer Inhalt akzeptiert wird, als im zweiten abgelehnt wird, und dass der Inhalt beider Urteile durch verschiedene Standards determiniert wird. Ich argumentiere zum einen, dass keine der beiden Positionen verständlich machen kann, weshalb die beiden Urteile unvereinbar sind. Zum anderen schlage ich vor, die Unvereinbarkeit der Urteile als interpersonales Dilemma zu deuten, also als praktischen Konflikt zwischen wahren moralischen Urteilen. Dieser Vorschlag kann das Negationsverhältnis zwischen den Urteilen als Implikation des Konflikts verständlich machen. Er ist außerdem ebenso offen für eine relativistische wie für eine universalistische Semantik moralischer Begriffe.“

⁶ “The main aim of this paper is to advance, clarify, and defend a definition of relativism. On the definition, relativism does not contrast with absolutism, is not the same as pluralism, contrasts with universalism and nihilism, and is compatible with both moral objectivity and moral subjectivity. Advantages of the definition are noted, but the bulk of the paper is devoted to detailed discussions of the concepts that figure in the definition or are entailed by it. Such concepts include those of a moral code, of conflict between moral codes, and of a convention.”

⁷ “In this article, various objections will be discussed that have been put forward against ethical relativism, but which haven't been considered seriously enough on the part of relativists and have been overrated on the part of their opponents. The objections will be concentrated into three arguments: the action-theoretic, the epistemological and the truth-theoretic argument. The article will discuss whether they can be rebutted by proponents of the two main types of relativism: indexical relativism and truth-relativism. The conclusion will be as follows: (i) one version of indexical relativism, the analytical version, gets into serious troubles by the action-theoretic argument, while its revisionary version will remain unaffected, (ii) the epistemological argument fails with respect to indexical relativism and stands on shaky ground as regards truth-relativism, (iii) the truth-theoretic argument puts considerable pressure (solely) on truth-relativism.”

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- 2015 [18] Muders, Sebastian (2015): *Richtig und doch falsch? Der Wahrheits- und Rechtfertigungsbegriff des metaethischen Relativismus*, Münster.⁸
- 2014 [19] Xiao, Yang/Huang, Yong (Hrsg.): *Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy. David Wong and His Critics*, Albany, NY.⁹
- 2013 [20] Fricker, Miranda (2013): Styles of Moral Relativism: A Critical Family Tree, in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics*, hrsg. von Roger Crisp, Oxford, S. 793–817.
- 2013 [21] Olinder, Ragnar Francén (2013): Moral Relativism, Error Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes, *Journal of Philosophy* 110, S. 564–80.
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- 2013 [23] Velleman, J. David (2013): *Foundations for Moral Relativism*, OpenBook Publishers: <http://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/181>
- 2012 [24] Quintelier, Katinka J. P. und Fessler, Daniel M. T. (2011): Varying Versions of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of normative Relativism, *Biology and Philosophy* 27, S. 95–113.¹⁰

⁸ „Welche Wahlmöglichkeiten haben Vertreter des metaethischen Relativismus hinsichtlich des Wahrheits- und Rechtfertigungsbegriffs, den sie für ihre Position in Anspruch nehmen? Und wie wirkt sich ihre Entscheidung auf die Plausibilität dieser Theorie aus? Anhand des bestehenden Angebots prominenter Wahrheits- und Rechtfertigungskonzeptionen, so der erste Teil der in diesem Buch vertretenen Antwort, ergibt sich für den Verfechter einer relativistischen Position zunächst eine breitere Auswahl als gemeinhin angenommen. Betrachtet man jedoch für den zweiten Teil der Ausgangsfrage die konkrete Verwendung dieser Wahrheits- und Rechtfertigungsbegriffe in führenden metaethisch-relativistischen Theorien, fällt auf, dass die an sie herangetragenen Anforderungen für sie aufgrund anderweitiger theorieinterner Entscheidungen umso schwieriger einzuhalten sind, je puristischer die Positionen auftreten. Varianten des Relativismus, die sich stärker zu ihren realistischen/objektivistischen Kontrahenten hin orientieren, können diese Anforderungen besser integrieren; dafür entstehen hier Spannungen zu den verbleibenden relativistisch geprägten Elementen dieser Theorien.“

⁹ Introduction (Yong Huang and Yang Xiao). Part I: Critical Essays. 2. Human Morality, Naturalism, and Accommodation (Lawrence Blum). 3. Naturalism and Pluralistic Relativism (Steven F. Geisz and Brook J. Sadler). 4. Principle of Humanity vs. Principle of Charity (Chad Hansen). 5. Naturalism, Relativism, and the Authority of Morality (Christopher W. Gowans). 6. The Metaphysics and Semantics of Moral Relativism (Paul Bloomfield and Daniel Massey). 7. Toward a Benign Moral Relativism: From the Agent/Appraiser-Centered to the Patient-Centered (Yong Huang). Part II: David Wong’s Responses to Critics. 8. Response to Blum. 9. Response to Geisz and Sadler. 10. Response to Hansen. 11. Response to Gowans. 12. Response to Bloomfield and Massey. 13. Response to Huang. Contributors. Index.

¹⁰ “Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual’s moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers’ normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss

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- 2011 [26] Balaguer, Mark (2011): Bare Bones Moral Realism and the Objections from Relativism, in *A Companion to Relativism*, hrsg. von Steven D. Hales, Oxford, S. 368–90.
- 2011 [27] Bilgrami, Akeel (2011): Secularism, Liberalism, and Relativism, in *A Companion to Relativism*, hrsg. von Steven D. Hales, Oxford, S. 326–45.
- 2011 [28] Boghossian, Paul (2011): The Maze of Moral Relativism, *The New York Times. Opinionator. Exclusive Online Commentary from the Times*, July 24, 2011: <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/the-maze-of-moral-relativism/>
- 2011 [29] Ernst, Gerhard (2011): Two Kinds of Moral Relativism, in *Comparing Ethics in Ancient China and Greco-Roman Antiquity*, hrsg. von R. A. H. King und Dennis Schilling, Berlin, S. 25–34.
- 2011 [30] Fisher, Andrew (2011): *Metaethics: An Introduction*, Durham, S. 111–26 (“Moral Relativism”).
- 2011 [31] Gowans, Christopher W. (2011): Virtue Ethics and Moral Relativism, in *A Companion to Relativism*, hrsg. von Steven D. Hales, Oxford, S. 391–410.
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- 2011 [33] Mende, Janne (2011): *Begründungsmuster weiblicher Genitalverstümmelung. Zur Vermittlung von Kulturrelativismus und Universalismus*, Bielefeld.
- 2011 [34] Miller, Christian B. (2011): Moral Relativism and Moral Psychology, in *A Companion to Relativism*, hrsg. von Steven D. Hales, Oxford, S. 346–67.
- 2011 [35] Park, Seungbae (2011): Defence of Cultural Relativism, *Cultura. International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology* 8, S. 159–70.¹¹
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- 2010 [37] Beebe, James R. (2010): Moral Relativism in Context, *Noûs* 44, S. 691–724.
- 2010 [38] Dimitrijevic, Nenad (2010): Moral Knowledge and Mass Crime. A Critical Reading of Moral Relativism, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 36, S. 131–56.¹²

recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future.”

¹¹ “I attempt to rebut the following standard objections against cultural relativism: 1. It is self-defeating for a cultural relativist to take the principle of tolerance as absolute; 2. There are universal moral rules, contrary to what cultural relativism claims; 3. If cultural relativism were true, Hitler’s genocidal actions would be right, social reformers would be wrong to go against their own culture, moral progress would be impossible, and an atrocious crime could be made moral by forming a culture which approves of it; 4. Cultural relativism is silent about how large a group must be in order to be a culture, and which culture we should follow when we belong to two cultures with conflicting moralities.”

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- 2009 [44] Capps, David/Lynch, Michael P./Massey, Daniel (2009): A Coherent Moral Relativism, *Synthese* 166, S. 413–30.¹⁴
- 2009 [45] Corradetti, Claudio (2009): *Relativism and Human Rights. A Theory of Pluralistic Universalism*, Dordrecht, S. 35–69. 2. Auflage: Dordrecht 2022, S. 37–74 (2 Beyond Moral Relativism and Objectivism. 2.1 Forms of Moral Relativism. 2.2 The Two Horns of the Dilemma: Relativism versus Objectivism. 2.2.1 Harman's Inner-Judgments Relativism. 2.2.2 The Limits of Nagel's Objectivism in Morality. 2.3 Wong's Mixed Position: the Idea of Pluralistic Relativism. 2.4 Discursive Dialectic of Recognition: for a Post-Metaphysical Justification of the Ethical Life).
- 2009 [46] Dreier, James (2009): Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement, *Philo-*

¹² "In this article I ask how moral relativism applies to the analysis of responsibility for mass crime. The focus is on the critical reading of two influential relativist attempts to offer a theoretically consistent response to the challenges imposed by extreme criminal practices. First, I explore Gilbert Harman's analytical effort to conceptualize the reach of moral discourse. According to Harman, mass crime creates a contextually specific relationship to which moral judgments do not apply any more. Second, I analyze the inability thesis, which claims that the agents of mass crime are not able to distinguish between right and wrong. Richard Arneson, Michael Zimmerman and Geoffrey Scarre do not deny the moral wrongness of crime. However, having introduced the claim of authenticity as a specific feature of the inability thesis, they maintain that killers are not responsible. I argue that these positions do not hold. The relativist failure to properly conceptualize responsibility for mass crime follows from the mistaken view of moral autonomy, which then leads to the erroneous explanation of the establishment, authority and justification of moral judgments."

¹³ „In diesem Buch wird nach einem Überblick über die Ideengeschichte relativistischen Denkens sowie einer systematischen Darstellung philosophischer und religiöser Relativismuskritik der Versuch unternommen, relativistischem Denken von der Beobachtung der moralischen Vielfalt über ihre Deutung bis hin zu normativen Implikationen nachzuspüren. Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung werden schließlich aktuellen gesellschafts- und globalpolitischen Diskursen zugeführt.“

¹⁴ "Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face."

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- 2009 [57] Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm (2009): Vermeidbare und unvermeidbare Relativitäten, in *Moralischer Relativismus*, hrsg. von Gerhard Ernst, Paderborn, S. 231–55.
- 2008 [58] Billet, Bret L. (2008): *Cultural Relativism in the Face of the West. The Plight of Women and Children*, Houndsmills.¹⁶

¹⁵ “I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent-neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and include at least some prescriptions that include ineliminable indexicals. I argue that there are no rational means of bridging the gap between the two types of theories; nevertheless this does not necessitate skepticism about the moral – we might instead opt for an ethical relativism in which the truth of moral statements is relativized to the perspective of moral theories on either side of the schism. Such a relativism does not mean that any ethical theory is as good as any other; some cannot be held in reflective equilibrium, and even among those that can, there may well be pragmatic reasons that motivate the selection of one theory over another. But if no sort of relativism is deemed acceptable, then it is hard to avoid moral skepticism.”

¹⁶ “The idea of universal human rights has been perhaps the most contentious concept of the twentieth century. Originally presented as a response to the atrocities of the past and an attempt to stifle the

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- 2008 [61] Mosteller, Timothy (2008): *Relativism: A Guide for the Perplexed*, London, S. 43–57 (“Ethical Relativism”).
- 2008 [62] Schaber, Peter (2008): Ethischer Relativismus: eine kohärente Doktrin? In *Gibt es eine universale Bioethik?*, hrsg. von Nikola Biller-Andorno, Peter Schaber und Annette Schulz-Baldes, Paderborn, S. 159–67.
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potential ills of the future, the concept has been under heated assault by adherents to the concept of ‘cultural relativism.’ The basic conflict between these two extreme perspectives lies with the degree to which either should be the primary consideration when dealing with the great diversity of peoples worldwide. While proponents of universal human rights believe that a fundamental group of human rights exist and can be applied uniformly throughout the world, cultural relativists are primarily concerned with protecting and understanding, usually in functionalist terms, the diversity of cultures worldwide. This overarching conflict is the underlying focus of ‘Cultural Relativism in the Face of the West’. Billet examines the debate between the uniform application of universal human rights and cultural relativism. In so doing, Billet outlines the foundations of both schools of thought and provides a history of their evolution. The book also examines case studies that involve either women or children and are typically viewed by the West as violations of fundamental human rights.

Table of contents: Introduction: Universal Human Rights versus Cultural Relativism. Female Circumcision. Female Infanticide. Female Child Prostitution. Female Child Labour. Trafficking Women and Female Slave Labour. Conclusions and Implications. Bibliography. Index.”

¹⁷ “Chapter 1: Subjectivism, Some Cultural Differences, and Cultural Moral Relativism. Chapter 2: A Remembered Incident, Human Rights as a “Higher Standard,” and Arguments against Cultural Moral Relativism. Chapter 3: More on “Higher Standards,” Arguments against Subjectivism, Why Maria is not a Cultural Moral Relativist, and Manners vs Morality. Chapter 4: Tolerance, Conscience, Moral Universals, Ethnocentrism, and Moral Absolutes. Chapter 5: Modified Cultural Moral Relativism and Qualified Subjectivism. Chapter 6: Moral Relativism vs Moral Absolutism, the Determining Type of Moral Relativism vs the Varying Type, Vishnu Sums Up, and Different Kinds of Cultural Differences Revisited.”

¹⁸ „Im vorliegenden Aufsatz werden die begrifflichen Verbindungen zwischen dem Standpunkt des Wertrelativismus und dem Toleranzgrundsatz erörtert sowie die beiden im gegebenen Zusammenhang vorgebrachten Einwände des Trugschlusses und der fehlenden Begründung für die vorausgesetzte Toleranzbereitschaft diskutiert. Anhand eingehender Argumentation wird gezeigt, dass jene Einwände der tatsächlichen konzeptionellen Struktur entsprechender relativistischer Lehren und ihren möglichen Ausformungen nicht ganz gerecht werden. Somit kann der relativistische Standpunkt erhalten bleiben.“

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- 2007 [66] Prinz, Jesse (2007): *The Emotional Construction of Morals*, Oxford.²⁰
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¹⁹ “I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents – should any exist – who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid; and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people’s wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts.”

²⁰ “Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection.

In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing our emotions. Prinz argues that these emotions do not track objective features of reality; rather, the rightness and wrongness of an act consists in the fact that people are disposed to have certain emotions towards it. In the second half of the book, he turns to a defence of moral relativism. Moral facts depend on emotional responses, and emotional responses vary from culture to culture. Prinz surveys the anthropological record to establish moral variation, and he draws on cultural history to show how attitudes toward practices such as cannibalism and marriage change over time. He also criticizes evidence from animal behaviour and child development that has been taken to support the claim that moral attitudes are hard-wired by natural selection. Prinz concludes that there is no single true morality, but he also argues that some moral values are better than others; moral progress is possible.

Throughout the book, Prinz relates his views to contemporary and historical work in philosophical ethics. His views echo themes in the writings of David Hume and Friedrich Nietzsche, but Prinz supports, extends, and revises these classic theories using the resources of cutting-edge cognitive science. *The Emotional Construction of Morals* will stimulate and challenge anyone who is curious about the nature and origin of moral values.”

²¹ “Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this

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action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person’s moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person’s moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.”

²² “In formulating this collection, Don Browning asked his contributors to respond to a simple question: has moral relativism run its course? The threats of terrorism, reproductive technology, and globalization have forced us to ask anew whether there are universal moral truths upon which to base political and ethical judgments. In this timely edited collection, distinguished scholars present and test the best answers to this question. This dialogue includes contributions from widely-recognized scholars Richard Bernstein, Amitai Etzioni, Jean Bethke Elshtain, William Galston, Franklin Gamwell, Timothy Jackson, James Turner Johnson, John Kelsay, and Jean Porter.

Although the conflict between universalism and relativism is a complex issue with many parts, the contributors to this volume tackle the question at hand in an engaging, thought-provoking manner. These insightful responses temper the strong antithesis between universalism and relativism and retain sensitivity to how language and history shape the context of our moral decisions. This important and relevant work of contemporary political and social thought is ideal for use in the classroom across many disciplines including political science, philosophy, ethics, theology, and law.

Contents: Preface. List of Contributors. Introduction (Don Browning). Part I: Foundationalism v. Antifoundationalism. Can We Justify Moral Norms? (Richard J. Bernstein). Self-Evident Truth (Beyond Relativism) (Amitai Etzioni). The Origin of Moral Norms (Franklin I. Gamwell). Part II: Approaches from Human Nature. Moral Ideals and Human Nature (Jean Porter). Can We Justify Universal Moral Norms? Yes, with Qualifications (William Galston). Part III: Common Ground through Historical Understanding. Searching for Common Ground: Ethical Tradition at the Interface with International Law (James Turner Johnson). Christians, Muslims, and the Conduct of War (John Kelsay). Part IV: Multidimensional Approaches. Universalism and Relativism: Some Lessons from Gandhi (Timothy Jackson). Concrete Levels of Being and Their Political Implications (Jean Bethke Elshtain). Response (Richard J. Bernstein). Response (Amitai Etzioni).”

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²³ “Contents: Introduction. Part I: Living with Cultural Paradoxes. Paradoxes of Culture. The Ethical Significance of Culture. A Cultural Critique of Cultural Relativism. Part II: Transcending Dichotomies. Destructive of Cultural Community? Intolerant of Cultural Pluralism? Part III: Human Rights: The View from Anywhere. Cross-Cultural via the Inter-Subjective. From Human Values to Inherent Rights. From Practical Reasons to Extrinsic Rights. An Unfair Utopia?”

²⁴ “To be called a relativist, especially a moral relativist, is to be condemned as someone who holds that no objective values exist, and that in essence “anything goes.” This is as true in moral philosophy as it is in public circles where a social or religious conservative might use the term. Frequently the term is part of a dichotomy: either accept relativism or accept absolutism and universalism – the views that only one true morality exists and that it holds no matter the situation.

David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of relativism that is both an alternative to, and fits between, universalism and the usual definition of relativism. He does agree with one aspect of relativism: there is no single true morality. Beyond that, he proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities, moralities that exist across different traditions and cultures, all of which address facets of the same problem: how we are to live well together. Wong examines a wide array of positions and texts within the Western canon as well as in Chinese philosophy, and draws on philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, history, and literature, to make a case for the importance of pluralism in moral life, and to establish the virtues of acceptance and accommodation. Wong's point is that there is no single value or principle or ordering of values and principles that offers a uniquely true path for human living, but variations according to different contexts that carry within them a common core of human values. We should thus be modest about our own morality, learn from other approaches, and accommodate different practices in our pluralistic society.

Contents: I. How Pluralism and Naturalism Make for Natural Moralities. 1. Pluralism and Ambivalence. 2. Pluralistic Relativism. 3. Objections and Replies. II. Constraints on Natural Moralities. 4. Identity, Flourishing, and Relationship. 5. Community and Liberal Theory. 6. Does Psychological Realism Constrain the Content of Moralities? III. Having Confidence in Our Moral Commitments. 7. Moral Reasons – Internal and External. 8. Morality and Need. 9. Coping with Moral Difference. Bibliography. Index.”

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²⁸ "The multicultural composition of the United States can pose problems for physicians and patients who come from diverse backgrounds. Although respect for cultural diversity mandates tolerance of the beliefs and practices of others, in some situations excessive tolerance can produce harm to patients. Careful analysis is needed to determine which values are culturally relative and which rest on an underlying universal ethical principle. A conception of justice as equality challenges the notion that it is always necessary to respect all of the beliefs and practices of every cultural group."

²⁹ "The paper undertakes a critical examination of three key strands – relativism, antirealism, and reflection – in Bernard Williams's sceptical interpretation of ethical thought. The anti-realist basis of Williams's 'relativism' of distance' is identified and the way this threatens to render his relativism more subversive than initially appears. Focusing on Williams's anti-realism, the paper argues that it fails because it is caught on the horns of a dilemma: either it draws on a conception of reality that is metaphysically incoherent, or else it employs a 'best explanation' criterion that question-beggingly excludes from further consideration the sort of reason-based explanations that disclose ethical properties to be real. Finally, it is noted that Williams's relativism and anti-realism destabilize his picture of ethical reflection."

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